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tinc/debian/patches/security-fixes
Guus Sliepen 4d11e18342 Import Debian changes 1.0.24-2.1+deb8u1 
tinc (1.0.24-2.1+deb8u1) jessie-security; urgency=medium

  * Prevent oracle attacks (CVE-2018-16737, CVE-2018-16738).
  * Prevent a MITM from forcing a NULL cipher for UDP (CVE-2018-16758).
2019-08-26 13:44:46 +02:00

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diff --git a/doc/tinc.conf.5.in b/doc/tinc.conf.5.in
index 0548628f..a2a635fb 100644
--- a/doc/tinc.conf.5.in
+++ b/doc/tinc.conf.5.in
@@ -464,7 +464,7 @@ Multiple
.Va Address
variables can be specified, in which case each address will be tried until a working
connection has been established.
-.It Va Cipher Li = Ar cipher Pq blowfish
+.It Va Cipher Li = Ar cipher Pq aes-256-cbc
The symmetric cipher algorithm used to encrypt UDP packets.
Any cipher supported by OpenSSL is recognised.
Furthermore, specifying
@@ -479,7 +479,7 @@ Fragmentation Needed or Packet too Big messages are dropped by firewalls.
This option sets the level of compression used for UDP packets.
Possible values are 0 (off), 1 (fast zlib) and any integer up to 9 (best zlib),
10 (fast lzo) and 11 (best lzo).
-.It Va Digest Li = Ar digest Pq sha1
+.It Va Digest Li = Ar digest Pq sha256
The digest algorithm used to authenticate UDP packets.
Any digest supported by OpenSSL is recognised.
Furthermore, specifying
diff --git a/doc/tinc.texi b/doc/tinc.texi
index 85790028..6e422cfe 100644
--- a/doc/tinc.texi
+++ b/doc/tinc.texi
@@ -1143,7 +1143,7 @@ Multiple Address variables can be specified, in which case each address will be
tried until a working connection has been established.
@cindex Cipher
-@item Cipher = <@var{cipher}> (blowfish)
+@item Cipher = <@var{cipher}> (aes-256-cbc)
The symmetric cipher algorithm used to encrypt UDP packets.
Any cipher supported by OpenSSL is recognized.
Furthermore, specifying "none" will turn off packet encryption.
@@ -1162,7 +1162,7 @@ Possible values are 0 (off), 1 (fast zlib) and any integer up to 9 (best zlib),
10 (fast lzo) and 11 (best lzo).
@cindex Digest
-@item Digest = <@var{digest}> (sha1)
+@item Digest = <@var{digest}> (sha256)
The digest algorithm used to authenticate UDP packets.
Any digest supported by OpenSSL is recognized.
Furthermore, specifying "none" will turn off packet authentication.
diff --git a/m4/openssl.m4 b/m4/openssl.m4
index 254ea4ff..77b3a4a8 100644
--- a/m4/openssl.m4
+++ b/m4/openssl.m4
@@ -45,12 +45,14 @@ AC_DEFUN([tinc_OPENSSL],
[AC_MSG_ERROR([OpenSSL libraries not found.])]
