tinc/src/protocol_auth.c

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/*
protocol_auth.c -- handle the meta-protocol, authentication
Copyright (C) 1999-2005 Ivo Timmermans,
2000-2013 Guus Sliepen <guus@tinc-vpn.org>
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This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
(at your option) any later version.
This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
GNU General Public License for more details.
You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along
with this program; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc.,
51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
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*/
#include "system.h"
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#include "conf.h"
#include "connection.h"
#include "control.h"
#include "control_common.h"
#include "cipher.h"
#include "crypto.h"
#include "digest.h"
Add an invitation protocol. Using the tinc command, an administrator of an existing VPN can generate invitations for new nodes. The invitation is a small URL that can easily be copy&pasted into email or live chat. Another person can have tinc automatically setup the necessary configuration files and exchange keys with the server, by only using the invitation URL. The invitation protocol uses temporary ECDSA keys. The invitation URL consists of the hostname and port of the server, a hash of the server's temporary ECDSA key and a cookie. When the client wants to accept an invitation, it also creates a temporary ECDSA key, connects to the server and says it wants to accept an invitation. Both sides exchange their temporary keys. The client verifies that the server's key matches the hash in the invitation URL. After setting up an SPTPS connection using the temporary keys, the client gives the cookie to the server. If the cookie is valid, the server sends the client an invitation file containing the client's new name and a copy of the server's host config file. If everything is ok, the client will generate a long-term ECDSA key and send it to the server, which will add it to a new host config file for the client. The invitation protocol currently allows multiple host config files to be send from the server to the client. However, the client filters out most configuration variables for its own host configuration file. In particular, it only accepts Name, Mode, Broadcast, ConnectTo, Subnet and AutoConnect. Also, at the moment no tinc-up script is generated. When an invitation has succesfully been accepted, the client needs to start the tinc daemon manually.
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#include "ecdsa.h"
#include "edge.h"
#include "graph.h"
#include "logger.h"
#include "meta.h"
Add an invitation protocol. Using the tinc command, an administrator of an existing VPN can generate invitations for new nodes. The invitation is a small URL that can easily be copy&pasted into email or live chat. Another person can have tinc automatically setup the necessary configuration files and exchange keys with the server, by only using the invitation URL. The invitation protocol uses temporary ECDSA keys. The invitation URL consists of the hostname and port of the server, a hash of the server's temporary ECDSA key and a cookie. When the client wants to accept an invitation, it also creates a temporary ECDSA key, connects to the server and says it wants to accept an invitation. Both sides exchange their temporary keys. The client verifies that the server's key matches the hash in the invitation URL. After setting up an SPTPS connection using the temporary keys, the client gives the cookie to the server. If the cookie is valid, the server sends the client an invitation file containing the client's new name and a copy of the server's host config file. If everything is ok, the client will generate a long-term ECDSA key and send it to the server, which will add it to a new host config file for the client. The invitation protocol currently allows multiple host config files to be send from the server to the client. However, the client filters out most configuration variables for its own host configuration file. In particular, it only accepts Name, Mode, Broadcast, ConnectTo, Subnet and AutoConnect. Also, at the moment no tinc-up script is generated. When an invitation has succesfully been accepted, the client needs to start the tinc daemon manually.
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#include "names.h"
#include "net.h"
#include "netutl.h"
#include "node.h"
#include "prf.h"
#include "protocol.h"
#include "rsa.h"
#include "sptps.h"
#include "utils.h"
#include "xalloc.h"
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Add an invitation protocol. Using the tinc command, an administrator of an existing VPN can generate invitations for new nodes. The invitation is a small URL that can easily be copy&pasted into email or live chat. Another person can have tinc automatically setup the necessary configuration files and exchange keys with the server, by only using the invitation URL. The invitation protocol uses temporary ECDSA keys. The invitation URL consists of the hostname and port of the server, a hash of the server's temporary ECDSA key and a cookie. When the client wants to accept an invitation, it also creates a temporary ECDSA key, connects to the server and says it wants to accept an invitation. Both sides exchange their temporary keys. The client verifies that the server's key matches the hash in the invitation URL. After setting up an SPTPS connection using the temporary keys, the client gives the cookie to the server. If the cookie is valid, the server sends the client an invitation file containing the client's new name and a copy of the server's host config file. If everything is ok, the client will generate a long-term ECDSA key and send it to the server, which will add it to a new host config file for the client. The invitation protocol currently allows multiple host config files to be send from the server to the client. However, the client filters out most configuration variables for its own host configuration file. In particular, it only accepts Name, Mode, Broadcast, ConnectTo, Subnet and AutoConnect. Also, at the moment no tinc-up script is generated. When an invitation has succesfully been accepted, the client needs to start the tinc daemon manually.
