Import Upstream version 1.1~pre2
This commit is contained in:
Guus Sliepen
parent
a04a7bcd67
commit
02de1cd2f1
172 changed files with 32291 additions and 25994 deletions
|
|
@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
|
|||
/*
|
||||
protocol_auth.c -- handle the meta-protocol, authentication
|
||||
Copyright (C) 1999-2005 Ivo Timmermans,
|
||||
2000-2016 Guus Sliepen <guus@tinc-vpn.org>
|
||||
2000-2010 Guus Sliepen <guus@tinc-vpn.org>
|
||||
|
||||
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
|
||||
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
|
||||
|
|
@ -20,49 +20,64 @@
|
|||
|
||||
#include "system.h"
|
||||
|
||||
#include <openssl/sha.h>
|
||||
#include <openssl/rand.h>
|
||||
#include <openssl/err.h>
|
||||
#include <openssl/evp.h>
|
||||
|
||||
#include "avl_tree.h"
|
||||
#include "splay_tree.h"
|
||||
#include "conf.h"
|
||||
#include "connection.h"
|
||||
#include "control.h"
|
||||
#include "control_common.h"
|
||||
#include "cipher.h"
|
||||
#include "crypto.h"
|
||||
#include "digest.h"
|
||||
#include "edge.h"
|
||||
#include "graph.h"
|
||||
#include "logger.h"
|
||||
#include "meta.h"
|
||||
#include "net.h"
|
||||
#include "netutl.h"
|
||||
#include "node.h"
|
||||
#include "prf.h"
|
||||
#include "protocol.h"
|
||||
#include "proxy.h"
|
||||
#include "rsa.h"
|
||||
#include "utils.h"
|
||||
#include "xalloc.h"
|
||||
|
||||
bool send_id(connection_t *c) {
|
||||
if(proxytype && c->outgoing && !c->status.proxy_passed) {
|
||||
return send_proxyrequest(c);
|
||||
gettimeofday(&c->start, NULL);
|
||||
|
||||
int minor = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
if(experimental) {
|
||||
if(c->config_tree && !read_ecdsa_public_key(c))
|
||||
minor = 1;
|
||||
else
|
||||
minor = myself->connection->protocol_minor;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return send_request(c, "%d %s %d", ID, myself->connection->name,
|
||||
myself->connection->protocol_version);
|
||||
return send_request(c, "%d %s %d.%d", ID, myself->connection->name, myself->connection->protocol_major, minor);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
bool id_h(connection_t *c) {
|
||||
bool id_h(connection_t *c, char *request) {
|
||||
char name[MAX_STRING_SIZE];
|
||||
|
||||
if(sscanf(c->buffer, "%*d " MAX_STRING " %d", name, &c->protocol_version) != 2) {
|
||||
if(sscanf(request, "%*d " MAX_STRING " %d.%d", name, &c->protocol_major, &c->protocol_minor) < 2) {
|
||||
logger(LOG_ERR, "Got bad %s from %s (%s)", "ID", c->name,
|
||||
c->hostname);
|
||||
c->hostname);
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* Check if this is a control connection */
|
||||
|
||||
if(name[0] == '^' && !strcmp(name + 1, controlcookie)) {
|
||||
c->status.control = true;
|
||||
c->allow_request = CONTROL;
|
||||
c->last_ping_time = time(NULL) + 3600;
|
||||
return send_request(c, "%d %d %d", ACK, TINC_CTL_VERSION_CURRENT, getpid());
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* Check if identity is a valid name */
|
||||
|
||||
if(!check_id(name) || !strcmp(name, myself->name)) {
|
||||
if(!check_id(name)) {
|
||||
logger(LOG_ERR, "Got bad %s from %s (%s): %s", "ID", c->name,
|
||||
c->hostname, "invalid name");
|
||||
c->hostname, "invalid name");
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -71,36 +86,27 @@ bool id_h(connection_t *c) {
|
|||
if(c->outgoing) {
|
||||
if(strcmp(c->name, name)) {
|
||||
logger(LOG_ERR, "Peer %s is %s instead of %s", c->hostname, name,
|
||||
c->name);
|
||||
c->name);
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
}
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
if(c->name) {
|
||||
if(c->name)
|
||||
free(c->name);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
c->name = xstrdup(name);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* Check if version matches */
|
||||
|
||||
if(c->protocol_version != myself->connection->protocol_version) {
|
||||
logger(LOG_ERR, "Peer %s (%s) uses incompatible version %d",
|
||||
c->name, c->hostname, c->protocol_version);
|
||||
if(c->protocol_major != myself->connection->protocol_major) {
|
||||
logger(LOG_ERR, "Peer %s (%s) uses incompatible version %d.%d",
|
||||
