mirror of
https://github.com/retspen/webvirtcloud
synced 2026-11-08 19:26:48 +00:00
4d34d9d07c
Add webvirtcloud/test_authorization_matrix.py, which walks every named URL and checks that a user without any VM/compute relation only reaches an explicit allowlist, and that the global view_instances permission does not open consoles. It found: - /computes/<id>/... views without any check (compute_graph, get_compute_*, get_dom_capabilities, storages.get_volumes): the whole computes URL namespace is now wrapped with superuser_only, so a view added there later cannot be exposed by a missing decorator. - guess_mac_address (leaks dhcpd.conf host/MAC pairs), random_mac_address and guess_clone_name: superuser-only, like the buttons that use them. - check_instance: cross-tenant VM name lookup with no caller; removed. - getvvfile and get_vdi_url: reachable with only view_instances, and the .vv file contains the VNC password. Console access now follows one rule, instances.utils.can_open_console: an active superuser or an active owner of the VM. The global view_instances permission is read-only. It is used by the console page, novncd, getvvfile and get_vdi_url (getvvfile and the VDI tab are kept for virt-viewer users). The console page answers 403 instead of 500 when access is denied, with the same answer for a missing VM. |
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| .. | ||
| api | ||
| migrations | ||
| templates | ||
| __init__.py | ||
| forms.py | ||
| models.py | ||
| test_api_security.py | ||
| test_reconciliation.py | ||
| tests.py | ||
| urls.py | ||
| utils.py | ||
| validators.py | ||
| views.py | ||