lagertonne/tinc
1
0
Fork 0
Code Issues Pull requests Projects Releases 6 Wiki Activity

Import Upstream version 1.0.5

Browse source
This commit is contained in:
Guus Sliepen 2019-08-26 13:44:37 +02:00
parent 392ff555ea
commit a18165833b
90 changed files with 7610 additions and 5088 deletions
Download patch file Download diff file Expand all files Collapse all files

34
src/protocol_auth.c
View file

@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
/*
protocol_auth.c -- handle the meta-protocol, authentication
Copyright (C) 1999-2005 Ivo Timmermans <ivo@tinc-vpn.org>,
2000-2005 Guus Sliepen <guus@tinc-vpn.org>
Copyright (C) 1999-2005 Ivo Timmermans,
2000-2006 Guus Sliepen <guus@tinc-vpn.org>
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
@ -17,7 +17,7 @@
along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
Foundation, Inc., 675 Mass Ave, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA.
$Id: protocol_auth.c 1439 2005-05-04 18:09:30Z guus $
$Id: protocol_auth.c 1452 2006-04-26 13:52:58Z guus $
*/
#include "system.h"
@ -118,7 +118,7 @@ bool id_h(connection_t *c)
bool send_metakey(connection_t *c)
{
char buffer[MAX_STRING_SIZE];
char *buffer;
int len;
bool x;
@ -128,6 +128,8 @@ bool send_metakey(connection_t *c)
/* Allocate buffers for the meta key */
buffer = alloca(2 * len + 1);
if(!c->outkey)
c->outkey = xmalloc(len);
@ -136,7 +138,7 @@ bool send_metakey(connection_t *c)
cp();
/* Copy random data to the buffer */
RAND_pseudo_bytes(c->outkey, len);
RAND_pseudo_bytes((unsigned char *)c->outkey, len);
/* The message we send must be smaller than the modulus of the RSA key.
By definition, for a key of k bits, the following formula holds:
@ -164,7 +166,7 @@ bool send_metakey(connection_t *c)
with a length equal to that of the modulus of the RSA key.
*/
if(RSA_public_encrypt(len, c->outkey, buffer, c->rsa_key, RSA_NO_PADDING) != len) {
if(RSA_public_encrypt(len, (unsigned char *)c->outkey, (unsigned char *)buffer, c->rsa_key, RSA_NO_PADDING) != len) {
logger(LOG_ERR, _("Error during encryption of meta key for %s (%s)"),
c->name, c->hostname);
return false;
@ -186,8 +188,8 @@ bool send_metakey(connection_t *c)
if(c->outcipher) {
if(!EVP_EncryptInit(c->outctx, c->outcipher,
c->outkey + len - c->outcipher->key_len,
c->outkey + len - c->outcipher->key_len -
(unsigned char *)c->outkey + len - c->outcipher->key_len,
(unsigned char *)c->outkey + len - c->outcipher->key_len -
c->outcipher->iv_len)) {
logger(LOG_ERR, _("Error during initialisation of cipher for %s (%s): %s"),
c->name, c->hostname, ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
@ -237,7 +239,7 @@ bool metakey_h(connection_t *c)
/* Decrypt the meta key */
if(RSA_private_decrypt(len, buffer, c->inkey, myself->connection->rsa_key, RSA_NO_PADDING) != len) { /* See challenge() */
if(RSA_private_decrypt(len, (unsigned char *)buffer, (unsigned char *)c->inkey, myself->connection->rsa_key, RSA_NO_PADDING) != len) { /* See challenge() */
logger(LOG_ERR, _("Error during encryption of meta key for %s (%s)"),
c->name, c->hostname);
return false;
@ -262,8 +264,8 @@ bool metakey_h(connection_t *c)
}
if(!EVP_DecryptInit(c->inctx, c->incipher,
c->inkey + len - c->incipher->key_len,
c->inkey + len - c->incipher->key_len -
(unsigned char *)c->inkey + len - c->incipher->key_len,
(unsigned char *)c->inkey + len - c->incipher->key_len -
c->incipher->iv_len)) {
logger(LOG_ERR, _("Error during initialisation of cipher from %s (%s): %s"),
c->name, c->hostname, ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
@ -302,7 +304,7 @@ bool metakey_h(connection_t *c)
bool send_challenge(connection_t *c)
{
char buffer[MAX_STRING_SIZE];
char *buffer;
int len;
cp();
@ -313,12 +315,14 @@ bool send_challenge(connection_t *c)
/* Allocate buffers for the challenge */
buffer = alloca(2 * len + 1);
if(!c->hischallenge)
c->hischallenge = xmalloc(len);
/* Copy random data to the buffer */
RAND_pseudo_bytes(c->hischallenge, len);
RAND_pseudo_bytes((unsigned char *)c->hischallenge, len);
/* Convert to hex */
@ -380,7 +384,7 @@ bool send_chal_reply(connection_t *c)
if(!EVP_DigestInit(&ctx, c->indigest)
|| !EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, c->mychallenge, RSA_size(myself->connection->rsa_key))
|| !EVP_DigestFinal(&ctx, hash, NULL)) {
|| !EVP_DigestFinal(&ctx, (unsigned char *)hash, NULL)) {
logger(LOG_ERR, _("Error during calculation of response for %s (%s): %s"),
c->name, c->hostname, ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
return false;
@ -426,7 +430,7 @@ bool chal_reply_h(connection_t *c)
if(!EVP_DigestInit(&ctx, c->outdigest)
|| !EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, c->hischallenge, RSA_size(c->rsa_key))
|| !EVP_DigestFinal(&ctx, myhash, NULL)) {
|| !EVP_DigestFinal(&ctx, (unsigned char *)myhash, NULL)) {
logger(LOG_ERR, _("Error during calculation of response from %s (%s): %s"),
c->name, c->hostname, ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
return false;