c->name, c->hostname, c->protocol_major, c->protocol_minor);
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if(bypass_security) {
|
||||
if(!c->config_tree) {
|
||||
if(!c->config_tree)
|
||||
init_configuration(&c->config_tree);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
c->allow_request = ACK;
|
||||
|
||||
if(!c->outgoing) {
|
||||
send_id(c);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return send_ack(c);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -109,66 +115,67 @@ bool id_h(connection_t *c) {
|
|||
|
||||
if(!read_connection_config(c)) {
|
||||
logger(LOG_ERR, "Peer %s had unknown identity (%s)", c->hostname,
|
||||
c->name);
|
||||
c->name);
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if(experimental && c->protocol_minor >= 2)
|
||||
if(!read_ecdsa_public_key(c))
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
if(!ecdsa_active(&c->ecdsa))
|
||||
c->protocol_minor = 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if(!read_rsa_public_key(c)) {
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if(!experimental)
|
||||
c->protocol_minor = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
c->allow_request = METAKEY;
|
||||
|
||||
if(!c->outgoing) {
|
||||
send_id(c);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return send_metakey(c);
|
||||
if(c->protocol_minor >= 2)
|
||||
return send_metakey_ec(c);
|
||||
else
|
||||
return send_metakey(c);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static uint64_t byte_budget(const EVP_CIPHER *cipher) {
|
||||
/* Hopefully some failsafe way to calculate the maximum amount of bytes to
|
||||
send/receive with a given cipher before we might run into birthday paradox
|
||||
attacks. Because we might use different modes, the block size of the mode
|
||||
might be 1 byte. In that case, use the IV length. Ensure the whole thing
|
||||
is limited to what can be represented with a 64 bits integer.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
bool send_metakey_ec(connection_t *c) {
|
||||
logger(LOG_DEBUG, "Sending ECDH metakey to %s", c->name);
|
||||
|
||||
int ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher);
|
||||
int blklen = EVP_CIPHER_block_size(cipher);
|
||||
int len = blklen > 1 ? blklen : ivlen > 1 ? ivlen : 8;
|
||||
int bits = len * 4 - 1;
|
||||
return bits < 64 ? UINT64_C(1) << bits : UINT64_MAX;
|
||||
size_t siglen = ecdsa_size(&myself->connection->ecdsa);
|
||||
|
||||
char key[(ECDH_SIZE + siglen) * 2 + 1];
|
||||
|
||||
// TODO: include nonce? Use relevant parts of SSH or TLS protocol
|
||||
|
||||
if(!ecdh_generate_public(&c->ecdh, key))
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
|
||||
if(!ecdsa_sign(&myself->connection->ecdsa, key, ECDH_SIZE, key + ECDH_SIZE))
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
|
||||
b64encode(key, key, ECDH_SIZE + siglen);
|
||||
|
||||
return send_request(c, "%d %s", METAKEY, key);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
bool send_metakey(connection_t *c) {
|
||||
bool x;
|
||||
|
||||
int len = RSA_size(c->rsa_key);
|
||||
|
||||
/* Allocate buffers for the meta key */
|
||||
|
||||
char buffer[2 * len + 1];
|
||||
|
||||
c->outkey = xrealloc(c->outkey, len);
|
||||
|
||||
if(!c->outctx) {
|
||||
c->outctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
|
||||
|
||||
if(!c->outctx) {
|
||||
abort();
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* Copy random data to the buffer */
|
||||
|
||||
if(1 != RAND_bytes((unsigned char *)c->outkey, len)) {
|
||||
int err = ERR_get_error();
|
||||
logger(LOG_ERR, "Failed to generate meta key (%s)", ERR_error_string(err, NULL));
|
||||
if(!read_rsa_public_key(c))
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if(!cipher_open_blowfish_ofb(&c->outcipher))
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
|
||||
if(!digest_open_sha1(&c->outdigest, -1))
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
|
||||
size_t len = rsa_size(&c->rsa);
|
||||
char key[len];
|
||||
char enckey[len];
|
||||
char hexkey[2 * len + 1];
|
||||
|
||||
/* Create a random key */
|
||||
|
||||
randomize(key, len);
|
||||
|
||||
/* The message we send must be smaller than the modulus of the RSA key.