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ecdsa_t *invitation_key = NULL;
static bool send_proxyrequest(connection_t *c) {
switch(proxytype) {
case PROXY_HTTP: {
char *host;
char *port;
sockaddr2str(&c->address, &host, &port);
send_request(c, "CONNECT %s:%s HTTP/1.1\r\n\r", host, port);
free(host);
free(port);
return true;
}
case PROXY_SOCKS4: {
if(c->address.sa.sa_family != AF_INET) {
logger(DEBUG_ALWAYS, LOG_ERR, "Cannot connect to an IPv6 host through a SOCKS 4 proxy!");
return false;
}
char s4req[9 + (proxyuser ? strlen(proxyuser) : 0)];
s4req[0] = 4;
s4req[1] = 1;
memcpy(s4req + 2, &c->address.in.sin_port, 2);
memcpy(s4req + 4, &c->address.in.sin_addr, 4);
if(proxyuser)
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memcpy(s4req + 8, proxyuser, strlen(proxyuser));
s4req[sizeof s4req - 1] = 0;
c->tcplen = 8;
return send_meta(c, s4req, sizeof s4req);
}
case PROXY_SOCKS5: {
int len = 3 + 6 + (c->address.sa.sa_family == AF_INET ? 4 : 16);
c->tcplen = 2;
if(proxypass)
len += 3 + strlen(proxyuser) + strlen(proxypass);
char s5req[len];
int i = 0;
s5req[i++] = 5;
s5req[i++] = 1;
if(proxypass) {
s5req[i++] = 2;
s5req[i++] = 1;
s5req[i++] = strlen(proxyuser);
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memcpy(s5req + i, proxyuser, strlen(proxyuser));
i += strlen(proxyuser);
s5req[i++] = strlen(proxypass);
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memcpy(s5req + i, proxypass, strlen(proxypass));
i += strlen(proxypass);
c->tcplen += 2;
} else {
s5req[i++] = 0;
}
s5req[i++] = 5;
s5req[i++] = 1;
s5req[i++] = 0;
if(c->address.sa.sa_family == AF_INET) {
s5req[i++] = 1;
memcpy(s5req + i, &c->address.in.sin_addr, 4);
i += 4;
memcpy(s5req + i, &c->address.in.sin_port, 2);
i += 2;
c->tcplen += 10;
} else if(c->address.sa.sa_family == AF_INET6) {
s5req[i++] = 3;
memcpy(s5req + i, &c->address.in6.sin6_addr, 16);
i += 16;
memcpy(s5req + i, &c->address.in6.sin6_port, 2);
i += 2;
c->tcplen += 22;
} else {
logger(DEBUG_ALWAYS, LOG_ERR, "Address family %hx not supported for SOCKS 5 proxies!", c->address.sa.sa_family);
return false;
}
if(i > len)
abort();
return send_meta(c, s5req, sizeof s5req);
}
case PROXY_SOCKS4A:
logger(DEBUG_ALWAYS, LOG_ERR, "Proxy type not implemented yet");
return false;
case PROXY_EXEC:
return true;
default:
logger(DEBUG_ALWAYS, LOG_ERR, "Unknown proxy type");
return false;
}
}
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bool send_id(connection_t *c) {
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gettimeofday(&c->start, NULL);
int minor = 0;
if(experimental) {
if(c->outgoing && !read_ecdsa_public_key(c))
minor = 1;
else
minor = myself->connection->protocol_minor;
}
if(proxytype && c->outgoing)
if(!send_proxyrequest(c))
return false;
return send_request(c, "%d %s %d.%d", ID, myself->connection->name, myself->connection->protocol_major, minor);
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}