)
- AC_CHECK_FUNCS([RAND_pseudo_bytes EVP_EncryptInit_ex], ,
- [AC_MSG_ERROR([Missing OpenSSL functionality, make sure you have installed the latest version.]); break],
+ AC_CHECK_FUNCS([RAND_bytes EVP_EncryptInit_ex EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new], ,
+ [AC_MSG_ERROR([Missing LibreSSL/OpenSSL functionality, make sure you have installed the latest version.]); break],
)
- AC_CHECK_DECL([OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms], ,
- [AC_MSG_ERROR([Missing OpenSSL functionality, make sure you have installed the latest version.]); break],
+ AC_CHECK_DECLS([OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms, EVP_aes_256_cfb], ,
+ [AC_MSG_ERROR([Missing LibreSSL/OpenSSL functionality, make sure you have installed the latest version.]); break],
[#include <openssl/evp.h>]
)
+
+ AC_CHECK_FUNCS([BN_GENCB_new ERR_remove_state RSA_set0_key], , , [#include <openssl/rsa.h>])
])
diff --git a/src/connection.h b/src/connection.h
index 877601fe..9e4dc663 100644
--- a/src/connection.h
+++ b/src/connection.h
@@ -41,7 +41,9 @@ typedef struct connection_status_t {
unsigned int encryptout:1; /* 1 if we can encrypt outgoing traffic */
unsigned int decryptin:1; /* 1 if we have to decrypt incoming traffic */
unsigned int mst:1; /* 1 if this connection is part of a minimum spanning tree */
- unsigned int unused:23;
+ unsigned int proxy_passed:1; /* 1 if we are connecting via a proxy and we have finished talking with it */
+ unsigned int tarpit:1; /* 1 if the connection should be added to the tarpit */
+ unsigned int unused:21;
} connection_status_t;
#include "edge.h"
diff --git a/src/net.c b/src/net.c
index 8d0a0cf4..4e53d920 100644
--- a/src/net.c
+++ b/src/net.c
@@ -166,6 +166,22 @@ static int build_fdset(fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) {
return max;
}
+/* Put a misbehaving connection in the tarpit */
+void tarpit(int fd) {
+ static int pits[10] = {-1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1};
+ static int next_pit = 0;
+
+ if(pits[next_pit] != -1) {
+ closesocket(pits[next_pit]);
+ }
+
+ pits[next_pit++] = fd;
+
+ if(next_pit >= sizeof pits / sizeof pits[0]) {
+ next_pit = 0;
+ }
+}
+
/*
Terminate a connection:
- Close the socket
@@ -186,8 +202,13 @@ void terminate_connection(connection_t *c, bool report) {
if(c->node)
c->node->connection = NULL;
- if(c->socket)
- closesocket(c->socket);
+ if(c->socket) {
+ if(c->status.tarpit) {
+ tarpit(c->socket);
+ } else {
+ closesocket(c->socket);
+ }
+ }
if(c->edge) {
if(!c->node) {
@@ -274,6 +295,7 @@ static void check_dead_connections(void) {
closesocket(c->socket);
do_outgoing_connection(c);
} else {
+ c->status.tarpit = true;
terminate_connection(c, false);
}
}
@@ -353,6 +375,7 @@ static void check_network_activity(fd_set * readset, fd_set * writeset) {
if(FD_ISSET(c->socket, readset)) {
if(!receive_meta(c)) {
+ c->status.tarpit = true;
terminate_connection(c, c->status.active);
continue;
}
diff --git a/src/net.h b/src/net.h
index 2b50c5a2..5ae8d344 100644
--- a/src/net.h
+++ b/src/net.h
@@ -163,6 +163,7 @@ extern void flush_queue(struct node_t *);
extern bool read_rsa_public_key(struct connection_t *);
extern void send_mtu_probe(struct node_t *);
extern void load_all_subnets(void);
+extern void tarpit(int fd);
#ifndef HAVE_MINGW
#define closesocket(s) close(s)
diff --git a/src/net_packet.c b/src/net_packet.c
index d11d58ad..5d7c212d 100644
--- a/src/net_packet.c
+++ b/src/net_packet.c
@@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ void send_mtu_probe(node_t *n) {
len = 64;
memset(packet.data, 0, 14);
- RAND_pseudo_bytes(packet.data + 14, len - 14);
+ RAND_bytes(packet.data + 14, len - 14);
packet.len = len;
if(i >= 4 && n->mtuprobes <= 10)
packet.priority = -1;
@@ -314,10 +314,10 @@ static void receive_udppacket(node_t *n, vpn_packet_t *inpkt) {
if(n->incipher) {
outpkt = pkt[nextpkt++];
- if(!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&n->inctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL)
- || !EVP_DecryptUpdate(&n->inctx, (unsigned char *) &outpkt->seqno, &outlen,
+ if(!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(n->inctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL)
+ || !EVP_DecryptUpdate(n->inctx, (unsigned char *) &outpkt->seqno, &outlen,
(unsigned char *) &inpkt->seqno, inpkt->len)
- || !EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&n->inctx, (unsigned char *) &outpkt->seqno + outlen, &outpad)) {