|
||||
By definition, for a key of k bits, the following formula holds:
|
||||
|
|
@ -180,13 +187,13 @@ bool send_metakey(connection_t *c) {
|
|||
This can be done by setting the most significant bit to zero.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
c->outkey[0] &= 0x7F;
|
||||
key[0] &= 0x7F;
|
||||
|
||||
cipher_set_key_from_rsa(&c->outcipher, key, len, true);
|
||||
|
||||
ifdebug(SCARY_THINGS) {
|
||||
bin2hex(c->outkey, buffer, len);
|
||||
buffer[len * 2] = '\0';
|
||||
logger(LOG_DEBUG, "Generated random meta key (unencrypted): %s",
|
||||
buffer);
|
||||
bin2hex(key, hexkey, len);
|
||||
logger(LOG_DEBUG, "Generated random meta key (unencrypted): %s", hexkey);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* Encrypt the random data
|
||||
|
|
@ -196,144 +203,152 @@ bool send_metakey(connection_t *c) {
|
|||
with a length equal to that of the modulus of the RSA key.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
if(RSA_public_encrypt(len, (unsigned char *)c->outkey, (unsigned char *)buffer, c->rsa_key, RSA_NO_PADDING) != len) {
|
||||
logger(LOG_ERR, "Error during encryption of meta key for %s (%s): %s",
|
||||
c->name, c->hostname, ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
|
||||
if(!rsa_public_encrypt(&c->rsa, key, len, enckey)) {
|
||||
logger(LOG_ERR, "Error during encryption of meta key for %s (%s)", c->name, c->hostname);
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* Convert the encrypted random data to a hexadecimal formatted string */
|
||||
|
||||
bin2hex(buffer, buffer, len);
|
||||
buffer[len * 2] = '\0';
|
||||
bin2hex(enckey, hexkey, len);
|
||||
|
||||
/* Send the meta key */
|
||||
|
||||
x = send_request(c, "%d %d %d %d %d %s", METAKEY,
|
||||
c->outcipher ? EVP_CIPHER_nid(c->outcipher) : 0,
|
||||
c->outdigest ? EVP_MD_type(c->outdigest) : 0, c->outmaclength,
|
||||
c->outcompression, buffer);
|
||||
|
||||
/* Further outgoing requests are encrypted with the key we just generated */
|
||||
|
||||
if(c->outcipher) {
|
||||
if(!EVP_EncryptInit(c->outctx, c->outcipher,
|
||||
(unsigned char *)c->outkey + len - EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c->outcipher),
|
||||
(unsigned char *)c->outkey + len - EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c->outcipher) -
|
||||
EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(c->outcipher))) {
|
||||
logger(LOG_ERR, "Error during initialisation of cipher for %s (%s): %s",
|
||||
c->name, c->hostname, ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
c->outbudget = byte_budget(c->outcipher);
|
||||
c->status.encryptout = true;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return x;
|
||||
bool result = send_request(c, "%d %d %d %d %d %s", METAKEY,
|
||||
cipher_get_nid(&c->outcipher),
|
||||
digest_get_nid(&c->outdigest), c->outmaclength,
|
||||
c->outcompression, hexkey);
|
||||
|
||||
c->status.encryptout = true;
|
||||
return result;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
bool metakey_h(connection_t *c) {
|
||||
char buffer[MAX_STRING_SIZE];
|
||||
int cipher, digest, maclength, compression;
|
||||
int len;
|
||||
static bool metakey_ec_h(connection_t *c, const char *request) {
|
||||
size_t siglen = ecdsa_size(&c->ecdsa);
|
||||
char key[MAX_STRING_SIZE];
|
||||
char sig[siglen];
|
||||
|
||||
if(sscanf(c->buffer, "%*d %d %d %d %d " MAX_STRING, &cipher, &digest, &maclength, &compression, buffer) != 5) {
|
||||
logger(LOG_ERR, "Got bad %s from %s (%s)", "METAKEY", c->name,
|
||||
c->hostname);
|
||||
logger(LOG_DEBUG, "Got ECDH metakey from %s", c->name);
|
||||
|
||||
if(sscanf(request, "%*d " MAX_STRING, key) != 1) {
|
||||
logger(LOG_ERR, "Got bad %s from %s (%s)", "METAKEY", c->name, c->hostname);
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
len = RSA_size(myself->connection->rsa_key);
|
||||
int inlen = b64decode(key, key, sizeof key);
|
||||
|
||||
/* Check if the length of the meta key is all right */
|
||||
|
||||
if(strlen(buffer) != (size_t)len * 2) {
|
||||
if(inlen != (ECDH_SIZE + siglen)) {
|
||||
logger(LOG_ERR, "Possible intruder %s (%s): %s", c->name, c->hostname, "wrong keylength");
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* Allocate buffers for the meta key */
|
||||
if(!ecdsa_verify(&c->ecdsa, key, ECDH_SIZE, key + ECDH_SIZE)) {
|
||||
logger(LOG_ERR, "Possible intruder %s (%s): %s", c->name, c->hostname, "invalid ECDSA signature");