Add an invitation protocol. Using the tinc command, an administrator of an existing VPN can generate invitations for new nodes. The invitation is a small URL that can easily be copy&pasted into email or live chat. Another person can have tinc automatically setup the necessary configuration files and exchange keys with the server, by only using the invitation URL. The invitation protocol uses temporary ECDSA keys. The invitation URL consists of the hostname and port of the server, a hash of the server's temporary ECDSA key and a cookie. When the client wants to accept an invitation, it also creates a temporary ECDSA key, connects to the server and says it wants to accept an invitation. Both sides exchange their temporary keys. The client verifies that the server's key matches the hash in the invitation URL. After setting up an SPTPS connection using the temporary keys, the client gives the cookie to the server. If the cookie is valid, the server sends the client an invitation file containing the client's new name and a copy of the server's host config file. If everything is ok, the client will generate a long-term ECDSA key and send it to the server, which will add it to a new host config file for the client. The invitation protocol currently allows multiple host config files to be send from the server to the client. However, the client filters out most configuration variables for its own host configuration file. In particular, it only accepts Name, Mode, Broadcast, ConnectTo, Subnet and AutoConnect. Also, at the moment no tinc-up script is generated. When an invitation has succesfully been accepted, the client needs to start the tinc daemon manually.
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static bool finalize_invitation(connection_t *c, const char *data, uint16_t len) {
if(strchr(data, '\n')) {
logger(DEBUG_ALWAYS, LOG_ERR, "Received invalid key from invited node %s (%s)!\n", c->name, c->hostname);
return false;
}
// Create a new host config file
char filename[PATH_MAX];
snprintf(filename, sizeof filename, "%s" SLASH "hosts" SLASH "%s", confbase, c->name);
if(!access(filename, F_OK)) {
logger(DEBUG_ALWAYS, LOG_ERR, "Host config file for %s (%s) already exists!\n", c->name, c->hostname);
return false;
}
FILE *f = fopen(filename, "w");
if(!f) {
logger(DEBUG_ALWAYS, LOG_ERR, "Error trying to create %s: %s\n", filename, strerror(errno));
return false;
}
fprintf(f, "ECDSAPublicKey = %s\n", data);
fclose(f);
logger(DEBUG_CONNECTIONS, LOG_INFO, "Key succesfully received from %s (%s)", c->name, c->hostname);
return true;
}
static bool receive_invitation_sptps(void *handle, uint8_t type, const char *data, uint16_t len) {
connection_t *c = handle;
if(type == 128)
return true;
if(type == 1 && c->status.invitation_used)
return finalize_invitation(c, data, len);
if(type != 0 || len != 18 || c->status.invitation_used)
return false;
char cookie[25];
b64encode_urlsafe(data, cookie, 18);
char filename[PATH_MAX], usedname[PATH_MAX];
snprintf(filename, sizeof filename, "%s" SLASH "invitations" SLASH "%s", confbase, cookie);
snprintf(usedname, sizeof usedname, "%s" SLASH "invitations" SLASH "%s.used", confbase, cookie);
// Atomically rename the invitation file
if(rename(filename, usedname)) {
if(errno == ENOENT)
logger(DEBUG_ALWAYS, LOG_ERR, "Peer %s tried to use non-existing invitation %s\n", c->hostname, cookie);
else
logger(DEBUG_ALWAYS, LOG_ERR, "Error trying to rename invitation %s\n", cookie);
return false;
}
// Open the renamed file
FILE *f = fopen(usedname, "r");
if(!f) {
logger(DEBUG_ALWAYS, LOG_ERR, "Error trying to open invitation %s\n", cookie);
return false;
}
// Read the new node's Name from the file
char buf[1024];
fgets(buf, sizeof buf, f);
if(*buf)
