tinc/src/protocol_auth.c

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/*
protocol_auth.c -- handle the meta-protocol, authentication
Copyright (C) 1999-2005 Ivo Timmermans,
2010-02-02 21:49:21 +00:00
2000-2010 Guus Sliepen <guus@tinc-vpn.org>
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This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
(at your option) any later version.
This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
GNU General Public License for more details.
You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along
with this program; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc.,
51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
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*/
#include "system.h"
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#include "splay_tree.h"
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#include "conf.h"
#include "connection.h"
#include "control.h"
#include "control_common.h"
#include "cipher.h"
#include "crypto.h"
#include "digest.h"
#include "edge.h"
#include "graph.h"
#include "logger.h"
#include "net.h"
#include "netutl.h"
#include "node.h"
#include "prf.h"
#include "protocol.h"
#include "rsa.h"
#include "utils.h"
#include "xalloc.h"
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bool send_id(connection_t *c) {
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gettimeofday(&c->start, NULL);
int minor = 0;
if(experimental) {
if(c->config_tree && !read_ecdsa_public_key(c))
minor = 1;
else
minor = myself->connection->protocol_minor;
}
return send_request(c, "%d %s %d.%d", ID, myself->connection->name, myself->connection->protocol_major, minor);
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}
bool id_h(connection_t *c, char *request) {
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char name[MAX_STRING_SIZE];
if(sscanf(request, "%*d " MAX_STRING " %d.%d", name, &c->protocol_major, &c->protocol_minor) < 2) {
logger(LOG_ERR, "Got bad %s from %s (%s)", "ID", c->name,
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c->hostname);
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return false;
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}
/* Check if this is a control connection */
if(name[0] == '^' && !strcmp(name + 1, controlcookie)) {
c->status.control = true;
c->allow_request = CONTROL;
c->last_ping_time = time(NULL) + 3600;
return send_request(c, "%d %d %d", ACK, TINC_CTL_VERSION_CURRENT, getpid());
}
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/* Check if identity is a valid name */
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if(!check_id(name)) {
logger(LOG_ERR, "Got bad %s from %s (%s): %s", "ID", c->name,
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c->hostname, "invalid name");
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return false;
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}
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/* If this is an outgoing connection, make sure we are connected to the right host */
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if(c->outgoing) {
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if(strcmp(c->name, name)) {
logger(LOG_ERR, "Peer %s is %s instead of %s", c->hostname, name,
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c->name);
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return false;
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}
} else {
if(c->name)
free(c->name);
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c->name = xstrdup(name);
}
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/* Check if version matches */
if(c->protocol_major != myself->connection->protocol_major) {
logger(LOG_ERR, "Peer %s (%s) uses incompatible version %d.%d",
c->name, c->hostname, c->protocol_major, c->protocol_minor);
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return false;
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}
if(bypass_security) {
if(!c->config_tree)
init_configuration(&c->config_tree);
c->allow_request = ACK;
return send_ack(c);
}
if(!experimental)
c->protocol_minor = 0;
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if(!c->config_tree) {
init_configuration(&c->config_tree);
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if(!read_connection_config(c)) {
logger(LOG_ERR, "Peer %s had unknown identity (%s)", c->hostname,
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c->name);
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return false;
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}
if(experimental && c->protocol_minor >= 2)
if(!read_ecdsa_public_key(c))
return false;
} else {
if(c->protocol_minor && !ecdsa_active(&c->ecdsa))
c->protocol_minor = 1;
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}
c->allow_request = METAKEY;
if(c->protocol_minor >= 2)
return send_metakey_ec(c);
else
return send_metakey(c);
}
bool send_metakey_ec(connection_t *c) {
logger(LOG_DEBUG, "Sending ECDH metakey to %s", c->name);
size_t siglen = ecdsa_size(&myself->connection->ecdsa);
char key[(ECDH_SIZE + siglen) * 2 + 1];
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// TODO: include nonce? Use relevant parts of SSH or TLS protocol
if(!ecdh_generate_public(&c->ecdh, key))
return false;
if(!ecdsa_sign(&myself->connection->ecdsa, key, ECDH_SIZE, key + ECDH_SIZE))
return false;
b64encode(key, key, ECDH_SIZE + siglen);
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return send_request(c, "%d %s", METAKEY, key);
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}
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bool send_metakey(connection_t *c) {
if(!read_rsa_public_key(c))
return false;
if(!cipher_open_blowfish_ofb(&c->outcipher))
return false;
if(!digest_open_sha1(&c->outdigest, -1))
return false;
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size_t len = rsa_size(&c->rsa);
char key[len];
char enckey[len];
char hexkey[2 * len + 1];
/* Create a random key */
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randomize(key, len);
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/* The message we send must be smaller than the modulus of the RSA key.
