The resize tab enabled disk growth only for a shut-off VM, although
resize_disk already grows a running domain's disk through blockResize.
The button is now enabled for running and paused VMs too. A live test
grows qcow2 and raw disks of a running and of a paused VM and checks the
size the guest sees, the volume size, the unchanged persistent definition
and the state.
A VM that disappears from its compute keeps its owners in a tombstone
until INSTANCE_OWNERSHIP_RETENTION_DAYS pass, but nothing showed them.
Superusers now see them on the "Removed VMs" admin page (name, UUID,
owners, removed, expires) and can remove one, so a VM deleted on
purpose no longer hands its owners to a later VM with the same UUID.
The host commands hard-coded www-data, which does not exist on RHEL and
openSUSE (the panel runs as nginx there), so the first command failed
with "invalid user". The user is now set once in U and its home is read
with getent, since ~$U is not expanded. The host block also ends with
the same connection check as the Docker one.
Both blocks are labelled, and the step says to use only the one for the
installation type: a key set up on the host is not seen by the panel in
Docker.
AGENTS.md is a local agent file and is ignored.
The README gave host commands (sudo, ~www-data) and one sentence for
Docker, where there is no sudo and exec runs as root: a key made that way
lands in /root/.ssh, which the panel (www-data) does not use, and the
first connection fails with "Host key verification failed". Docker now
has its own commands, run as www-data, ending with a connection check.
Both variants accept a new host key once (accept-new) instead of
disabling host key checking.
Power cycle force-stopped and started a template, which power on refuses.
A non-staff owner with is_delete could delete a template that the
template rule otherwise leaves to superusers and staff owners;
get_instance(perm_type="delete") now refuses it, and the page offers
Destroy by the same rule.
gstfsd mounted every partition it listed: a root on LVM was never found,
a disk with two OS roots got the change twice and two concatenated
replies, and no root, an error or a request longer than 1024 bytes ended
the connection without a reply. It now lets libguestfs inspect the guest,
mounts its one OS the way the guest does (a broken filesystem off the
changed path is left out), and sends exactly one reply, keeping the first
error. The root entry is found on any line of /etc/shadow and must be
unique; a key needs no shadow file. A request is at most 64 KiB. Each
change runs in a worker process with a directly started appliance; both
are killed when the request is not done 100 s after gstfsd accepted it
(GSTFSD_DEADLINE may only lower that), before the panel's 120 s timeout
releases the VM, or when the panel's connection ends, and the reply waits
until they are gone, so nothing touches the disk once the panel has given
up. A worker that dies says why. The panel
connects over IPv4 or IPv6, sends the whole request and reads the reply
until gstfsd closes.
The documented rule held only for snapshots: an owner with is_change could
still resize a template, set its root password and SSH keys, change its
options and console settings. get_instance(perm_type="change") now
refuses a template to owners who are not staff, which covers every change
view and the API; the per-view snapshot checks it replaces are removed,
and the page offers those controls by the same rule. Viewing, the console,
power (a no-op on a template) and cloning are unchanged.
The README grew as a list of per-change notes. Reorder it along the
operator's path (install, first login, compute node, configuration,
update, usage, development) and correct what no longer matched the code:
supported distros and Python, the openSUSE nginx step that installed a
full nginx.conf as a vhost, the disabled serial console listed as a
feature, missing ALLOWED_HOSTS and file-mode steps, services not
restarted, and an update path that copied settings blocks by hand
instead of rebuilding settings.py from the template with the panel
stopped.
OTP (OTP_ENABLED) was enforced only by the HTML login form, but two other
doors let an enrolled user authenticate with a password and no token, so a
leaked password defeated the second factor. Both were reproduced with a
confirmed TOTP device: /api-auth/login/ (DRF's browsable-API login) created a
site-wide session, and DRF's default BasicAuthentication let every /api/v1/
endpoint accept HTTP Basic credentials.
The api-auth/ include is removed, so the only interactive login is the
OTP-aware form at /accounts/login/; the browsable API still works with the
session that form sets. REST_FRAMEWORK now pins DEFAULT_AUTHENTICATION_CLASSES
to SessionAuthentication only, so the API requires a session and no longer
accepts a password over HTTP Basic. A session therefore implies the OTP factor
was met. Password-based programmatic API access is intentionally dropped.
The authorization matrix drops its rest_framework:login/logout allowlist
entries (the routes are gone). New tests assert the browsable login route is
removed, HTTP Basic is rejected on the API, Basic is not a default auth class,
and a session still reaches the API. Verified live with OTP_ENABLED that
/api-auth/login/ is 404 and an API Basic request is 403.
