The edit form posts net-*-<n> fields for NIC n and carries only the
new MAC. The backend read index 0 and looked the NIC up by the new MAC,
so editing a MAC detached nothing and attached a second NIC, and edits
of any NIC but the first were applied with empty values.
The form now also posts the current MAC (net-old-mac-<n>). The view
reads the submitted NIC's fields, validates the new MAC and reports
errors. The backend replaces the NIC with the old MAC, refuses an
unknown one, and on a failed attach restores the old NIC and raises
instead of reporting success.
The view crashed with a TypeError without a Referer header; it now
returns to the instance page, and a Referer from another site is
ignored.
- Flavor create/update/delete fell back to the nonexistent
instances:flavors URL; reverse() ran on every request, so each of
them raised NoReverseMatch. Fall back to instances:index.
- Creating a VM from XML called instances.utils.refresh_instance_database,
which does not exist; use utils.refr.
Both found by running the live libvirt suite.
Disk edits:
- edit_disk built a new <disk> from the form and replaced the old one,
losing what the form does not show (e.g. encryption and virtio
driver options); a bus change detached and re-attached the disk.
The disk of the persistent definition is now edited in place and the
domain defined once; a bus change picks a free device name and drops
the old address and virtio-only options. Pending persistent changes of
a running VM are kept.
- Clone omits empty disk devices, refuses a disk without a supported
source and destination, and checks the name before allocating storage.
Locks:
- Every VM change held its compute's exclusive lock, so one slow
operation blocked all VMs on that compute. A VM change now holds its
own VM lock plus a shared compute lock; reconciliation, migration and
cloning hold the compute exclusively (two clones of different VMs
must not pass the name check together).
- Quota-checked changes of one user (CPU, memory and disk resize,
clone) run one at a time under a per-user lock, also across computes,
so concurrent requests cannot all pass the check against the old
allocation. It is the outermost lock; superusers, who have no quota,
skip it.
- A busy lock answers 409 to the API and a message in the web UI. API
power and destroy actions return the view's error instead of success.
A disk without driver/@type could not be edited: the empty format was
rejected, and edit_disk would have written type=''. An empty format is
now accepted and edit_disk leaves the type attribute out.
Clone refused VMs that cloned fine before: a disk without a volume got a
None disk name, and a source image with characters such as a space or "@"
produced a derived name outside the allowed pattern. Disks without a
volume (which clone_instance does not copy) are no longer validated, and
derived disk names are sanitized to the allowed charset. Names typed by a
superuser are still validated strictly.
The edit_volume bus change detached the disk and attached a new one built
as a file disk, so block and rbd disks lost their source and auth, and a
failed attach left the disk detached. Add wvmInstance.change_disk_bus,
which reuses the disk element and only changes <target> (dropping the old
bus address), and re-attaches the original disk if attaching fails.
edit_disk also rebuilt every disk with <source file=...>; it now keeps the
existing <source> and <auth> of block and network disks.
- Hash the root password with a random SHA-512 salt instead of the fixed
"$6$kgPoiREy".
- Talk to gstfsd through one helper with a 120 s socket timeout; an
unreachable daemon or a bad reply is an error message, not a 500.
- gstfsd refuses to listen on a non-loopback address unless
GSTFSD_ALLOW_REMOTE=1: it is an unauthenticated root service.
- gstfsd: encode replies (sendall(str) raised TypeError on Python 3, so
the success path never worked) and use octal chmod modes.
- README: what gstfsd does and how to allow it on a remote compute.
- edit_volume passed driver_type to attach_disk, which has no such
parameter, so every bus change failed after the disk was detached; pass
format_type.
- A disk without a driver type shows "None" in the edit form; keep the
disk's current format instead of rejecting it.
- Validate with fullmatch, so a trailing newline is no longer accepted,
and use one volume-name pattern for disk views and clone.
change_options set is_template for any owner with is_change; the
"staff only" rule existed only as a disabled checkbox in the UI. A
non-staff owner could mark or unmark templates with a POST, and because a
disabled checkbox is not submitted, a non-staff owner who only edited a
template's title or description silently unmarked it, which lifted the
template-only restrictions.
Only change is_template for superusers and staff (for them an unchecked,
unsubmitted checkbox still means "not a template"); leave it alone for
everyone else.
The console settings form on the VM detail page renders the VNC password
(PasswordInput(render_value=True)) and was shown to every is_staff user.
A staff user with the global view_instances permission, or a staff owner
without is_vnc, could read the VNC password of every VM they could see.