By definition, for a key of k bits, the following formula holds:
2^(k-1) <= modulus < 2^(k)
Where ^ means "to the power of", not "xor".
This means that to be sure, we must choose our message < 2^(k-1).
This can be done by setting the most significant bit to zero.
*/
key[0] &= 0x7F;
cipher_set_key_from_rsa(&c->outcipher, key, len, true);
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ifdebug(SCARY_THINGS) {
bin2hex(key, hexkey, len);
logger(LOG_DEBUG, "Generated random meta key (unencrypted): %s", hexkey);
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}
/* Encrypt the random data
We do not use one of the PKCS padding schemes here.
This is allowed, because we encrypt a totally random string
with a length equal to that of the modulus of the RSA key.
*/
if(!rsa_public_encrypt(&c->rsa, key, len, enckey)) {
logger(LOG_ERR, "Error during encryption of meta key for %s (%s)", c->name, c->hostname);
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return false;
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}
/* Convert the encrypted random data to a hexadecimal formatted string */
bin2hex(enckey, hexkey, len);
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/* Send the meta key */
bool result = send_request(c, "%d %d %d %d %d %s", METAKEY,
cipher_get_nid(&c->outcipher),
digest_get_nid(&c->outdigest), c->outmaclength,
c->outcompression, hexkey);
c->status.encryptout = true;
return result;
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}
static bool metakey_ec_h(connection_t *c, const char *request) {
size_t siglen = ecdsa_size(&c->ecdsa);
char key[MAX_STRING_SIZE];
logger(LOG_DEBUG, "Got ECDH metakey from %s", c->name);
if(sscanf(request, "%*d " MAX_STRING, key) != 1) {
logger(LOG_ERR, "Got bad %s from %s (%s)", "METAKEY", c->name, c->hostname);
return false;
}
int inlen = b64decode(key, key, sizeof key);
if(inlen != (ECDH_SIZE + siglen)) {
logger(LOG_ERR, "Possible intruder %s (%s): %s", c->name, c->hostname, "wrong keylength");
return false;
}
if(!ecdsa_verify(&c->ecdsa, key, ECDH_SIZE, key + ECDH_SIZE)) {
logger(LOG_ERR, "Possible intruder %s (%s): %s", c->name, c->hostname, "invalid ECDSA signature");
return false;
}
char shared[ECDH_SHARED_SIZE];
if(!ecdh_compute_shared(&c->ecdh, key, shared))
return false;
/* Update our crypto end */
if(!cipher_open_by_name(&c->incipher, "aes-256-ofb"))
return false;
if(!digest_open_by_name(&c->indigest, "sha512", -1))
return false;
if(!cipher_open_by_name(&c->outcipher, "aes-256-ofb"))
return false;
if(!digest_open_by_name(&c->outdigest, "sha512", -1))
return false;
size_t mykeylen = cipher_keylength(&c->incipher);
size_t hiskeylen = cipher_keylength(&c->outcipher);
char *mykey;
char *hiskey;
char *seed;
if(strcmp(myself->name, c->name) < 0) {
mykey = key;
hiskey = key + mykeylen * 2;
xasprintf(&seed, "tinc TCP key expansion %s %s", myself->name, c->name);
} else {
mykey = key + hiskeylen * 2;
hiskey = key;
xasprintf(&seed, "tinc TCP key expansion %s %s", c->name, myself->name);
}
if(!prf(shared, ECDH_SHARED_SIZE, seed, strlen(seed), key, hiskeylen * 2 + mykeylen * 2))
return false;
free(seed);
cipher_set_key(&c->incipher, mykey, false);
digest_set_key(&c->indigest, mykey + mykeylen, mykeylen);
cipher_set_key(&c->outcipher, hiskey, true);
digest_set_key(&c->outdigest, hiskey + hiskeylen, hiskeylen);
c->status.decryptin = true;
c->status.encryptout = true;
c->allow_request = CHALLENGE;
return send_challenge(c);
}
bool metakey_h(connection_t *c, char *request) {
if(c->protocol_minor >= 2)
return metakey_ec_h(c, request);
char hexkey[MAX_STRING_SIZE];
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int cipher, digest, maclength, compression;
size_t len = rsa_size(&myself->connection->rsa);
char enckey[len];
char key[len];
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if(sscanf(request, "%*d %d %d %d %d " MAX_STRING, &cipher, &digest, &maclength, &compression, hexkey) != 5) {
logger(LOG_ERR, "Got bad %s from %s (%s)", "METAKEY", c->name, c->hostname);
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return false;
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}
/* Convert the challenge from hexadecimal back to binary */
int inlen = hex2bin(hexkey, enckey, sizeof enckey);