With "VM Clone Auto Migrate" on, a new clone was migrated to a random
compute, whatever storage, CPU or network that host had, and a failed
migration showed as a failed clone although the clone existed.
The setting and its code are removed; migration appsettings.0015
deletes the setting. A clone can be migrated afterwards like any VM.
The README's update notes list the migration changes: the migration
address, storage pools for the disk check, and this setting.
Nothing limited failed logins: a password could be guessed at the speed
the server answers. django-axes (8.3.1, Django 5.2, Python 3.10-3.13)
now counts them.
- A user is locked for the address the failed logins come from
(username and IP together), so an attacker cannot lock someone out
from elsewhere and users behind one NAT address do not share a lock.
A successful login resets the count. axes sits in front of every
authentication: the login page with or without OTP, LDAP and the API.
- The number of failed logins (default 5) and the lock time in minutes
(default 15) are on the Settings page (LOGIN_FAILURE_LIMIT,
LOGIN_LOCKOUT_MINUTES, added by migration appsettings.0014) and apply
at once; an invalid value falls back to the default. Unlock with
"manage.py axes_reset_username <username>".
- Behind the bundled nginx every request comes from 127.0.0.1; the
client address is read from X-Real-IP, which nginx sets, but only for
requests from a loopback address or from LOGIN_TRUSTED_PROXIES, so a
forged header does not escape a lock.
settings.py.template gets the app, middleware, backend and AXES_*
settings; README tells existing installations what to copy. Tests that
call client.login now pass a request, which the axes backend needs.
The new tests fail with axes disabled.
SHOW_PROFILE_EDIT_PASSWORD was replaced in 2020 by the change_password
permission, settable per user or group. A post_migrate hook applied the
old setting to all users so existing installs kept their behavior, and
asked to remove the setting afterwards; but the settings template still
set it to True. Every migrate, so every upgrade, therefore granted the
permission to all users again and undid an admin's per-user or
per-group choice (with False it would have revoked it from everyone).
- Migration accounts.0008 applies the setting one last time, if a
settings.py still has it; the post_migrate hook is gone.
- New users get the permission when they are created (any path,
including LDAP); the admin user form ticks it and saves the admin's
choice afterwards.
- The template no longer sets SHOW_PROFILE_EDIT_PASSWORD; a check
(accounts.W001) asks to remove it from existing settings, and the
README upgrade notes say so.
The test that removes the permission and runs migrate fails on the
previous code. An upgrade from master with users was simulated: the
setting is applied once, and a permission removed afterwards stays
removed through the next migrate.
The live tests so far ran VMs without an OS, so everything that needs the
guest's cooperation was untested. With TEST_LIBVIRT_GUEST_IMAGE set to an
installed Linux image with qemu-guest-agent, instances/test_live_guest.py
boots wvc-test VMs from qcow2 overlays of it (the image is only read) and
checks through the web views:
- delete_vol on a running VM: the guest releases the disk, so it leaves
the live and persistent definitions and the volume is deleted;
- detach_vol removes the disk from the running guest and keeps the volume;
- add_network/delete_network: the guest sees the hotplugged NIC, and the
unplug completes in both definitions;
- set_vcpu brings a hotplugged vCPU online in the guest;
- osinfo returns the guest agent's OS, time zone and host name, and the
agent reports the VM's NIC by MAC;
- poweroff shuts the guest down through libvirt.
The image must be a BIOS-bootable qcow2 volume in a storage pool other
than wvc-test; the tests are skipped while a running VM uses it. They pass
against a Rocky Linux 9 guest on a RHEL qemu-kvm host; the guest had no
address on the NAT network (its network configuration is static), so only
the agent's NIC report is checked, not an address.
django-login-required-middleware is dropped; Django 5.1+ ships the same
middleware. The login page is already marked login_not_required by
Django; email_otp gets the decorator, which replaces
LOGIN_REQUIRED_IGNORE_VIEW_NAMES. The datasource still requires login.
Existing settings.py files still name the old middleware. A system
check (accounts.E002) stops migrate and the server until MIDDLEWARE
uses Django's middleware, instead of an ImportError at startup; the
README has the steps.
A new matrix test walks every URL anonymously: everything outside a
short allowlist (login pages, the OpenAPI docs) sends the visitor to
the login page, and API views deny with 401/403. It passed with the old
middleware first and passes unchanged now.
Django 4.2 reached end of life on 2026-04-07.
- Django==5.2.17; django-login-required-middleware 0.9.0 keeps working
(the authorization matrix passes).
- USE_L10N removed from the settings template.
- Log out is a POST form in the navbar; Django 5 removed GET logout.
- pip-audit in CI no longer ignores the Django 4.2.30 advisories.