+ || !EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(n->inctx, (unsigned char *) &outpkt->seqno + outlen, &outpad)) {
ifdebug(TRAFFIC) logger(LOG_DEBUG, "Error decrypting packet from %s (%s): %s",
n->name, n->hostname, ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
return;
@@ -482,10 +482,10 @@ static void send_udppacket(node_t *n, vpn_packet_t *origpkt) {
if(n->outcipher) {
outpkt = pkt[nextpkt++];
- if(!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&n->outctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL)
- || !EVP_EncryptUpdate(&n->outctx, (unsigned char *) &outpkt->seqno, &outlen,
+ if(!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(n->outctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL)
+ || !EVP_EncryptUpdate(n->outctx, (unsigned char *) &outpkt->seqno, &outlen,
(unsigned char *) &inpkt->seqno, inpkt->len)
- || !EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(&n->outctx, (unsigned char *) &outpkt->seqno + outlen, &outpad)) {
+ || !EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(n->outctx, (unsigned char *) &outpkt->seqno + outlen, &outpad)) {
ifdebug(TRAFFIC) logger(LOG_ERR, "Error while encrypting packet to %s (%s): %s",
n->name, n->hostname, ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
goto end;
diff --git a/src/net_setup.c b/src/net_setup.c
index fa4e9867..ea2a3b78 100644
--- a/src/net_setup.c
+++ b/src/net_setup.c
@@ -53,11 +53,22 @@ char *proxyuser;
char *proxypass;
proxytype_t proxytype;
+#ifndef HAVE_RSA_SET0_KEY
+int RSA_set0_key(RSA *r, BIGNUM *n, BIGNUM *e, BIGNUM *d) {
+ BN_free(r->n); r->n = n;
+ BN_free(r->e); r->e = e;
+ BN_free(r->d); r->d = d;
+ return 1;
+}
+#endif
+
bool read_rsa_public_key(connection_t *c) {
FILE *fp;
char *pubname;
char *hcfname;
char *key;
+ BIGNUM *n = NULL;
+ BIGNUM *e = NULL;
if(!c->rsa_key) {
c->rsa_key = RSA_new();
@@ -67,12 +78,19 @@ bool read_rsa_public_key(connection_t *c) {
/* First, check for simple PublicKey statement */
if(get_config_string(lookup_config(c->config_tree, "PublicKey"), &key)) {
- if(BN_hex2bn(&c->rsa_key->n, key) != strlen(key)) {
+ if(BN_hex2bn(&n, key) != strlen(key)) {
+ free(key);
logger(LOG_ERR, "Invalid PublicKey for %s!", c->name);
return false;
}
- BN_hex2bn(&c->rsa_key->e, "FFFF");
free(key);
+ BN_hex2bn(&e, "FFFF");
+ if(!n || !e || RSA_set0_key(c->rsa_key, n, e, NULL) != 1) {
+ BN_free(e);
+ BN_free(n);
+ logger(LOG_ERR, "RSA_set0_key() failed with PublicKey for %s!", c->name);
+ return false;
+ }
return true;
}
@@ -163,27 +181,39 @@ bool read_rsa_public_key(connection_t *c) {
static bool read_rsa_private_key(void) {
FILE *fp;
char *fname, *key, *pubkey;
+ BIGNUM *n = NULL;
+ BIGNUM *e = NULL;
+ BIGNUM *d = NULL;
if(get_config_string(lookup_config(config_tree, "PrivateKey"), &key)) {
myself->connection->rsa_key = RSA_new();
// RSA_blinding_on(myself->connection->rsa_key, NULL);
- if(BN_hex2bn(&myself->connection->rsa_key->d, key) != strlen(key)) {
+ if(BN_hex2bn(&d, key) != strlen(key)) {
logger(LOG_ERR, "Invalid PrivateKey for myself!");
free(key);
return false;
}
free(key);
if(!get_config_string(lookup_config(config_tree, "PublicKey"), &pubkey)) {
+ BN_free(d);
logger(LOG_ERR, "PrivateKey used but no PublicKey found!");
return false;
}
- if(BN_hex2bn(&myself->connection->rsa_key->n, pubkey) != strlen(pubkey)) {
- logger(LOG_ERR, "Invalid PublicKey for myself!");
+ if(BN_hex2bn(&n, pubkey) != strlen(pubkey)) {
free(pubkey);
+ BN_free(d);
+ logger(LOG_ERR, "Invalid PublicKey for myself!");
return false;
}
free(pubkey);
- BN_hex2bn(&myself->connection->rsa_key->e, "FFFF");
+ BN_hex2bn(&e, "FFFF");
+ if(!n || !e || !d || RSA_set0_key(myself->connection->rsa_key, n, e, d) != 1) {
+ BN_free(d);
+ BN_free(e);
+ BN_free(n);
+ logger(LOG_ERR, "RSA_set0_key() failed with PrivateKey for myself!");
+ return false;
+ }
return true;
}
@@ -608,14 +638,25 @@ static bool setup_myself(void) {
}
free(cipher);
} else
- myself->incipher = EVP_bf_cbc();
+ myself->incipher = EVP_aes_256_cbc();
if(myself->incipher)
- myself->inkeylength = myself->incipher->key_len + myself->incipher->iv_len;
+ myself->inkeylength = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(myself->incipher) + EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(myself->incipher);
else
myself->inkeylength = 1;
- myself->connection->outcipher = EVP_bf_ofb();
+ /* We need to use a stream mode for the meta protocol. Use AES for this,
+ but try to match the key size with the one from the cipher selected
+ by Cipher.