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
c->inkey = xrealloc(c->inkey, len);
|
||||
char shared[ECDH_SHARED_SIZE];
|
||||
|
||||
if(!c->inctx) {
|
||||
c->inctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
|
||||
if(!ecdh_compute_shared(&c->ecdh, key, shared))
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
|
||||
if(!c->inctx) {
|
||||
abort();
|
||||
}
|
||||
/* Update our crypto end */
|
||||
|
||||
if(!cipher_open_by_name(&c->incipher, "aes-256-ofb"))
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
if(!digest_open_by_name(&c->indigest, "sha512", -1))
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
if(!cipher_open_by_name(&c->outcipher, "aes-256-ofb"))
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
if(!digest_open_by_name(&c->outdigest, "sha512", -1))
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
|
||||
size_t mykeylen = cipher_keylength(&c->incipher);
|
||||
size_t hiskeylen = cipher_keylength(&c->outcipher);
|
||||
|
||||
char *mykey;
|
||||
char *hiskey;
|
||||
char *seed;
|
||||
|
||||
if(strcmp(myself->name, c->name) < 0) {
|
||||
mykey = key;
|
||||
hiskey = key + mykeylen * 2;
|
||||
xasprintf(&seed, "tinc TCP key expansion %s %s", myself->name, c->name);
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
mykey = key + hiskeylen * 2;
|
||||
hiskey = key;
|
||||
xasprintf(&seed, "tinc TCP key expansion %s %s", c->name, myself->name);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if(!prf(shared, ECDH_SHARED_SIZE, seed, strlen(seed), key, hiskeylen * 2 + mykeylen * 2))
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
|
||||
free(seed);
|
||||
|
||||
cipher_set_key(&c->incipher, mykey, false);
|
||||
digest_set_key(&c->indigest, mykey + mykeylen, mykeylen);
|
||||
|
||||
cipher_set_key(&c->outcipher, hiskey, true);
|
||||
digest_set_key(&c->outdigest, hiskey + hiskeylen, hiskeylen);
|
||||
|
||||
c->status.decryptin = true;
|
||||
c->status.encryptout = true;
|
||||
c->allow_request = CHALLENGE;
|
||||
|
||||
return send_challenge(c);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
bool metakey_h(connection_t *c, char *request) {
|
||||
if(c->protocol_minor >= 2)
|
||||
return metakey_ec_h(c, request);
|
||||
|
||||
char hexkey[MAX_STRING_SIZE];
|
||||
int cipher, digest, maclength, compression;
|
||||
size_t len = rsa_size(&myself->connection->rsa);
|
||||
char enckey[len];
|
||||
char key[len];
|
||||
|
||||
if(sscanf(request, "%*d %d %d %d %d " MAX_STRING, &cipher, &digest, &maclength, &compression, hexkey) != 5) {
|
||||
logger(LOG_ERR, "Got bad %s from %s (%s)", "METAKEY", c->name, c->hostname);
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* Convert the challenge from hexadecimal back to binary */
|
||||
|
||||
if(!hex2bin(buffer, buffer, len)) {
|
||||
logger(LOG_ERR, "Got bad %s from %s(%s): %s", "METAKEY", c->name, c->hostname, "invalid key");
|
||||
int inlen = hex2bin(hexkey, enckey, sizeof enckey);
|
||||
|
||||
/* Check if the length of the meta key is all right */
|
||||
|
||||
if(inlen != len) {
|
||||
logger(LOG_ERR, "Possible intruder %s (%s): %s", c->name, c->hostname, "wrong keylength");
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* Decrypt the meta key */
|
||||
|
||||
if(RSA_private_decrypt(len, (unsigned char *)buffer, (unsigned char *)c->inkey, myself->connection->rsa_key, RSA_NO_PADDING) != len) { /* See challenge() */
|
||||
logger(LOG_ERR, "Error during decryption of meta key for %s (%s): %s",
|
||||
c->name, c->hostname, ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
|
||||
if(!rsa_private_decrypt(&myself->connection->rsa, enckey, len, key)) {
|
||||
logger(LOG_ERR, "Error during decryption of meta key for %s (%s)", c->name, c->hostname);
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
ifdebug(SCARY_THINGS) {
|
||||
bin2hex(c->inkey, buffer, len);
|
||||
buffer[len * 2] = '\0';
|
||||
logger(LOG_DEBUG, "Received random meta key (unencrypted): %s", buffer);
|
||||
bin2hex(key, hexkey, len);
|
||||
logger(LOG_DEBUG, "Received random meta key (unencrypted): %s", hexkey);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* All incoming requests will now be encrypted. */
|
||||
|
||||
/* Check and lookup cipher and digest algorithms */
|
||||
|
||||
if(cipher) {
|
||||
c->incipher = EVP_get_cipherbynid(cipher);
|
||||
|
||||
if(!c->incipher) {
|
||||