- README: Django 5.2, backup step and upgrade notes for existing
settings and GET logout callers.
python -Wd manage.py test shows no Django deprecation warnings. The live
libvirt suite passes on 5.2 and on 4.2 against a RHEL qemu-kvm host.
- Runs only when TEST_LIBVIRT_HOST is set, so manage.py test on a
developer machine no longer creates VMs on the local libvirtd.
- Every VM and volume is named wvc-test-*, and volumes live in a
temporary wvc-test pool (/var/lib/libvirt/wvc-test) instead of the
default pool next to real images.
- Cleanup removes only prefixed domains and the test pool's volumes;
it also clears leftovers of an interrupted run before starting, and
tolerates domains that turned transient.
- tearDownClass fails if any domain or volume outside the test
namespace appeared, disappeared or was replaced.
- livetest gains create_volume/define_vm helpers and
test_live_dataloss.py, whose setUpClass opens the class transaction
last, so a failed libvirt connection cannot lock the test database
for later test classes.
The first live tests reproduce two known external-snapshot data losses
and are marked expectedFailure: reverting deletes a disk added after
the snapshot, and deleting the older of two snapshots deletes the
newer one's overlay.
- Pick the test VM by name; .first() could select any VM already on
the compute, and tearDownClass deletes the chosen VM's disks.
- Delete the test volume when setUpClass fails after creating it.
- test-vm.xml: no hard-coded emulator, machine alias q35 instead of
pc-q35-5.1, so it defines on RHEL qemu-kvm hosts too.
- Follow current behavior: power actions are POST-only, the create
form needs add_cdrom/add_input and VNC, cloning needs change
permission on the source VM.
- README: the tests read TEST_LIBVIRT_HOST/TYPE/LOGIN/PASSWORD;
WEBVIRTCLOUD_TEST_LIBVIRT_URI never existed.
- Matrix 3.10-3.13; pip cache keyed on the requirements.
- New steps: makemigrations --check, spectacular --validate
--fail-on-warn, check --deploy --fail-level ERROR, pip-audit of the
installed environment (the Django 4.2.30 advisories are ignored until
the Django 5.2 upgrade), and a Docker image build.
- The separate vrtManager unittest run is dropped; manage.py test
already runs those tests.
- CodeQL also runs on pull requests to master.
- Docker installs into a plain venv instead of using the distro's
python3-lxml and python3-libvirt; lxml>=6.1, since the distro's
lxml 5.2.1 has CVE-2026-41066.
- dev requirements add ruff and pip-audit.
The forced change of the generated admin password was a session flag
set at login when the password still matched data/admin_password. A
new session after the file was gone bypassed it.
- UserAttributes.must_change_password (migration 0007) holds it; the
admin created with a generated password gets it, and a password
change clears it. ForcePasswordChangeMiddleware reads it.
- A system check (accounts.E001) stops the server unless the middleware
follows AuthenticationMiddleware; the README has the settings change.
- If the generated password cannot be stored privately, provisioning
stops without printing it and without creating the admin (one
transaction for the user and its attributes).
- The admin is provisioned on any real migrate run while no user
exists, so running migrate again after a failure creates it; flush
(plan=None) and rollbacks of accounts are skipped.
- The post_migrate receivers check the migration state for the models
they use, so a targeted migrate on a fresh database (e.g. migrate
appsettings) no longer fails with 'no such table'.
While data/admin_password exists and a user's password still matches it,
the login sets a session flag (checked once at login, not per request).
ForcePasswordChangeMiddleware then sends that user to the password-change
page for every view except change password, login and logout. Setting a
new password clears the flag and deletes data/admin_password. No schema
change; if ADMIN_PASSWORD was set, there is no file and nothing is forced.
- The serial console cannot work until socketiod is rewritten (it does
not understand the signed console token), so the README no longer
describes how to enable it; only the hardening line for existing
installs is kept. The reverse-proxy example no longer sets
SOCKETIO_PUBLIC_PORT.
- Move the users, roles and permissions reference to doc/permissions.md
and link it from the README.
- Hash the root password with a random SHA-512 salt instead of the fixed
"$6$kgPoiREy".
- Talk to gstfsd through one helper with a 120 s socket timeout; an
unreachable daemon or a bad reply is an error message, not a 500.
- gstfsd refuses to listen on a non-loopback address unless
GSTFSD_ALLOW_REMOTE=1: it is an unauthenticated root service.
- gstfsd: encode replies (sendall(str) raised TypeError on Python 3, so
the success path never worked) and use octal chmod modes.
- README: what gstfsd does and how to allow it on a remote compute.