buf[strlen(buf) - 1] = 0;
len = strcspn(buf, " \t=");
char *name = buf + len;
name += strspn(name, " \t");
if(*name == '=') {
name++;
name += strspn(name, " \t");
}
buf[len] = 0;
if(!*buf || !*name || strcasecmp(buf, "Name") || !check_id(name)) {
logger(DEBUG_ALWAYS, LOG_ERR, "Invalid invitation file %s\n", cookie);
fclose(f);
return false;
}
free(c->name);
c->name = xstrdup(name);
// Send the node the contents of the invitation file
rewind(f);
size_t result;
while((result = fread(buf, 1, sizeof buf, f)))
sptps_send_record(&c->sptps, 0, buf, result);
sptps_send_record(&c->sptps, 1, buf, 0);
fclose(f);
unlink(usedname);
c->status.invitation_used = true;
logger(DEBUG_CONNECTIONS, LOG_INFO, "Invitation %s succesfully sent to %s (%s)", cookie, c->name, c->hostname);
return true;
}
bool id_h(connection_t *c, const char *request) {
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char name[MAX_STRING_SIZE];
if(sscanf(request, "%*d " MAX_STRING " %d.%d", name, &c->protocol_major, &c->protocol_minor) < 2) {
logger(DEBUG_ALWAYS, LOG_ERR, "Got bad %s from %s (%s)", "ID", c->name,
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c->hostname);
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return false;
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}
/* Check if this is a control connection */
if(name[0] == '^' && !strcmp(name + 1, controlcookie)) {
c->status.control = true;
c->allow_request = CONTROL;
c->last_ping_time = now.tv_sec + 3600;
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free(c->name);
c->name = xstrdup("<control>");
return send_request(c, "%d %d %d", ACK, TINC_CTL_VERSION_CURRENT, getpid());
}
Add an invitation protocol. Using the tinc command, an administrator of an existing VPN can generate invitations for new nodes. The invitation is a small URL that can easily be copy&pasted into email or live chat. Another person can have tinc automatically setup the necessary configuration files and exchange keys with the server, by only using the invitation URL. The invitation protocol uses temporary ECDSA keys. The invitation URL consists of the hostname and port of the server, a hash of the server's temporary ECDSA key and a cookie. When the client wants to accept an invitation, it also creates a temporary ECDSA key, connects to the server and says it wants to accept an invitation. Both sides exchange their temporary keys. The client verifies that the server's key matches the hash in the invitation URL. After setting up an SPTPS connection using the temporary keys, the client gives the cookie to the server. If the cookie is valid, the server sends the client an invitation file containing the client's new name and a copy of the server's host config file. If everything is ok, the client will generate a long-term ECDSA key and send it to the server, which will add it to a new host config file for the client. The invitation protocol currently allows multiple host config files to be send from the server to the client. However, the client filters out most configuration variables for its own host configuration file. In particular, it only accepts Name, Mode, Broadcast, ConnectTo, Subnet and AutoConnect. Also, at the moment no tinc-up script is generated. When an invitation has succesfully been accepted, the client needs to start the tinc daemon manually.