logger(LOG_ERR, "%s (%s) uses unknown cipher!", c->name, c->hostname);
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if(!EVP_DecryptInit(c->inctx, c->incipher,
|
||||
(unsigned char *)c->inkey + len - EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c->incipher),
|
||||
(unsigned char *)c->inkey + len - EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c->incipher) -
|
||||
EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(c->incipher))) {
|
||||
logger(LOG_ERR, "Error during initialisation of cipher from %s (%s): %s",
|
||||
c->name, c->hostname, ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
c->inbudget = byte_budget(c->incipher);
|
||||
c->status.decryptin = true;
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
logger(LOG_ERR, "%s (%s) uses null cipher!", c->name, c->hostname);
|
||||
if(!cipher_open_by_nid(&c->incipher, cipher) || !cipher_set_key_from_rsa(&c->incipher, key, len, false)) {
|
||||
logger(LOG_ERR, "Error during initialisation of cipher from %s (%s)", c->name, c->hostname);
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
c->inmaclength = maclength;
|
||||
|
||||
if(digest) {
|
||||
c->indigest = EVP_get_digestbynid(digest);
|
||||
|
||||
if(!c->indigest) {
|
||||
logger(LOG_ERR, "Node %s (%s) uses unknown digest!", c->name, c->hostname);
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if(c->inmaclength > EVP_MD_size(c->indigest) || c->inmaclength < 0) {
|
||||
logger(LOG_ERR, "%s (%s) uses bogus MAC length!", c->name, c->hostname);
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
}
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
logger(LOG_ERR, "%s (%s) uses null digest!", c->name, c->hostname);
|
||||
if(!digest_open_by_nid(&c->indigest, digest, -1)) {
|
||||
logger(LOG_ERR, "Error during initialisation of digest from %s (%s)", c->name, c->hostname);
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
c->incompression = compression;
|
||||
c->status.decryptin = true;
|
||||
|
||||
c->allow_request = CHALLENGE;
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -341,166 +356,87 @@ bool metakey_h(connection_t *c) {
|
|||
}
|
||||
|
||||
bool send_challenge(connection_t *c) {
|
||||
/* CHECKME: what is most reasonable value for len? */
|
||||
size_t len = c->protocol_minor >= 2 ? ECDH_SIZE : rsa_size(&c->rsa);
|
||||
char buffer[len * 2 + 1];
|
||||
|
||||
int len = RSA_size(c->rsa_key);
|
||||
|
||||
/* Allocate buffers for the challenge */
|
||||
|
||||
char buffer[2 * len + 1];
|
||||
|
||||
c->hischallenge = xrealloc(c->hischallenge, len);
|
||||
if(!c->hischallenge)
|
||||
c->hischallenge = xrealloc(c->hischallenge, len);
|
||||
|
||||
/* Copy random data to the buffer */
|
||||
|
||||
if(1 != RAND_bytes((unsigned char *)c->hischallenge, len)) {
|
||||
int err = ERR_get_error();
|
||||
logger(LOG_ERR, "Failed to generate challenge (%s)", ERR_error_string(err, NULL));
|
||||
return false; // Do not send predictable challenges, let connection attempt fail.
|
||||
}
|
||||
randomize(c->hischallenge, len);
|
||||
|
||||
/* Convert to hex */
|
||||
|
||||
bin2hex(c->hischallenge, buffer, len);
|
||||
buffer[len * 2] = '\0';
|
||||
|
||||
/* Send the challenge */
|
||||
|
||||
return send_request(c, "%d %s", CHALLENGE, buffer);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
bool challenge_h(connection_t *c) {
|
||||
bool challenge_h(connection_t *c, char *request) {
|
||||
char buffer[MAX_STRING_SIZE];
|
||||
int len;
|
||||
size_t len = c->protocol_minor >= 2 ? ECDH_SIZE : rsa_size(&myself->connection->rsa);
|
||||
size_t digestlen = digest_length(&c->indigest);
|
||||
char digest[digestlen];
|
||||
|
||||
if(sscanf(c->buffer, "%*d " MAX_STRING, buffer) != 1) {
|
||||
logger(LOG_ERR, "Got bad %s from %s (%s)", "CHALLENGE", c->name,
|
||||
c->hostname);
|
||||
if(sscanf(request, "%*d " MAX_STRING, buffer) != 1) {
|
||||
logger(LOG_ERR, "Got bad %s from %s (%s)", "CHALLENGE", c->name, c->hostname);
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
len = RSA_size(myself->connection->rsa_key);
|
||||
|
||||
/* Check if the length of the challenge is all right */
|
||||
|
||||
if(strlen(buffer) != (size_t)len * 2) {
|
||||
logger(LOG_ERR, "Possible intruder %s (%s): %s", c->name,
|
||||
c->hostname, "wrong challenge length");
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* Allocate buffers for the challenge */
|
||||
|