- The generated admin password is written to data/admin_password (mode
0600) instead of being printed, so it no longer ends up in the install
log or `docker logs`. If the file cannot be written it is printed as
before, so the admin is never locked out.
- webvirtcloud.sh no longer echoes the generated SECRET_KEY.
- install.sh creates the install log with mode 0600.
- Comment out the nginx /socket.io/ location: a firewall on 6081 does not
protect a console that nginx proxies on 80/443.
- Default SOCKETIO_HOST to 127.0.0.1.
- README: short enable steps and the changes existing installs need.
- test_socketiod_disabled writes its settings module to a temporary
directory instead of the source tree.
is_staff does not reveal console settings or VNC passwords (fixed on
fix/wave0-staff-console-password), but staff owners with is_change may
also change VMs marked as templates. Superuser-only pages answer 403 to
everyone else, and the console page answers 403 both for a missing VM and
for a VM the user may not open.
Describe the access model: superuser, the global permissions
(view_instances as a read-only auditor role, clone_instances,
snapshot_instances, passwordless_console, change_password) and per-VM
ownership flags (is_change, is_delete, is_vnc), with a table of which
VM actions each combination allows.
The table describes the state after all Wave 0 branches are merged:
disk/media views are superuser-only (fix/wave0-disk-tenant-isolation) and
clone requires is_change except for templates (fix/wave0-clone-permission).
socketiod does not validate the console token, keeps a single global PTY
and broadcasts its output to every connected client, so anyone who can
reach port 6081 can read and write a serial console that someone opened.
It is also broken for legitimate users, since console/views.py now writes
signed tokens that socketiod cannot parse.
Until it is rewritten, turn the serial console off by default:
- Add SERIAL_CONSOLE_ENABLED = False to the settings template; installs
whose settings.py lacks it are treated as disabled.
- The console view shows an error instead of the xterm page for pty
consoles while the setting is off.
- socketiod refuses to start unless SERIAL_CONSOLE_ENABLED is True.
- Supervisor: autostart=false for socketiod; drop -d (debug) from the
supervisor and systemd definitions; fix the systemd unit description;
conf/systemd/install.sh no longer suggests enabling socketiod.
- README: stop opening port 6081 and document how to enable the serial
console on a trusted network.
- Rewrite purpose/features intro around libvirt as single source of truth
- Generate SECRET_KEY into data/secret_key instead of editing settings.py
- Consolidate local development setup into one flow using
--system-site-packages, settings-dev and runserver --nostatic
- Document the generated admin password instead of admin/admin
- Use the shared supervisor config on RHEL (adds missing socketiod)
and add supervisor setup on openSUSE
- Document SOCKETIO_PUBLIC_PORT and CSRF_TRUSTED_ORIGINS for proxies
- Point test setup at the dev virtualenv
- Remove obsolete spice-html5 static assets and SPICE console templates
- Restrict default console types to VNC with migration 0012
- Filter out SPICE in VM creation form and backend capabilities
- Return friendly deprecation notice if legacy VM is opened with SPICE
- Clean up docs, architecture references, and libvirt-bootstrap scripts
- Prevent baking SECRET_KEY into Docker image during collectstatic
- Persist runtime SECRET_KEY in data/secret_key volume or read from environment
- Remove sed-based injection of CSRF_TRUSTED_ORIGINS in favor of native os.getenv
- Avoid overwriting system python3 symlink on SUSE; auto-detect python 3.10+ binaries
- Make /etc/hosts entry in installer idempotent
- Add security notice regarding compute node VNC/SPICE port firewall isolation
- Add python3-libvirt to apt and configure --system-site-packages for zero-compilation build
- Introduce 10_webvirtcloud_init.sh to handle container startup, migrations, and SQLite persistence
- Exclude host settings.py in .dockerignore for clean builds from settings.py.template
- Add docker-compose.yml with persistent data and SSH volume mounts
- Document Docker Compose deployment in README.md
- Configure matrix testing across Python 3.10, 3.11, and 3.12 on ubuntu-latest
- Install system libvirt, ldap, and C build dependencies with pip cache
- Run Django database migrations and test suite
- Run vrtManager unit test discovery with test_*.py pattern
- Fix vrtManager unittest discovery command in README.md
- Relax libvirt-python and lxml version pins to allow precompiled distro packages
- Add PEP 508 environment marker to crypt-r (python_version >= 3.13) to avoid unnecessary C compilation on Python 3.12
- Add stdlib crypt fallback when crypt_r is not available in instances/views.py
- Make LDAP imports and configuration optional in settings.py.template
- Add --system-site-packages and missing packages in webvirtcloud.sh for RHEL/CentOS
- Update README with working Rocky Linux / RHEL / Fedora installation and local dev setup
