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webvirtcloud/conf/daemon/gstfsd
catborise 2dab23cd9e fix(gstfsd): only the panel, with the host's key, can change a VM's disk
gstfsd, the root service on each compute that rewrites a shut-off VM's
/etc/shadow and authorized_keys, did what any client on its port asked.
Now it needs GSTFSD_KEY (64 hexadecimal characters, in the unit's
/etc/default/webvirt-gstfsd) and does not start without it. Each
connection gets a new challenge; the panel signs its request for it
with HMAC-SHA256 and gstfsd checks the signature before any change, so
a request recorded on one connection is refused on another. gstfsd
signs its reply for the same challenge and the panel's nonce, and the
panel accepts only that reply.

Each compute has a gstfsd key, the host's GSTFSD_KEY: the compute forms
and the API take it and never show it, and an empty value on an edit
keeps it. The bootstrap script makes the key file once, readable by
root only; the README shows how to make it and where the panel takes
it. The traffic is still not encrypted: a remote panel's port stays
open to the panel's address only.
2026-10-31 01:53:43 +03:00

351 lines
13 KiB
Python

#!/usr/bin/env python3
#
# gstfsd - WebVirtCloud daemon for managing VM's filesystem
#
# The server reads one JSON request per connection and sends exactly one JSON
# reply. Each change runs in a worker process ("gstfsd --worker") that is
# killed, with its guestfs appliance, when the request is not done DEADLINE
# seconds after the connection was accepted.
#
# Only the panel may ask: it knows this host's key (GSTFSD_KEY, 64 hex
# characters, the gstfsd key of the host in the panel). Each connection gets
# a new challenge; the request and the reply carry an HMAC-SHA256 of it:
#
# gstfsd -> panel {"challenge": C}\n
# panel -> gstfsd {"nonce": N, "request": R, "mac": mac("request", C, N, R)}
# gstfsd -> panel {"reply": A, "mac": mac("reply", C, N, A)}
#
# R and A are the request and the reply as JSON text. A request recorded on
# one connection is refused on any other, and only the panel's own
# connection can get a reply it accepts. The traffic is not encrypted.
#
import hashlib
import hmac
import ipaddress
import json
import os
import re
import secrets
import select
import signal
import socket
import socketserver
import subprocess
import sys
import threading
import time
HEX64 = re.compile(r"[0-9a-f]{64}")
KEY = os.environ.get("GSTFSD_KEY", "").strip()
PORT = int(os.environ.get("GSTFSD_PORT", 16510))
ADDRESS = os.environ.get("GSTFSD_BIND_HOST", "127.0.0.1")
MAX_REQUEST = 64 * 1024
# A request, from accepting the connection to closing the appliance, must
# finish within this many seconds, or it is stopped: the panel gives up 120 s
# after connecting and releases the VM, which may then be started.
DEADLINE = float(os.environ.get("GSTFSD_DEADLINE", 100))
MAX_DEADLINE = 100
# Time to send the reply after the deadline.
REPLY_TIMEOUT = 5
# Time for a killed worker and its appliance to be gone.
STOP_TIMEOUT = 5
def is_loopback(host):
try:
return ipaddress.ip_address(host).is_loopback
except ValueError:
return host == "localhost"
# --- worker: one change to one guest ----------------------------------------
def set_root_password(gfs, passwd):
shadow = gfs.cat('/etc/shadow')
new_shadow, found = re.subn('^root:[^:]*:', lambda m: "root:" + passwd + ":", shadow, flags=re.MULTILINE)
if found != 1:
raise RuntimeError("/etc/shadow has %d root entries, need exactly one" % found)
gfs.write('/etc/shadow', new_shadow)
gfs.chmod(0o640, '/etc/shadow')
def add_root_key(gfs, key):
if not gfs.is_dir('/root/.ssh'):
gfs.mkdir('/root/.ssh')
gfs.chmod(0o700, "/root/.ssh")
# Add the key; keep the ones already there.
keys_path = '/root/.ssh/authorized_keys'
keys = gfs.cat(keys_path) if gfs.is_file(keys_path) else ''
new_key = key.strip()
if new_key not in keys.splitlines():
if keys and not keys.endswith('\n'):
keys += '\n'
gfs.write(keys_path, keys + new_key + '\n')
gfs.chmod(0o600, keys_path)
# action: (function, the files it changes, where it may create files)
ACTIONS = {
'password': (lambda gfs, data: set_root_password(gfs, data['passwd']), ['/etc/shadow'], None),
'publickey': (lambda gfs, data: add_root_key(gfs, data['key']), ['/root/.ssh/authorized_keys'], '/root/.ssh'),
}
def selinux_specfile(gfs):
"""The guest's SELinux file contexts, or None without an SELinux policy or
with SELinux disabled (enabling it again relabels the whole guest)."""