Add instances.utils.can_manage_console (active superuser, or an active
owner with is_change and is_vnc), which matches what update_console
already enforced. The detail view only builds the form, and so only puts
the password into the page, when it returns True; the template and
update_console use the same rule.
Add webvirtcloud/test_authorization_matrix.py, which walks every named URL
and checks that a user without any VM/compute relation only reaches an
explicit allowlist, and that the global view_instances permission does not
open consoles. It found:
- /computes/<id>/... views without any check (compute_graph,
get_compute_*, get_dom_capabilities, storages.get_volumes): the whole
computes URL namespace is now wrapped with superuser_only, so a view
added there later cannot be exposed by a missing decorator.
- guess_mac_address (leaks dhcpd.conf host/MAC pairs), random_mac_address
and guess_clone_name: superuser-only, like the buttons that use them.
- check_instance: cross-tenant VM name lookup with no caller; removed.
- getvvfile and get_vdi_url: reachable with only view_instances, and the
.vv file contains the VNC password.
Console access now follows one rule, instances.utils.can_open_console:
an active superuser or an active owner of the VM. The global
view_instances permission is read-only. It is used by the console page,
novncd, getvvfile and get_vdi_url (getvvfile and the VDI tab are kept for
virt-viewer users). The console page answers 403 instead of 500 when
access is denied, with the same answer for a missing VM.
clone only required "view" access, so a user with clone_instances and the
global view_instances permission could clone anyone's VM and read its
disks. It also copied every POST field into clone_data, which let the
client override the server-set disk_owner_uid/gid, and disk-<dev> values
went unvalidated into volume XML and os.path.join.
- Require change permission on the source VM, except for templates,
which any user who can view them may clone.
- Build clone_data from an allowlist: name, title and description for
everyone; disk names and MAC addresses only from superusers.
- For non-superusers, derive disk names (get_clone_disk_name) and MAC
addresses (DHCP or random) on the server; their form only sent the
source VM's own values, which could never work.
- Validate every MAC address (not only the first) and every disk name;
a missing MAC is an error message instead of a KeyError.
Several views returned json.dumps() output through HttpResponse, i.e. as
text/html, and guess_mac_address reflects the URL's vname into it
(reflected XSS). Templates filled the log table and volume dropdowns by
concatenating server data into HTML strings, and log messages contain
user-entered snapshot/disk/clone names (stored XSS that runs when a
superuser opens the Logs tab).
- Use JsonResponse in guess_mac_address, random_mac_address,
guess_clone_name, sshkeys, storages.get_volumes,
datasource.os_metadata_json and logs.vm_logs; sshkeys?plain=true is
served as text/plain.
- stats_tab.html builds log rows with .text(); instance.html and
create_instance_w2.html build <option> elements with .val().text().
Disk and media mutation views (add_new_vol, add_existing_vol, edit_volume,
delete_vol, detach_vol, add_cdrom, detach_cdrom, mount_iso, unmount_iso)
were reachable by any owner with is_change, although the UI only shows the
Disk tab to superusers. An ordinary user could delete any volume on the
compute or attach arbitrary host files to their VM.
- Require superuser for all disk/media views, matching the UI.
- delete_vol resolves the volume from the VM's own disk XML by dev and
ignores the posted storage/name.
- Validate bus/cache/io/discard/detect_zeroes against the hypervisor's
lists, and format/serial/volume name against strict patterns.
- add_existing_vol only accepts volumes that exist in the selected pool.
- edit_volume only accepts a dev attached to the VM.
- vrtManager: escape all values interpolated into disk XML and pass dev
as an XPath variable in detach_disk/edit_disk.
- Relax libvirt-python and lxml version pins to allow precompiled distro packages
- Add PEP 508 environment marker to crypt-r (python_version >= 3.13) to avoid unnecessary C compilation on Python 3.12
- Add stdlib crypt fallback when crypt_r is not available in instances/views.py
- Make LDAP imports and configuration optional in settings.py.template
- Add --system-site-packages and missing packages in webvirtcloud.sh for RHEL/CentOS
- Update README with working Rocky Linux / RHEL / Fedora installation and local dev setup
* Add rest framework for API: First Commit
* modify some shell scripts to make variable references safer; modify some python scripts to reduce the code complexity and cyclomatic complexity of functions.
* Add REST API for some webvirtcloud functions. Instance list/delete/create, compute list/delete/create, storages-network list/retrieve. Add swagger and redoc for API interface
* update requirements
Co-authored-by: herengui <herengui@uniontech.com>