+ */
+
+ int keylen = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(myself->incipher);
+ if(keylen <= 16)
+ myself->connection->outcipher = EVP_aes_128_cfb();
+ else if(keylen <= 24)
+ myself->connection->outcipher = EVP_aes_192_cfb();
+ else
+ myself->connection->outcipher = EVP_aes_256_cfb();
if(!get_config_int(lookup_config(config_tree, "KeyExpire"), &keylifetime))
keylifetime = 3600;
@@ -639,13 +680,13 @@ static bool setup_myself(void) {
free(digest);
} else
- myself->indigest = EVP_sha1();
+ myself->indigest = EVP_sha256();
- myself->connection->outdigest = EVP_sha1();
+ myself->connection->outdigest = EVP_sha256();
if(get_config_int(lookup_config(config_tree, "MACLength"), &myself->inmaclength)) {
if(myself->indigest) {
- if(myself->inmaclength > myself->indigest->md_size) {
+ if(myself->inmaclength > EVP_MD_size(myself->indigest)) {
logger(LOG_ERR, "MAC length exceeds size of digest!");
return false;
} else if(myself->inmaclength < 0) {
diff --git a/src/net_socket.c b/src/net_socket.c
index 9a67bb3c..479b595d 100644
--- a/src/net_socket.c
+++ b/src/net_socket.c
@@ -513,6 +513,9 @@ void setup_outgoing_connection(outgoing_t *outgoing) {
new connection
*/
bool handle_new_meta_connection(int sock) {
+ static const int max_accept_burst = 10;
+ static int last_accept_burst;
+ static int last_accept_time;
connection_t *c;
sockaddr_t sa;
int fd;
@@ -525,6 +528,22 @@ bool handle_new_meta_connection(int sock) {
return false;
}
+ if(last_accept_time == now) {
+ last_accept_burst++;
+
+ if(last_accept_burst >= max_accept_burst) {
+ if(last_accept_burst == max_accept_burst) {
+ ifdebug(CONNECTIONS) logger(LOG_WARNING, "Throttling incoming connections");
+ }
+
+ tarpit(fd);
+ return false;
+ }
+ } else {
+ last_accept_burst = 0;
+ last_accept_time = now;
+ }
+
sockaddrunmap(&sa);
c = new_connection();
@@ -546,7 +565,6 @@ bool handle_new_meta_connection(int sock) {
connection_add(c);
c->allow_request = ID;
- send_id(c);
return true;
}
diff --git a/src/node.c b/src/node.c
index cf70f838..19f37306 100644
--- a/src/node.c
+++ b/src/node.c
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
/*
node.c -- node tree management
- Copyright (C) 2001-2011 Guus Sliepen <guus@tinc-vpn.org>,
+ Copyright (C) 2001-2016 Guus Sliepen <guus@tinc-vpn.org>,
2001-2005 Ivo Timmermans
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
@@ -57,8 +57,10 @@ node_t *new_node(void) {
if(replaywin) n->late = xmalloc_and_zero(replaywin);
n->subnet_tree = new_subnet_tree();
n->edge_tree = new_edge_tree();
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&n->inctx);
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&n->outctx);
+ n->inctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
+ n->outctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
+ if(!n->inctx || !n->outctx)
+ abort();
n->mtu = MTU;
n->maxmtu = MTU;
@@ -80,8 +82,8 @@ void free_node(node_t *n) {
sockaddrfree(&n->address);
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&n->inctx);
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&n->outctx);
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(n->outctx);
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(n->inctx);
if(n->mtuevent)
event_del(n->mtuevent);
@@ -172,8 +174,8 @@ void dump_nodes(void) {
for(node = node_tree->head; node; node = node->next) {
n = node->data;
logger(LOG_DEBUG, " %s at %s cipher %d digest %d maclength %d compression %d options %x status %04x nexthop %s via %s pmtu %d (min %d max %d)",
- n->name, n->hostname, n->outcipher ? n->outcipher->nid : 0,