if not gfs.is_file('/etc/selinux/config'):
return None
config = gfs.cat('/etc/selinux/config')
if re.search(r"^\s*SELINUX\s*=\s*[\"']?disabled\b", config, re.MULTILINE):
return None
found = re.search(r"^\s*SELINUXTYPE\s*=\s*[\"']?([\w.-]+)", config, re.MULTILINE)
specfile = '/etc/selinux/%s/contexts/files/file_contexts' % (found.group(1) if found else 'targeted')
return specfile if gfs.is_file(specfile) else None
def holds(mountpoint, path):
return mountpoint == '/' or path == mountpoint or path.startswith(mountpoint.rstrip('/') + '/')
def mount_guest(gfs, paths):
"""Mount the guest's one operating system the way it mounts itself (LVM
included), parents first. A filesystem on the way to one of paths must
mount; another one that fails (a broken /data) is left out."""
roots = gfs.inspect_os()
if len(roots) != 1:
raise RuntimeError("found %d operating systems on the disks, need exactly one" % len(roots))
mountpoints = gfs.inspect_get_mountpoints(roots[0])
for mountpoint in sorted(mountpoints, key=len):
try:
gfs.mount(mountpoints[mountpoint], mountpoint)
except RuntimeError:
if any(holds(mountpoint, path) for path in paths):
raise
def change_guest(data):
import guestfs
action, paths, creates = ACTIONS[data['action']]
gfs = guestfs.GuestFS(python_return_dict=True)
launched = False
try:
gfs.add_domain(data['vname'])
gfs.launch()
launched = True
mount_guest(gfs, paths)
if '/etc/shadow' in paths and not gfs.is_file('/etc/shadow'):
raise RuntimeError("the guest has no /etc/shadow")
# A file libguestfs creates has no SELinux label, and an enforcing
# guest's sshd does not read an unlabeled authorized_keys.
specfile = creates and selinux_specfile(gfs)
if specfile and not gfs.feature_available(['selinuxrelabel']):
raise RuntimeError("the guest uses SELinux, but libguestfs on this host cannot set SELinux labels")
action(gfs, data)
if specfile:
gfs.selinux_relabel(specfile, creates, force=True)
except Exception:
# the first error is the one to report; cleanup still runs
if launched:
try:
gfs.umount_all()
gfs.shutdown()
except Exception:
pass
gfs.close()
raise
try:
# writes reach the disk at umount and shutdown: their errors count
gfs.umount_all()
gfs.shutdown()
finally:
gfs.close()
def worker():
"""Read one request on stdin, change the guest, write the reply on stdout."""
try:
change_guest(json.loads(sys.stdin.buffer.read()))
reply = {'return': 'success'}
except Exception as err:
reply = {'return': 'error', 'message': str(err)}
sys.stdout.write(json.dumps(reply))
return 0
# --- server -----------------------------------------------------------------
def read_request(sock, end):
"""The client sends one JSON object and waits for the reply: read until
it parses (a long SSH key spans several reads), before end (a
time.monotonic() value) and within MAX_REQUEST bytes."""
data = b""
while True:
remaining = end - time.monotonic()
if remaining <= 0:
raise ValueError("the request was not complete within %d seconds" % DEADLINE)
sock.settimeout(remaining)
try:
chunk = sock.recv(min(4096, MAX_REQUEST + 1 - len(data)))
except socket.timeout:
raise ValueError("the request was not complete within %d seconds" % DEADLINE)
if not chunk:
return json.loads(data)
data += chunk
if len(data) > MAX_REQUEST:
raise ValueError("the request is longer than %d bytes" % MAX_REQUEST)
try:
return json.loads(data)
except ValueError:
continue
def mac(kind, challenge, nonce, payload):
message = "\n".join(("gstfsd-v1", kind, challenge, nonce, payload)).encode()
return hmac.new(bytes.fromhex(KEY), message, hashlib.sha256).hexdigest()
def signed_request(sock, end, challenge):
"""The client's nonce and request, if the panel signed it for this
connection's challenge; PermissionError otherwise, before any change."""
frame = read_request(sock, end)
nonce, request, given = (frame.get(key) if isinstance(frame, dict) else None for key in ("nonce", "request", "mac"))
if not (isinstance(nonce, str) and HEX64.fullmatch(nonce) and isinstance(request, str)
and isinstance(given, str) and hmac.compare_digest(given, mac("request", challenge, nonce, request))):
raise PermissionError("the request is not signed with this host's gstfsd key")
return nonce, json.loads(request)
def group_running(pgid):
"""Whether a process of the group still runs. A killed appliance whose
parent is gone may stay a zombie until init reaps it; it holds no disk."""