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if(name[0] == '?') {
if(!invitation_key) {
logger(DEBUG_ALWAYS, LOG_ERR, "Got invitation from %s but we don't have an invitation key", c->hostname);
return false;
}
c->ecdsa = ecdsa_set_base64_public_key(name + 1);
if(!c->ecdsa) {
logger(DEBUG_ALWAYS, LOG_ERR, "Got bad invitation from %s", c->hostname);
return false;
}
c->status.invitation = true;
char *mykey = ecdsa_get_base64_public_key(invitation_key);
if(!mykey)
return false;
if(!send_request(c, "%d %s", ACK, mykey))
return false;
free(mykey);
c->protocol_minor = 2;
return sptps_start(&c->sptps, c, false, false, invitation_key, c->ecdsa, "tinc invitation", 15, send_meta_sptps, receive_invitation_sptps);
}
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/* Check if identity is a valid name */
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if(!check_id(name)) {
logger(DEBUG_ALWAYS, LOG_ERR, "Got bad %s from %s (%s): %s", "ID", c->name,
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c->hostname, "invalid name");
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return false;
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}
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/* If this is an outgoing connection, make sure we are connected to the right host */
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if(c->outgoing) {
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if(strcmp(c->name, name)) {
logger(DEBUG_ALWAYS, LOG_ERR, "Peer %s is %s instead of %s", c->hostname, name,
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c->name);
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return false;
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}
} else {
if(c->name)
free(c->name);
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c->name = xstrdup(name);
}
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/* Check if version matches */
if(c->protocol_major != myself->connection->protocol_major) {
logger(DEBUG_ALWAYS, LOG_ERR, "Peer %s (%s) uses incompatible version %d.%d",
c->name, c->hostname, c->protocol_major, c->protocol_minor);
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return false;
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}
if(bypass_security) {
if(!c->config_tree)
init_configuration(&c->config_tree);
c->allow_request = ACK;
return send_ack(c);
}
if(!experimental)
c->protocol_minor = 0;
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if(!c->config_tree) {
init_configuration(&c->config_tree);
if(!read_host_config(c->config_tree, c->name)) {
logger(DEBUG_ALWAYS, LOG_ERR, "Peer %s had unknown identity (%s)", c->hostname, c->name);
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return false;
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}
if(experimental)
read_ecdsa_public_key(c);
} else {
if(c->protocol_minor && !ecdsa_active(c->ecdsa))
c->protocol_minor = 1;
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}
/* Forbid version rollback for nodes whose ECDSA key we know */
if(ecdsa_active(c->ecdsa) && c->protocol_minor < 2) {
logger(DEBUG_ALWAYS, LOG_ERR, "Peer %s (%s) tries to roll back protocol version to %d.%d",
c->name, c->hostname, c->protocol_major, c->protocol_minor);
return false;
}
c->allow_request = METAKEY;
if(c->protocol_minor >= 2) {
c->allow_request = ACK;
char label[25 + strlen(myself->name) + strlen(c->name)];
if(c->outgoing)
snprintf(label, sizeof label, "tinc TCP key expansion %s %s", myself->name, c->name);
else
snprintf(label, sizeof label, "tinc TCP key expansion %s %s", c->name, myself->name);
return sptps_start(&c->sptps, c, c->outgoing, false, myself->connection->ecdsa, c->ecdsa, label, sizeof label, send_meta_sptps, receive_meta_sptps);
} else {
return send_metakey(c);
}
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}
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bool send_metakey(connection_t *c) {
if(!read_rsa_public_key(c))
return false;
if(!(c->outcipher = cipher_open_blowfish_ofb()))
return false;
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if(!(c->outdigest = digest_open_sha1(-1)))
return false;
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size_t len = rsa_size(c->rsa);
char key[len];
char enckey[len];
char hexkey[2 * len + 1];
/* Create a random key */
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randomize(key, len);
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/* The message we send must be smaller than the modulus of the RSA key.
By definition, for a key of k bits, the following formula holds:
2^(k-1) <= modulus < 2^(k)
Where ^ means "to the power of", not "xor".
This means that to be sure, we must choose our message < 2^(k-1).
This can be done by setting the most significant bit to zero.
*/
key[0] &= 0x7F;
if(!cipher_set_key_from_rsa(c->outcipher, key, len, true))
return false;
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if(debug_level >= DEBUG_SCARY_THINGS) {
bin2hex(key, hexkey, len);
logger(DEBUG_SCARY_THINGS, LOG_DEBUG, "Generated random meta key (unencrypted): %s", hexkey);
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}
/* Encrypt the random data
We do not use one of the PKCS padding schemes here.
This is allowed, because we encrypt a totally random string
with a length equal to that of the modulus of the RSA key.