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/* Check if the length of the meta key is all right */
if(inlen != len) {
logger(LOG_ERR, "Possible intruder %s (%s): %s", c->name, c->hostname, "wrong keylength");
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return false;
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}
/* Decrypt the meta key */
if(!rsa_private_decrypt(&myself->connection->rsa, enckey, len, key)) {
logger(LOG_ERR, "Error during decryption of meta key for %s (%s)", c->name, c->hostname);
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return false;
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}
ifdebug(SCARY_THINGS) {
bin2hex(key, hexkey, len);
logger(LOG_DEBUG, "Received random meta key (unencrypted): %s", hexkey);
}
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/* Check and lookup cipher and digest algorithms */
if(!cipher_open_by_nid(&c->incipher, cipher) || !cipher_set_key_from_rsa(&c->incipher, key, len, false)) {
logger(LOG_ERR, "Error during initialisation of cipher from %s (%s)", c->name, c->hostname);
return false;
}
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if(!digest_open_by_nid(&c->indigest, digest, -1)) {
logger(LOG_ERR, "Error during initialisation of digest from %s (%s)", c->name, c->hostname);
return false;
}
c->status.decryptin = true;
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c->allow_request = CHALLENGE;
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return send_challenge(c);
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}
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bool send_challenge(connection_t *c) {
size_t len = c->protocol_minor >= 2 ? ECDH_SIZE : rsa_size(&c->rsa);
char buffer[len * 2 + 1];
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if(!c->hischallenge)
c->hischallenge = xrealloc(c->hischallenge, len);
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/* Copy random data to the buffer */
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randomize(c->hischallenge, len);
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/* Convert to hex */
bin2hex(c->hischallenge, buffer, len);
/* Send the challenge */
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return send_request(c, "%d %s", CHALLENGE, buffer);
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}
bool challenge_h(connection_t *c, char *request) {
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char buffer[MAX_STRING_SIZE];
size_t len = c->protocol_minor >= 2 ? ECDH_SIZE : rsa_size(&myself->connection->rsa);
size_t digestlen = digest_length(&c->indigest);
char digest[digestlen];
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if(sscanf(request, "%*d " MAX_STRING, buffer) != 1) {
logger(LOG_ERR, "Got bad %s from %s (%s)", "CHALLENGE", c->name, c->hostname);
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return false;
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}
/* Convert the challenge from hexadecimal back to binary */
int inlen = hex2bin(buffer, buffer, sizeof buffer);
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/* Check if the length of the challenge is all right */
if(inlen != len) {
logger(LOG_ERR, "Possible intruder %s (%s): %s", c->name, c->hostname, "wrong challenge length");
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return false;
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}
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c->allow_request = CHAL_REPLY;
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/* Calculate the hash from the challenge we received */
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digest_create(&c->indigest, buffer, len, digest);
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/* Convert the hash to a hexadecimal formatted string */
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bin2hex(digest, buffer, digestlen);
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/* Send the reply */
return send_request(c, "%d %s", CHAL_REPLY, buffer);
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}
bool chal_reply_h(connection_t *c, char *request) {
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char hishash[MAX_STRING_SIZE];
if(sscanf(request, "%*d " MAX_STRING, hishash) != 1) {
logger(LOG_ERR, "Got bad %s from %s (%s)", "CHAL_REPLY", c->name,