- n->outdigest ? n->outdigest->type : 0, n->outmaclength, n->outcompression,
+ n->name, n->hostname, n->outcipher ? EVP_CIPHER_nid(n->outcipher) : 0,
+ n->outdigest ? EVP_MD_type(n->outdigest) : 0, n->outmaclength, n->outcompression,
n->options, bitfield_to_int(&n->status, sizeof n->status), n->nexthop ? n->nexthop->name : "-",
n->via ? n->via->name : "-", n->mtu, n->minmtu, n->maxmtu);
}
diff --git a/src/node.h b/src/node.h
index f9ef3c15..c83610e8 100644
--- a/src/node.h
+++ b/src/node.h
@@ -50,12 +50,12 @@ typedef struct node_t {
const EVP_CIPHER *incipher; /* Cipher type for UDP packets received from him */
char *inkey; /* Cipher key and iv */
int inkeylength; /* Cipher key and iv length */
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX inctx; /* Cipher context */
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *inctx; /* Cipher context */
const EVP_CIPHER *outcipher; /* Cipher type for UDP packets sent to him*/
char *outkey; /* Cipher key and iv */
int outkeylength; /* Cipher key and iv length */
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX outctx; /* Cipher context */
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *outctx; /* Cipher context */
const EVP_MD *indigest; /* Digest type for MAC of packets received from him */
int inmaclength; /* Length of MAC */
diff --git a/src/protocol_auth.c b/src/protocol_auth.c
index 971341f7..5834fcdf 100644
--- a/src/protocol_auth.c
+++ b/src/protocol_auth.c
@@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ bool id_h(connection_t *c) {
/* Check if identity is a valid name */
- if(!check_id(name)) {
+ if(!check_id(name) || !strcmp(name, myself->name)) {
logger(LOG_ERR, "Got bad %s from %s (%s): %s", "ID", c->name,
c->hostname, "invalid name");
return false;
@@ -177,6 +177,11 @@ bool id_h(connection_t *c) {
if(!c->config_tree)
init_configuration(&c->config_tree);
c->allow_request = ACK;
+
+ if(!c->outgoing) {
+ send_id(c);
+ }
+
return send_ack(c);
}
@@ -196,6 +201,10 @@ bool id_h(connection_t *c) {
c->allow_request = METAKEY;
+ if(!c->outgoing) {
+ send_id(c);
+ }
+
return send_metakey(c);
}
@@ -210,8 +219,11 @@ bool send_metakey(connection_t *c) {
c->outkey = xrealloc(c->outkey, len);
- if(!c->outctx)
- c->outctx = xmalloc_and_zero(sizeof(*c->outctx));
+ if(!c->outctx) {
+ c->outctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
+ if(!c->outctx)
+ abort();
+ }
/* Copy random data to the buffer */
@@ -262,17 +274,17 @@ bool send_metakey(connection_t *c) {
/* Send the meta key */
x = send_request(c, "%d %d %d %d %d %s", METAKEY,
- c->outcipher ? c->outcipher->nid : 0,
- c->outdigest ? c->outdigest->type : 0, c->outmaclength,
+ c->outcipher ? EVP_CIPHER_nid(c->outcipher) : 0,
+ c->outdigest ? EVP_MD_type(c->outdigest) : 0, c->outmaclength,
c->outcompression, buffer);
/* Further outgoing requests are encrypted with the key we just generated */
if(c->outcipher) {
if(!EVP_EncryptInit(c->outctx, c->outcipher,
- (unsigned char *)c->outkey + len - c->outcipher->key_len,
- (unsigned char *)c->outkey + len - c->outcipher->key_len -
- c->outcipher->iv_len)) {
+ (unsigned char *)c->outkey + len - EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c->outcipher),
+ (unsigned char *)c->outkey + len - EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c->outcipher) -
+ EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(c->outcipher))) {
logger(LOG_ERR, "Error during initialisation of cipher for %s (%s): %s",
c->name, c->hostname, ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
return false;