*/
if(!rsa_public_encrypt(c->rsa, key, len, enckey)) {
logger(DEBUG_ALWAYS, LOG_ERR, "Error during encryption of meta key for %s (%s)", c->name, c->hostname);
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return false;
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}
/* Convert the encrypted random data to a hexadecimal formatted string */
bin2hex(enckey, hexkey, len);
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/* Send the meta key */
bool result = send_request(c, "%d %d %d %d %d %s", METAKEY,
cipher_get_nid(c->outcipher),
digest_get_nid(c->outdigest), c->outmaclength,
c->outcompression, hexkey);
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c->status.encryptout = true;
return result;
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}
bool metakey_h(connection_t *c, const char *request) {
char hexkey[MAX_STRING_SIZE];
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int cipher, digest, maclength, compression;
size_t len = rsa_size(myself->connection->rsa);
char enckey[len];
char key[len];
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if(sscanf(request, "%*d %d %d %d %d " MAX_STRING, &cipher, &digest, &maclength, &compression, hexkey) != 5) {
logger(DEBUG_ALWAYS, LOG_ERR, "Got bad %s from %s (%s)", "METAKEY", c->name, c->hostname);
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return false;
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}
/* Convert the challenge from hexadecimal back to binary */
int inlen = hex2bin(hexkey, enckey, sizeof enckey);
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/* Check if the length of the meta key is all right */
if(inlen != len) {
logger(DEBUG_ALWAYS, LOG_ERR, "Possible intruder %s (%s): %s", c->name, c->hostname, "wrong keylength");
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return false;
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}
/* Decrypt the meta key */
if(!rsa_private_decrypt(myself->connection->rsa, enckey, len, key)) {
logger(DEBUG_ALWAYS, LOG_ERR, "Error during decryption of meta key for %s (%s)", c->name, c->hostname);
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return false;
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}
if(debug_level >= DEBUG_SCARY_THINGS) {
bin2hex(key, hexkey, len);
logger(DEBUG_SCARY_THINGS, LOG_DEBUG, "Received random meta key (unencrypted): %s", hexkey);
}
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/* Check and lookup cipher and digest algorithms */
if(!(c->incipher = cipher_open_by_nid(cipher)) || !cipher_set_key_from_rsa(c->incipher, key, len, false)) {
logger(DEBUG_ALWAYS, LOG_ERR, "Error during initialisation of cipher from %s (%s)", c->name, c->hostname);
return false;
}
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if(!(c->indigest = digest_open_by_nid(digest, -1))) {
logger(DEBUG_ALWAYS, LOG_ERR, "Error during initialisation of digest from %s (%s)", c->name, c->hostname);
return false;
}
c->status.decryptin = true;
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c->allow_request = CHALLENGE;
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return send_challenge(c);
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}
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bool send_challenge(connection_t *c) {
size_t len = rsa_size(c->rsa);
char buffer[len * 2 + 1];
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if(!c->hischallenge)
c->hischallenge = xrealloc(c->hischallenge, len);
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/* Copy random data to the buffer */
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randomize(c->hischallenge, len);
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/* Convert to hex */
bin2hex(c->hischallenge, buffer, len);
/* Send the challenge */
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return send_request(c, "%d %s", CHALLENGE, buffer);
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}
bool challenge_h(connection_t *c, const char *request) {
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char buffer[MAX_STRING_SIZE];
size_t len = rsa_size(myself->connection->rsa);
size_t digestlen = digest_length(c->indigest);
char digest[digestlen];
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if(sscanf(request, "%*d " MAX_STRING, buffer) != 1) {
logger(DEBUG_ALWAYS, LOG_ERR, "Got bad %s from %s (%s)", "CHALLENGE", c->name, c->hostname);
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return false;
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}
/* Convert the challenge from hexadecimal back to binary */
int inlen = hex2bin(buffer, buffer, sizeof buffer);
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/* Check if the length of the challenge is all right */
if(inlen != len) {