for pid in os.listdir('/proc'):
try:
with open('/proc/%s/stat' % pid) as f:
fields = f.read().rsplit(')', 1)[1].split()
except (OSError, IndexError):
continue # not a process, or gone meanwhile
if fields[0] != 'Z' and int(fields[2]) == pgid:
return True
return False
def stop_worker(proc):
"""Kill the worker with its appliance and wait until they are gone."""
try:
os.killpg(proc.pid, signal.SIGKILL)
except ProcessLookupError:
pass
# a process in uninterruptible disk I/O dies only when the I/O ends
end = time.monotonic() + STOP_TIMEOUT
try:
proc.wait(timeout=STOP_TIMEOUT)
except subprocess.TimeoutExpired:
pass
while time.monotonic() < end:
if proc.returncode is not None and not group_running(proc.pid):
return
time.sleep(0.05)
raise RuntimeError("the change was stopped, but its appliance is still running")
def watch_client(sock, proc, done):
"""Kill the worker when the client leaves: the panel then no longer keeps
the VM from being started. The client sends nothing more until the reply."""
while not done.is_set():
try:
if select.select([sock], [], [], 0.2)[0] and not sock.recv(4096):
break
except OSError:
break
else:
return
try:
os.killpg(proc.pid, signal.SIGKILL)
except ProcessLookupError:
pass
def run_worker(data, end, sock):
if data.get('action') not in ACTIONS:
raise ValueError("unknown action %r" % data.get('action'))
# Its own session, and the appliance started directly by it (not by
# libvirtd): killing the worker's process group also kills the appliance.
proc = subprocess.Popen(
[sys.executable, os.path.abspath(__file__), '--worker'],
stdin=subprocess.PIPE, stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.PIPE,
start_new_session=True,
env=dict(os.environ, LIBGUESTFS_BACKEND='direct'),
)
done = threading.Event()
watcher = threading.Thread(target=watch_client, args=(sock, proc, done), daemon=True)
watcher.start()
try:
out, err = proc.communicate(json.dumps(data).encode(), timeout=max(0, end - time.monotonic()))
except subprocess.TimeoutExpired:
stop_worker(proc)
raise RuntimeError("the change took longer than %d seconds and was stopped" % DEADLINE)
finally:
done.set()
watcher.join()
if proc.returncode != 0:
stop_worker(proc) # a crashed or killed worker may leave its appliance
lines = err.decode(errors='replace').strip().splitlines()
raise RuntimeError("the change failed (exit %d): %s" % (proc.returncode, lines[-1] if lines else "no output"))
return json.loads(out)
class MyTCPServerHandler(socketserver.StreamRequestHandler):
def handle(self):
# Exactly one reply per request, success or error; signed only for a
# signed request.
end = time.monotonic() + DEADLINE
challenge, nonce = secrets.token_hex(32), None
try:
self.request.settimeout(REPLY_TIMEOUT)
self.request.sendall((json.dumps({"challenge": challenge}) + "\n").encode())
nonce, data = signed_request(self.request, end, challenge)
reply = run_worker(data, end, self.request)
except Exception as err:
reply = {'return': 'error', 'message': str(err)}
answer = json.dumps(reply)
frame = {"reply": answer, "mac": mac("reply", challenge, nonce, answer) if nonce else ""}
try:
self.request.settimeout(REPLY_TIMEOUT)
self.request.sendall(json.dumps(frame).encode())
except OSError:
pass # the client is gone
def serve():
# gstfsd is a root service that rewrites any VM's /etc/shadow and
# authorized_keys; its traffic is not encrypted, so it only listens on
# loopback unless explicitly allowed.
if not HEX64.fullmatch(KEY):
sys.stderr.write("gstfsd: GSTFSD_KEY must be 64 hexadecimal characters (lowercase); "
"set it in /etc/default/webvirt-gstfsd\n")
return 1
if not 0 < DEADLINE <= MAX_DEADLINE:
sys.stderr.write("gstfsd: GSTFSD_DEADLINE must be above 0 and at most %d seconds\n" % MAX_DEADLINE)
return 1
if not is_loopback(ADDRESS) and os.environ.get("GSTFSD_ALLOW_REMOTE") != "1":
sys.stderr.write(
"gstfsd: refusing to listen on %s (a root service whose traffic is not encrypted). "
"Set GSTFSD_ALLOW_REMOTE=1 to allow it on a trusted network.\n" % ADDRESS
)
return 1
class MyTCPServer(socketserver.ThreadingTCPServer):
allow_reuse_address = True
address_family = socket.AF_INET6 if ":" in ADDRESS else socket.AF_INET
MyTCPServer((ADDRESS, PORT), MyTCPServerHandler).serve_forever()
return 0
if __name__ == '__main__':
sys.exit(worker() if sys.argv[1:] == ['--worker'] else serve())