||||
c->mychallenge = xrealloc(c->mychallenge, len);
|
||||
|
||||
/* Convert the challenge from hexadecimal back to binary */
|
||||
|
||||
if(!hex2bin(buffer, c->mychallenge, len)) {
|
||||
logger(LOG_ERR, "Got bad %s from %s(%s): %s", "CHALLENGE", c->name, c->hostname, "invalid challenge");
|
||||
int inlen = hex2bin(buffer, buffer, sizeof buffer);
|
||||
|
||||
/* Check if the length of the challenge is all right */
|
||||
|
||||
if(inlen != len) {
|
||||
logger(LOG_ERR, "Possible intruder %s (%s): %s", c->name, c->hostname, "wrong challenge length");
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
c->allow_request = CHAL_REPLY;
|
||||
|
||||
/* Rest is done by send_chal_reply() */
|
||||
|
||||
if(c->outgoing) {
|
||||
return send_chal_reply(c);
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
return true;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
bool send_chal_reply(connection_t *c) {
|
||||
char hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE * 2 + 1];
|
||||
EVP_MD_CTX *ctx;
|
||||
|
||||
/* Calculate the hash from the challenge we received */
|
||||
|
||||
ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
|
||||
|
||||
if(!ctx) {
|
||||
abort();
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if(!EVP_DigestInit(ctx, c->indigest)
|
||||
|| !EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, c->mychallenge, RSA_size(myself->connection->rsa_key))
|
||||
|| !EVP_DigestFinal(ctx, (unsigned char *)hash, NULL)) {
|
||||
EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(ctx);
|
||||
logger(LOG_ERR, "Error during calculation of response for %s (%s): %s",
|
||||
c->name, c->hostname, ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(ctx);
|
||||
digest_create(&c->indigest, buffer, len, digest);
|
||||
|
||||
/* Convert the hash to a hexadecimal formatted string */
|
||||
|
||||
bin2hex(hash, hash, EVP_MD_size(c->indigest));
|
||||
hash[EVP_MD_size(c->indigest) * 2] = '\0';
|
||||
bin2hex(digest, buffer, digestlen);
|
||||
|
||||
/* Send the reply */
|
||||
|
||||
return send_request(c, "%d %s", CHAL_REPLY, hash);
|
||||
return send_request(c, "%d %s", CHAL_REPLY, buffer);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
bool chal_reply_h(connection_t *c) {
|
||||
bool chal_reply_h(connection_t *c, char *request) {
|
||||
char hishash[MAX_STRING_SIZE];
|
||||
char myhash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
|
||||
EVP_MD_CTX *ctx;
|
||||
|
||||
if(sscanf(c->buffer, "%*d " MAX_STRING, hishash) != 1) {
|
||||
if(sscanf(request, "%*d " MAX_STRING, hishash) != 1) {
|
||||
logger(LOG_ERR, "Got bad %s from %s (%s)", "CHAL_REPLY", c->name,
|
||||
c->hostname);
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* Check if the length of the hash is all right */
|
||||
|
||||
if(strlen(hishash) != (size_t)EVP_MD_size(c->outdigest) * 2) {
|
||||
logger(LOG_ERR, "Possible intruder %s (%s): %s", c->name,
|
||||
c->hostname, "wrong challenge reply length");
|
||||
c->hostname);
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* Convert the hash to binary format */
|
||||
|
||||
if(!hex2bin(hishash, hishash, EVP_MD_size(c->outdigest))) {
|
||||
logger(LOG_ERR, "Got bad %s from %s(%s): %s", "CHAL_REPLY", c->name, c->hostname, "invalid hash");
|
||||
int inlen = hex2bin(hishash, hishash, sizeof hishash);
|
||||
|
||||
/* Check if the length of the hash is all right */
|
||||
|
||||
if(inlen != digest_length(&c->outdigest)) {
|
||||
logger(LOG_ERR, "Possible intruder %s (%s): %s", c->name, c->hostname, "wrong challenge reply length");
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* Calculate the hash from the challenge we sent */
|
||||
|
||||
ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
|
||||
|
||||
if(!ctx) {
|
||||
abort();
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if(!EVP_DigestInit(ctx, c->outdigest)
|
||||
|| !EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, c->hischallenge, RSA_size(c->rsa_key))
|
||||
|| !EVP_DigestFinal(ctx, (unsigned char *)myhash, NULL)) {
|
||||
EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(ctx);
|
||||
logger(LOG_ERR, "Error during calculation of response from %s (%s): %s",
|
||||
c->name, c->hostname, ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(ctx);
|
||||
|
||||
/* Verify the incoming hash with the calculated hash */
|
||||
|
||||
if(memcmp(hishash, myhash, EVP_MD_size(c->outdigest))) {