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c->hostname);
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return false;
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}
/* Convert the hash to binary format */
int inlen = hex2bin(hishash, hishash, sizeof hishash);
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/* Check if the length of the hash is all right */
if(inlen != digest_length(&c->outdigest)) {
logger(LOG_ERR, "Possible intruder %s (%s): %s", c->name, c->hostname, "wrong challenge reply length");
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return false;
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}
/* Verify the hash */
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if(!digest_verify(&c->outdigest, c->hischallenge, c->protocol_minor >= 2 ? ECDH_SIZE : rsa_size(&c->rsa), hishash)) {
logger(LOG_ERR, "Possible intruder %s (%s): %s", c->name, c->hostname, "wrong challenge reply");
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return false;
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}
/* Identity has now been positively verified.
Send an acknowledgement with the rest of the information needed.
*/
free(c->hischallenge);
c->hischallenge = NULL;
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c->allow_request = ACK;
return send_ack(c);
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}
static bool send_upgrade(connection_t *c) {
/* Special case when protocol_minor is 1: the other end is ECDSA capable,
* but doesn't know our key yet. So send it now. */
char *pubkey = ecdsa_get_base64_public_key(&myself->connection->ecdsa);
if(!pubkey)
return false;
bool result = send_request(c, "%d %s", ACK, pubkey);
free(pubkey);
return result;
}
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bool send_ack(connection_t *c) {
if(c->protocol_minor == 1)
return send_upgrade(c);
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/* ACK message contains rest of the information the other end needs
to create node_t and edge_t structures. */
struct timeval now;
bool choice;
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/* Estimate weight */
gettimeofday(&now, NULL);
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c->estimated_weight = (now.tv_sec - c->start.tv_sec) * 1000 + (now.tv_usec - c->start.tv_usec) / 1000;
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/* Check some options */
if((get_config_bool(lookup_config(c->config_tree, "IndirectData"), &choice) && choice) || myself->options & OPTION_INDIRECT)
c->options |= OPTION_INDIRECT;
if((get_config_bool(lookup_config(c->config_tree, "TCPOnly"), &choice) && choice) || myself->options & OPTION_TCPONLY)
c->options |= OPTION_TCPONLY | OPTION_INDIRECT;
if(myself->options & OPTION_PMTU_DISCOVERY)
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c->options |= OPTION_PMTU_DISCOVERY;
choice = myself->options & OPTION_CLAMP_MSS;
get_config_bool(lookup_config(c->config_tree, "ClampMSS"), &choice);
if(choice)
c->options |= OPTION_CLAMP_MSS;
get_config_int(lookup_config(c->config_tree, "Weight"), &c->estimated_weight);
return send_request(c, "%d %s %d %x", ACK, myport, c->estimated_weight, c->options);
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}
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static void send_everything(connection_t *c) {
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splay_node_t *node, *node2;
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node_t *n;
subnet_t *s;
edge_t *e;
/* Send all known subnets and edges */
if(tunnelserver) {
for(node = myself->subnet_tree->head; node; node = node->next) {
s = node->data;
send_add_subnet(c, s);
}
return;
}
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for(node = node_tree->head; node; node = node->next) {
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n = node->data;
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for(node2 = n->subnet_tree->head; node2; node2 = node2->next) {
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s = node2->data;
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send_add_subnet(c, s);
}
for(node2 = n->edge_tree->head; node2; node2 = node2->next) {
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e = node2->data;