@@ -308,8 +320,11 @@ bool metakey_h(connection_t *c) {
c->inkey = xrealloc(c->inkey, len);
- if(!c->inctx)
- c->inctx = xmalloc_and_zero(sizeof(*c->inctx));
+ if(!c->inctx) {
+ c->inctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
+ if(!c->inctx)
+ abort();
+ }
/* Convert the challenge from hexadecimal back to binary */
@@ -345,9 +360,9 @@ bool metakey_h(connection_t *c) {
}
if(!EVP_DecryptInit(c->inctx, c->incipher,
- (unsigned char *)c->inkey + len - c->incipher->key_len,
- (unsigned char *)c->inkey + len - c->incipher->key_len -
- c->incipher->iv_len)) {
+ (unsigned char *)c->inkey + len - EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c->incipher),
+ (unsigned char *)c->inkey + len - EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c->incipher) -
+ EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(c->incipher))) {
logger(LOG_ERR, "Error during initialisation of cipher from %s (%s): %s",
c->name, c->hostname, ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
return false;
@@ -355,7 +370,8 @@ bool metakey_h(connection_t *c) {
c->status.decryptin = true;
} else {
- c->incipher = NULL;
+ logger(LOG_ERR, "%s (%s) uses null cipher!", c->name, c->hostname);
+ return false;
}
c->inmaclength = maclength;
@@ -368,12 +384,13 @@ bool metakey_h(connection_t *c) {
return false;
}
- if(c->inmaclength > c->indigest->md_size || c->inmaclength < 0) {
+ if(c->inmaclength > EVP_MD_size(c->indigest) || c->inmaclength < 0) {
logger(LOG_ERR, "%s (%s) uses bogus MAC length!", c->name, c->hostname);
return false;
}
} else {
- c->indigest = NULL;
+ logger(LOG_ERR, "%s (%s) uses null digest!", c->name, c->hostname);
+ return false;
}
c->incompression = compression;
@@ -447,27 +464,38 @@ bool challenge_h(connection_t *c) {
/* Rest is done by send_chal_reply() */
- return send_chal_reply(c);
+ if(c->outgoing) {
+ return send_chal_reply(c);
+ } else {
+ return true;
+ }
}
bool send_chal_reply(connection_t *c) {
char hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE * 2 + 1];
- EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
+ EVP_MD_CTX *ctx;
/* Calculate the hash from the challenge we received */
- if(!EVP_DigestInit(&ctx, c->indigest)
- || !EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, c->mychallenge, RSA_size(myself->connection->rsa_key))
- || !EVP_DigestFinal(&ctx, (unsigned char *)hash, NULL)) {
+ ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
+ if(!ctx)
+ abort();
+
+ if(!EVP_DigestInit(ctx, c->indigest)
+ || !EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, c->mychallenge, RSA_size(myself->connection->rsa_key))
+ || !EVP_DigestFinal(ctx, (unsigned char *)hash, NULL)) {
+ EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(ctx);
logger(LOG_ERR, "Error during calculation of response for %s (%s): %s",
c->name, c->hostname, ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
return false;
}
+ EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(ctx);
+
/* Convert the hash to a hexadecimal formatted string */
- bin2hex(hash, hash, c->indigest->md_size);
- hash[c->indigest->md_size * 2] = '\0';
+ bin2hex(hash, hash, EVP_MD_size(c->indigest));
+ hash[EVP_MD_size(c->indigest) * 2] = '\0';
/* Send the reply */
@@ -477,7 +505,7 @@ bool send_chal_reply(connection_t *c) {
bool chal_reply_h(connection_t *c) {
char hishash[MAX_STRING_SIZE];
char myhash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
- EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
+ EVP_MD_CTX *ctx;
if(sscanf(c->buffer, "%*d " MAX_STRING, hishash) != 1) {
logger(LOG_ERR, "Got bad %s from %s (%s)", "CHAL_REPLY", c->name,