|
||||
logger(LOG_ERR, "Possible intruder %s (%s): %s", c->name,
|
||||
c->hostname, "wrong challenge reply");
|
||||
|
||||
ifdebug(SCARY_THINGS) {
|
||||
bin2hex(myhash, hishash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
|
||||
hishash[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH * 2] = '\0';
|
||||
logger(LOG_DEBUG, "Expected challenge reply: %s", hishash);
|
||||
}
|
||||
/* Verify the hash */
|
||||
|
||||
if(!digest_verify(&c->outdigest, c->hischallenge, c->protocol_minor >= 2 ? ECDH_SIZE : rsa_size(&c->rsa), hishash)) {
|
||||
logger(LOG_ERR, "Possible intruder %s (%s): %s", c->name, c->hostname, "wrong challenge reply");
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -508,16 +444,31 @@ bool chal_reply_h(connection_t *c) {
|
|||
Send an acknowledgement with the rest of the information needed.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
free(c->hischallenge);
|
||||
c->hischallenge = NULL;
|
||||
c->allow_request = ACK;
|
||||
|
||||
if(!c->outgoing) {
|
||||
send_chal_reply(c);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return send_ack(c);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static bool send_upgrade(connection_t *c) {
|
||||
/* Special case when protocol_minor is 1: the other end is ECDSA capable,
|
||||
* but doesn't know our key yet. So send it now. */
|
||||
|
||||
char *pubkey = ecdsa_get_base64_public_key(&myself->connection->ecdsa);
|
||||
|
||||
if(!pubkey)
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
|
||||
bool result = send_request(c, "%d %s", ACK, pubkey);
|
||||
free(pubkey);
|
||||
return result;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
bool send_ack(connection_t *c) {
|
||||
if(c->protocol_minor == 1)
|
||||
return send_upgrade(c);
|
||||
|
||||
/* ACK message contains rest of the information the other end needs
|
||||
to create node_t and edge_t structures. */
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -531,24 +482,19 @@ bool send_ack(connection_t *c) {
|
|||
|
||||
/* Check some options */
|
||||
|
||||
if((get_config_bool(lookup_config(c->config_tree, "IndirectData"), &choice) && choice) || myself->options & OPTION_INDIRECT) {
|
||||
if((get_config_bool(lookup_config(c->config_tree, "IndirectData"), &choice) && choice) || myself->options & OPTION_INDIRECT)
|
||||
c->options |= OPTION_INDIRECT;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if((get_config_bool(lookup_config(c->config_tree, "TCPOnly"), &choice) && choice) || myself->options & OPTION_TCPONLY) {
|
||||
if((get_config_bool(lookup_config(c->config_tree, "TCPOnly"), &choice) && choice) || myself->options & OPTION_TCPONLY)
|
||||
c->options |= OPTION_TCPONLY | OPTION_INDIRECT;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if(myself->options & OPTION_PMTU_DISCOVERY && !(c->options & OPTION_TCPONLY)) {
|
||||
if(myself->options & OPTION_PMTU_DISCOVERY)
|
||||
c->options |= OPTION_PMTU_DISCOVERY;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
choice = myself->options & OPTION_CLAMP_MSS;
|
||||
get_config_bool(lookup_config(c->config_tree, "ClampMSS"), &choice);
|
||||
|
||||
if(choice) {
|
||||
if(choice)
|
||||
c->options |= OPTION_CLAMP_MSS;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
get_config_int(lookup_config(c->config_tree, "Weight"), &c->estimated_weight);
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -556,7 +502,7 @@ bool send_ack(connection_t *c) {
|
|||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static void send_everything(connection_t *c) {
|
||||
avl_node_t *node, *node2;
|
||||
splay_node_t *node, *node2;
|
||||
node_t *n;
|
||||
subnet_t *s;
|
||||
edge_t *e;
|
||||
|
|
@ -587,16 +533,39 @@ static void send_everything(connection_t *c) {
|
|||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
bool ack_h(connection_t *c) {
|
||||
static bool upgrade_h(connection_t *c, char *request) {
|
||||
char pubkey[MAX_STRING_SIZE];
|
||||
|
||||
if(sscanf(request, "%*d " MAX_STRING, pubkey) != 1) {
|
||||
logger(LOG_ERR, "Got bad %s from %s (%s)", "ACK", c->name, c->hostname);
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if(ecdsa_active(&c->ecdsa) || read_ecdsa_public_key(c)) {
|
||||
logger(LOG_INFO, "Already have ECDSA public key from %s (%s), not upgrading.", c->name, c->hostname);
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