logger(DEBUG_ALWAYS, LOG_ERR, "Possible intruder %s (%s): %s", c->name, c->hostname, "wrong challenge length");
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return false;
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}
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/* Calculate the hash from the challenge we received */
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if(!digest_create(c->indigest, buffer, len, digest))
return false;
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/* Convert the hash to a hexadecimal formatted string */
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bin2hex(digest, buffer, digestlen);
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/* Send the reply */
c->allow_request = CHAL_REPLY;
return send_request(c, "%d %s", CHAL_REPLY, buffer);
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}
bool chal_reply_h(connection_t *c, const char *request) {
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char hishash[MAX_STRING_SIZE];
if(sscanf(request, "%*d " MAX_STRING, hishash) != 1) {
logger(DEBUG_ALWAYS, LOG_ERR, "Got bad %s from %s (%s)", "CHAL_REPLY", c->name,
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c->hostname);
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return false;
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}
/* Convert the hash to binary format */
int inlen = hex2bin(hishash, hishash, sizeof hishash);
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/* Check if the length of the hash is all right */
if(inlen != digest_length(c->outdigest)) {
logger(DEBUG_ALWAYS, LOG_ERR, "Possible intruder %s (%s): %s", c->name, c->hostname, "wrong challenge reply length");
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return false;
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}
/* Verify the hash */
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if(!digest_verify(c->outdigest, c->hischallenge, rsa_size(c->rsa), hishash)) {
logger(DEBUG_ALWAYS, LOG_ERR, "Possible intruder %s (%s): %s", c->name, c->hostname, "wrong challenge reply");
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return false;
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}
/* Identity has now been positively verified.
Send an acknowledgement with the rest of the information needed.
*/
free(c->hischallenge);
c->hischallenge = NULL;
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c->allow_request = ACK;
return send_ack(c);
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}
static bool send_upgrade(connection_t *c) {
/* Special case when protocol_minor is 1: the other end is ECDSA capable,
* but doesn't know our key yet. So send it now. */
char *pubkey = ecdsa_get_base64_public_key(myself->connection->ecdsa);
if(!pubkey)
return false;
bool result = send_request(c, "%d %s", ACK, pubkey);
free(pubkey);
return result;
}
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bool send_ack(connection_t *c) {
if(c->protocol_minor == 1)
return send_upgrade(c);
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/* ACK message contains rest of the information the other end needs
to create node_t and edge_t structures. */
struct timeval now;
bool choice;
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/* Estimate weight */
gettimeofday(&now, NULL);
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c->estimated_weight = (now.tv_sec - c->start.tv_sec) * 1000 + (now.tv_usec - c->start.tv_usec) / 1000;
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/* Check some options */
if((get_config_bool(lookup_config(c->config_tree, "IndirectData"), &choice) && choice) || myself->options & OPTION_INDIRECT)
c->options |= OPTION_INDIRECT;
if((get_config_bool(lookup_config(c->config_tree, "TCPOnly"), &choice) && choice) || myself->options & OPTION_TCPONLY)
c->options |= OPTION_TCPONLY | OPTION_INDIRECT;
if(myself->options & OPTION_PMTU_DISCOVERY)
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c->options |= OPTION_PMTU_DISCOVERY;
choice = myself->options & OPTION_CLAMP_MSS;
get_config_bool(lookup_config(c->config_tree, "ClampMSS"), &choice);
if(choice)
c->options |= OPTION_CLAMP_MSS;
get_config_int(lookup_config(c->config_tree, "Weight"), &c->estimated_weight);
return send_request(c, "%d %s %d %x", ACK, myport, c->estimated_weight, (c->options & 0xffffff) | (experimental ? (PROT_MINOR << 24) : 0));
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}
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static void send_everything(connection_t *c) {
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/* Send all known subnets and edges */
if(disablebuggypeers) {
static struct {
vpn_packet_t pkt;
char pad[MAXBUFSIZE - MAXSIZE];
} zeropkt;
memset(&zeropkt, 0, sizeof zeropkt);
zeropkt.pkt.len = MAXBUFSIZE;