@@ -487,7 +515,7 @@ bool chal_reply_h(connection_t *c) {
/* Check if the length of the hash is all right */
- if(strlen(hishash) != c->outdigest->md_size * 2) {
+ if(strlen(hishash) != EVP_MD_size(c->outdigest) * 2) {
logger(LOG_ERR, "Possible intruder %s (%s): %s", c->name,
c->hostname, "wrong challenge reply length");
return false;
@@ -495,24 +523,31 @@ bool chal_reply_h(connection_t *c) {
/* Convert the hash to binary format */
- if(!hex2bin(hishash, hishash, c->outdigest->md_size)) {
+ if(!hex2bin(hishash, hishash, EVP_MD_size(c->outdigest))) {
logger(LOG_ERR, "Got bad %s from %s(%s): %s", "CHAL_REPLY", c->name, c->hostname, "invalid hash");
return false;
}
/* Calculate the hash from the challenge we sent */
- if(!EVP_DigestInit(&ctx, c->outdigest)
- || !EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, c->hischallenge, RSA_size(c->rsa_key))
- || !EVP_DigestFinal(&ctx, (unsigned char *)myhash, NULL)) {
+ ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
+ if(!ctx)
+ abort();
+
+ if(!EVP_DigestInit(ctx, c->outdigest)
+ || !EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, c->hischallenge, RSA_size(c->rsa_key))
+ || !EVP_DigestFinal(ctx, (unsigned char *)myhash, NULL)) {
+ EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(ctx);
logger(LOG_ERR, "Error during calculation of response from %s (%s): %s",
c->name, c->hostname, ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
return false;
}
+ EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(ctx);
+
/* Verify the incoming hash with the calculated hash */
- if(memcmp(hishash, myhash, c->outdigest->md_size)) {
+ if(memcmp(hishash, myhash, EVP_MD_size(c->outdigest))) {
logger(LOG_ERR, "Possible intruder %s (%s): %s", c->name,
c->hostname, "wrong challenge reply");
@@ -531,6 +566,10 @@ bool chal_reply_h(connection_t *c) {
c->allow_request = ACK;
+ if(!c->outgoing) {
+ send_chal_reply(c);
+ }
+
return send_ack(c);
}
diff --git a/src/protocol_edge.c b/src/protocol_edge.c
index 3dfff05e..fa57494e 100644
--- a/src/protocol_edge.c
+++ b/src/protocol_edge.c
@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ bool add_edge_h(connection_t *c) {
/* Check if names are valid */
- if(!check_id(from_name) || !check_id(to_name)) {
+ if(!check_id(from_name) || !check_id(to_name) || !strcmp(from_name, to_name)) {
logger(LOG_ERR, "Got bad %s from %s (%s): %s", "ADD_EDGE", c->name,
c->hostname, "invalid name");
return false;
@@ -181,7 +181,7 @@ bool del_edge_h(connection_t *c) {
/* Check if names are valid */
- if(!check_id(from_name) || !check_id(to_name)) {
+ if(!check_id(from_name) || !check_id(to_name) || !strcmp(from_name, to_name)) {
logger(LOG_ERR, "Got bad %s from %s (%s): %s", "DEL_EDGE", c->name,
c->hostname, "invalid name");
return false;
diff --git a/src/protocol_key.c b/src/protocol_key.c
index 301ead5d..1b96597f 100644
--- a/src/protocol_key.c
+++ b/src/protocol_key.c
@@ -164,7 +164,7 @@ bool send_ans_key(node_t *to) {
}
if(to->incipher)
- EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&to->inctx, to->incipher, NULL, (unsigned char *)to->inkey, (unsigned char *)to->inkey + to->incipher->key_len);
+ EVP_DecryptInit_ex(to->inctx, to->incipher, NULL, (unsigned char *)to->inkey, (unsigned char *)to->inkey + EVP_CIPHER_key_length(to->incipher));
// Reset sequence number and late packet window
mykeyused = true;
@@ -178,8 +178,8 @@ bool send_ans_key(node_t *to) {
return send_request(to->nexthop->connection, "%d %s %s %s %d %d %d %d", ANS_KEY,
myself->name, to->name, key,
- to->incipher ? to->incipher->nid : 0,