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send_add_edge(c, e);
}
}
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}
static bool upgrade_h(connection_t *c, char *request) {
char pubkey[MAX_STRING_SIZE];
if(sscanf(request, "%*d " MAX_STRING, pubkey) != 1) {
logger(LOG_ERR, "Got bad %s from %s (%s)", "ACK", c->name, c->hostname);
return false;
}
if(ecdsa_active(&c->ecdsa) || read_ecdsa_public_key(c)) {
logger(LOG_INFO, "Already have ECDSA public key from %s (%s), not upgrading.", c->name, c->hostname);
return false;
}
logger(LOG_INFO, "Got ECDSA public key from %s (%s), upgrading!", c->name, c->hostname);
append_config_file(c->name, "ECDSAPublicKey", pubkey);
c->allow_request = TERMREQ;
return send_termreq(c);
}
bool ack_h(connection_t *c, char *request) {
if(c->protocol_minor == 1)
return upgrade_h(c, request);
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char hisport[MAX_STRING_SIZE];
char *hisaddress;
int weight, mtu;
uint32_t options;
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node_t *n;
bool choice;
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if(sscanf(request, "%*d " MAX_STRING " %d %x", hisport, &weight, &options) != 3) {
logger(LOG_ERR, "Got bad %s from %s (%s)", "ACK", c->name,
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c->hostname);
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return false;
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}
/* Check if we already have a node_t for him */
n = lookup_node(c->name);
if(!n) {
n = new_node();
n->name = xstrdup(c->name);
node_add(n);
} else {
if(n->connection) {
/* Oh dear, we already have a connection to this node. */
ifdebug(CONNECTIONS) logger(LOG_DEBUG, "Established a second connection with %s (%s), closing old connection", n->connection->name, n->connection->hostname);
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if(n->connection->outgoing) {
if(c->outgoing)
logger(LOG_WARNING, "Two outgoing connections to the same node!");
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else
c->outgoing = n->connection->outgoing;
n->connection->outgoing = NULL;
}
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terminate_connection(n->connection, false);
/* Run graph algorithm to purge key and make sure up/down scripts are rerun with new IP addresses and stuff */
graph();
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}
}
n->connection = c;
c->node = n;
if(!(c->options & options & OPTION_PMTU_DISCOVERY)) {
c->options &= ~OPTION_PMTU_DISCOVERY;
options &= ~OPTION_PMTU_DISCOVERY;
}
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c->options |= options;
if(get_config_int(lookup_config(c->config_tree, "PMTU"), &mtu) && mtu < n->mtu)
n->mtu = mtu;
if(get_config_int(lookup_config(config_tree, "PMTU"), &mtu) && mtu < n->mtu)
n->mtu = mtu;
if(get_config_bool(lookup_config(c->config_tree, "ClampMSS"), &choice)) {
if(choice)
c->options |= OPTION_CLAMP_MSS;
else
c->options &= ~OPTION_CLAMP_MSS;
}
if(c->protocol_minor > 0)
c->node->status.ecdh = true;
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/* Activate this connection */
c->allow_request = ALL;
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c->status.active = true;
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ifdebug(CONNECTIONS) logger(LOG_NOTICE, "Connection with %s (%s) activated", c->name,
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c->hostname);
/* Send him everything we know */
send_everything(c);
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/* Create an edge_t for this connection */
c->edge = new_edge();
c->edge->from = myself;
c->edge->to = n;
sockaddr2str(&c->address, &hisaddress, NULL);
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c->edge->address = str2sockaddr(hisaddress, hisport);
free(hisaddress);
c->edge->weight = (weight + c->estimated_weight) / 2;
c->edge->connection = c;
c->edge->options = c->options;
edge_add(c->edge);
/* Notify everyone of the new edge */
if(tunnelserver)
send_add_edge(c, c->edge);
else
send_add_edge(everyone, c->edge);
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/* Run MST and SSSP algorithms */
graph();
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return true;
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}