send_tcppacket(c, &zeropkt.pkt);
}
if(tunnelserver) {
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for splay_each(subnet_t, s, myself->subnet_tree)
send_add_subnet(c, s);
return;
}
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for splay_each(node_t, n, node_tree) {
for splay_each(subnet_t, s, n->subnet_tree)
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send_add_subnet(c, s);
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for splay_each(edge_t, e, n->edge_tree)
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send_add_edge(c, e);
}
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}
static bool upgrade_h(connection_t *c, const char *request) {
char pubkey[MAX_STRING_SIZE];
if(sscanf(request, "%*d " MAX_STRING, pubkey) != 1) {
logger(DEBUG_ALWAYS, LOG_ERR, "Got bad %s from %s (%s)", "ACK", c->name, c->hostname);
return false;
}
if(ecdsa_active(c->ecdsa) || read_ecdsa_public_key(c)) {
logger(DEBUG_ALWAYS, LOG_INFO, "Already have ECDSA public key from %s (%s), not upgrading.", c->name, c->hostname);
return false;
}
logger(DEBUG_ALWAYS, LOG_INFO, "Got ECDSA public key from %s (%s), upgrading!", c->name, c->hostname);
append_config_file(c->name, "ECDSAPublicKey", pubkey);
c->allow_request = TERMREQ;
return send_termreq(c);
}
bool ack_h(connection_t *c, const char *request) {
if(c->protocol_minor == 1)
return upgrade_h(c, request);
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char hisport[MAX_STRING_SIZE];
char *hisaddress;
int weight, mtu;
uint32_t options;
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node_t *n;
bool choice;
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if(sscanf(request, "%*d " MAX_STRING " %d %x", hisport, &weight, &options) != 3) {
logger(DEBUG_ALWAYS, LOG_ERR, "Got bad %s from %s (%s)", "ACK", c->name,
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c->hostname);
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return false;
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}
/* Check if we already have a node_t for him */
n = lookup_node(c->name);
if(!n) {
n = new_node();
n->name = xstrdup(c->name);
node_add(n);
} else {
if(n->connection) {
/* Oh dear, we already have a connection to this node. */
logger(DEBUG_CONNECTIONS, LOG_DEBUG, "Established a second connection with %s (%s), closing old connection", n->connection->name, n->connection->hostname);
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if(n->connection->outgoing) {
if(c->outgoing)
logger(DEBUG_ALWAYS, LOG_WARNING, "Two outgoing connections to the same node!");
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else
c->outgoing = n->connection->outgoing;
n->connection->outgoing = NULL;
}
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terminate_connection(n->connection, false);
/* Run graph algorithm to purge key and make sure up/down scripts are rerun with new IP addresses and stuff */
graph();
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}
}
n->connection = c;
c->node = n;
if(!(c->options & options & OPTION_PMTU_DISCOVERY)) {
c->options &= ~OPTION_PMTU_DISCOVERY;
options &= ~OPTION_PMTU_DISCOVERY;
}
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c->options |= options;
if(get_config_int(lookup_config(c->config_tree, "PMTU"), &mtu) && mtu < n->mtu)
n->mtu = mtu;
if(get_config_int(lookup_config(config_tree, "PMTU"), &mtu) && mtu < n->mtu)
n->mtu = mtu;
if(get_config_bool(lookup_config(c->config_tree, "ClampMSS"), &choice)) {
if(choice)
c->options |= OPTION_CLAMP_MSS;
else
c->options &= ~OPTION_CLAMP_MSS;
}
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/* Activate this connection */
c->allow_request = ALL;
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c->status.active = true;
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logger(DEBUG_CONNECTIONS, LOG_NOTICE, "Connection with %s (%s) activated", c->name,
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c->hostname);
/* Send him everything we know */
send_everything(c);
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/* Create an edge_t for this connection */
c->edge = new_edge();
c->edge->from = myself;
c->edge->to = n;
sockaddr2str(&c->address, &hisaddress, NULL);
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c->edge->address = str2sockaddr(hisaddress, hisport);
free(hisaddress);
c->edge->weight = (weight + c->estimated_weight) / 2;
c->edge->connection = c;
c->edge->options = c->options;
edge_add(c->edge);
/* Notify everyone of the new edge */
if(tunnelserver)
send_add_edge(c, c->edge);
else
send_add_edge(everyone, c->edge);
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/* Run MST and SSSP algorithms */
graph();
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return true;
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}