logger(LOG_INFO, "Got ECDSA public key from %s (%s), upgrading!", c->name, c->hostname);
|
||||
append_config_file(c->name, "ECDSAPublicKey", pubkey);
|
||||
c->allow_request = TERMREQ;
|
||||
return send_termreq(c);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
bool ack_h(connection_t *c, char *request) {
|
||||
if(c->protocol_minor == 1)
|
||||
return upgrade_h(c, request);
|
||||
|
||||
char hisport[MAX_STRING_SIZE];
|
||||
char *hisaddress;
|
||||
int weight, mtu;
|
||||
uint32_t options;
|
||||
node_t *n;
|
||||
bool choice;
|
||||
|
||||
if(sscanf(c->buffer, "%*d " MAX_STRING " %d %x", hisport, &weight, &options) != 3) {
|
||||
if(sscanf(request, "%*d " MAX_STRING " %d %x", hisport, &weight, &options) != 3) {
|
||||
logger(LOG_ERR, "Got bad %s from %s (%s)", "ACK", c->name,
|
||||
c->hostname);
|
||||
c->hostname);
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -611,8 +580,17 @@ bool ack_h(connection_t *c) {
|
|||
} else {
|
||||
if(n->connection) {
|
||||
/* Oh dear, we already have a connection to this node. */
|
||||
ifdebug(CONNECTIONS) logger(LOG_DEBUG, "Established a second connection with %s (%s), closing old connection",
|
||||
n->name, n->hostname);
|
||||
ifdebug(CONNECTIONS) logger(LOG_DEBUG, "Established a second connection with %s (%s), closing old connection", n->connection->name, n->connection->hostname);
|
||||
|
||||
if(n->connection->outgoing) {
|
||||
if(c->outgoing)
|
||||
logger(LOG_WARNING, "Two outgoing connections to the same node!");
|
||||
else
|
||||
c->outgoing = n->connection->outgoing;
|
||||
|
||||
n->connection->outgoing = NULL;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
terminate_connection(n->connection, false);
|
||||
/* Run graph algorithm to purge key and make sure up/down scripts are rerun with new IP addresses and stuff */
|
||||
graph();
|
||||
|
|
@ -621,37 +599,35 @@ bool ack_h(connection_t *c) {
|
|||
|
||||
n->connection = c;
|
||||
c->node = n;
|
||||
|
||||
if(!(c->options & options & OPTION_PMTU_DISCOVERY)) {
|
||||
c->options &= ~OPTION_PMTU_DISCOVERY;
|
||||
options &= ~OPTION_PMTU_DISCOVERY;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
c->options |= options;
|
||||
|
||||
if(get_config_int(lookup_config(c->config_tree, "PMTU"), &mtu) && mtu < n->mtu) {
|
||||
if(get_config_int(lookup_config(c->config_tree, "PMTU"), &mtu) && mtu < n->mtu)
|
||||
n->mtu = mtu;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if(get_config_int(lookup_config(config_tree, "PMTU"), &mtu) && mtu < n->mtu) {
|
||||
if(get_config_int(lookup_config(config_tree, "PMTU"), &mtu) && mtu < n->mtu)
|
||||
n->mtu = mtu;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if(get_config_bool(lookup_config(c->config_tree, "ClampMSS"), &choice)) {
|
||||
if(choice) {
|
||||
if(choice)
|
||||
c->options |= OPTION_CLAMP_MSS;
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
else
|
||||
c->options &= ~OPTION_CLAMP_MSS;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if(c->protocol_minor > 0)
|
||||
c->node->status.ecdh = true;
|
||||
|
||||
/* Activate this connection */
|
||||
|
||||
c->allow_request = ALL;
|
||||
c->status.active = true;
|
||||
|
||||
ifdebug(CONNECTIONS) logger(LOG_NOTICE, "Connection with %s (%s) activated", c->name,
|
||||
c->hostname);
|
||||
c->hostname);
|
||||
|
||||
/* Send him everything we know */
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -662,8 +638,9 @@ bool ack_h(connection_t *c) {
|
|||
c->edge = new_edge();
|
||||
c->edge->from = myself;
|
||||
c->edge->to = n;
|
||||
sockaddrcpy(&c->edge->address, &c->address);
|
||||
sockaddr_setport(&c->edge->address, hisport);
|
||||
sockaddr2str(&c->address, &hisaddress, NULL);
|
||||
c->edge->address = str2sockaddr(hisaddress, hisport);
|
||||
free(hisaddress);
|
||||
c->edge->weight = (weight + c->estimated_weight) / 2;
|
||||
c->edge->connection = c;
|
||||
c->edge->options = c->options;
|
||||
|
|
@ -672,11 +649,10 @@ bool ack_h(connection_t *c) {
|
|||
|
||||
/* Notify everyone of the new edge */
|
||||
|
||||
if(tunnelserver) {
|
||||
if(tunnelserver)
|
||||
send_add_edge(c, c->edge);
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
send_add_edge(everyone, c->edge);
|
||||
}
|
||||
else
|
||||
send_add_edge(broadcast, c->edge);
|
||||
|
||||
/* Run MST and SSSP algorithms */
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
Loading…
Add table
Add a link
Reference in a new issue