- to->indigest ? to->indigest->type : 0, to->inmaclength,
+ to->incipher ? EVP_CIPHER_nid(to->incipher) : 0,
+ to->indigest ? EVP_MD_type(to->indigest) : 0, to->inmaclength,
to->incompression);
}
@@ -268,12 +268,17 @@ bool ans_key_h(connection_t *c) {
return true;
}
- if(from->outkeylength != from->outcipher->key_len + from->outcipher->iv_len) {
+ if(from->outkeylength != EVP_CIPHER_key_length(from->outcipher) + EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(from->outcipher)) {
logger(LOG_ERR, "Node %s (%s) uses wrong keylength!", from->name,
from->hostname);
return true;
}
} else {
+ if(from->outkeylength != 1) {
+ logger(LOG_ERR, "Node %s (%s) uses wrong keylength!", from->name, from->hostname);
+ return true;
+ }
+
from->outcipher = NULL;
}
@@ -288,7 +293,7 @@ bool ans_key_h(connection_t *c) {
return true;
}
- if(from->outmaclength > from->outdigest->md_size || from->outmaclength < 0) {
+ if(from->outmaclength > EVP_MD_size(from->outdigest) || from->outmaclength < 0) {
logger(LOG_ERR, "Node %s (%s) uses bogus MAC length!",
from->name, from->hostname);
return true;
@@ -305,7 +310,7 @@ bool ans_key_h(connection_t *c) {
from->outcompression = compression;
if(from->outcipher)
- if(!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&from->outctx, from->outcipher, NULL, (unsigned char *)from->outkey, (unsigned char *)from->outkey + from->outcipher->key_len)) {
+ if(!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(from->outctx, from->outcipher, NULL, (unsigned char *)from->outkey, (unsigned char *)from->outkey + EVP_CIPHER_key_length(from->outcipher))) {
logger(LOG_ERR, "Error during initialisation of key from %s (%s): %s",
from->name, from->hostname, ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
return true;
diff --git a/src/tincd.c b/src/tincd.c
index b6a6c29c..19f2e174 100644
--- a/src/tincd.c
+++ b/src/tincd.c
@@ -330,7 +330,7 @@ static bool parse_options(int argc, char **argv) {
/* This function prettyprints the key generation process */
-static void indicator(int a, int b, void *p) {
+static int indicator(int a, int b, BN_GENCB *cb) {
switch (a) {
case 0:
fprintf(stderr, ".");
@@ -362,19 +362,48 @@ static void indicator(int a, int b, void *p) {
default:
fprintf(stderr, "?");
}
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+#ifndef HAVE_BN_GENCB_NEW
+BN_GENCB *BN_GENCB_new(void) {
+ return xmalloc_and_zero(sizeof(BN_GENCB));
}
+void BN_GENCB_free(BN_GENCB *cb) {
+ free(cb);
+}
+#endif
+
/*
Generate a public/private RSA keypair, and ask for a file to store
them in.
*/
static bool keygen(int bits) {
+ BIGNUM *e = NULL;
RSA *rsa_key;
FILE *f;
char *pubname, *privname;
+ BN_GENCB *cb;
+ int result;
fprintf(stderr, "Generating %d bits keys:\n", bits);
- rsa_key = RSA_generate_key(bits, 0x10001, indicator, NULL);
+
+ cb = BN_GENCB_new();
+ if(!cb)
+ abort();
+ BN_GENCB_set(cb, indicator, NULL);
+
+ rsa_key = RSA_new();
+ BN_hex2bn(&e, "10001");
+ if(!rsa_key || !e)
+ abort();
+
+ result = RSA_generate_key_ex(rsa_key, bits, e, cb);
+
+ BN_free(e);
+ BN_GENCB_free(cb);
if(!rsa_key) {
fprintf(stderr, "Error during key generation!\n");
@@ -697,7 +726,11 @@ end:
EVP_cleanup();
ENGINE_cleanup();
CRYPTO_cleanup_all_ex_data();
+#ifdef HAVE_ERR_REMOVE_STATE
+ // OpenSSL claims this function was deprecated in 1.0.0,
+ // but valgrind's leak detector shows you still need to call it to make sure OpenSSL cleans up properly.
ERR_remove_state(0);
+#endif
ERR_free_strings();
exit_configuration(&config_tree);
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