- edit_volume passed driver_type to attach_disk, which has no such
parameter, so every bus change failed after the disk was detached; pass
format_type.
- A disk without a driver type shows "None" in the edit form; keep the
disk's current format instead of rejecting it.
- Validate with fullmatch, so a trailing newline is no longer accepted,
and use one volume-name pattern for disk views and clone.
change_options set is_template for any owner with is_change; the
"staff only" rule existed only as a disabled checkbox in the UI. A
non-staff owner could mark or unmark templates with a POST, and because a
disabled checkbox is not submitted, a non-staff owner who only edited a
template's title or description silently unmarked it, which lifted the
template-only restrictions.
Only change is_template for superusers and staff (for them an unchecked,
unsubmitted checkbox still means "not a template"); leave it alone for
everyone else.
The console settings form on the VM detail page renders the VNC password
(PasswordInput(render_value=True)) and was shown to every is_staff user.
A staff user with the global view_instances permission, or a staff owner
without is_vnc, could read the VNC password of every VM they could see.
Add instances.utils.can_manage_console (active superuser, or an active
owner with is_change and is_vnc), which matches what update_console
already enforced. The detail view only builds the form, and so only puts
the password into the page, when it returns True; the template and
update_console use the same rule.
Add webvirtcloud/test_authorization_matrix.py, which walks every named URL
and checks that a user without any VM/compute relation only reaches an
explicit allowlist, and that the global view_instances permission does not
open consoles. It found:
- /computes/<id>/... views without any check (compute_graph,
get_compute_*, get_dom_capabilities, storages.get_volumes): the whole
computes URL namespace is now wrapped with superuser_only, so a view
added there later cannot be exposed by a missing decorator.
- guess_mac_address (leaks dhcpd.conf host/MAC pairs), random_mac_address
and guess_clone_name: superuser-only, like the buttons that use them.
- check_instance: cross-tenant VM name lookup with no caller; removed.
- getvvfile and get_vdi_url: reachable with only view_instances, and the
.vv file contains the VNC password.
Console access now follows one rule, instances.utils.can_open_console:
an active superuser or an active owner of the VM. The global
view_instances permission is read-only. It is used by the console page,
novncd, getvvfile and get_vdi_url (getvvfile and the VDI tab are kept for
virt-viewer users). The console page answers 403 instead of 500 when
access is denied, with the same answer for a missing VM.
clone only required "view" access, so a user with clone_instances and the
global view_instances permission could clone anyone's VM and read its
disks. It also copied every POST field into clone_data, which let the
client override the server-set disk_owner_uid/gid, and disk-<dev> values
went unvalidated into volume XML and os.path.join.
- Require change permission on the source VM, except for templates,
which any user who can view them may clone.
- Build clone_data from an allowlist: name, title and description for
everyone; disk names and MAC addresses only from superusers.
- For non-superusers, derive disk names (get_clone_disk_name) and MAC
addresses (DHCP or random) on the server; their form only sent the
source VM's own values, which could never work.
- Validate every MAC address (not only the first) and every disk name;
a missing MAC is an error message instead of a KeyError.
Several views returned json.dumps() output through HttpResponse, i.e. as
text/html, and guess_mac_address reflects the URL's vname into it
(reflected XSS). Templates filled the log table and volume dropdowns by
concatenating server data into HTML strings, and log messages contain
user-entered snapshot/disk/clone names (stored XSS that runs when a
superuser opens the Logs tab).
- Use JsonResponse in guess_mac_address, random_mac_address,
guess_clone_name, sshkeys, storages.get_volumes,
datasource.os_metadata_json and logs.vm_logs; sshkeys?plain=true is
served as text/plain.
- stats_tab.html builds log rows with .text(); instance.html and
create_instance_w2.html build <option> elements with .val().text().
Disk and media mutation views (add_new_vol, add_existing_vol, edit_volume,
delete_vol, detach_vol, add_cdrom, detach_cdrom, mount_iso, unmount_iso)
were reachable by any owner with is_change, although the UI only shows the
Disk tab to superusers. An ordinary user could delete any volume on the
compute or attach arbitrary host files to their VM.
- Require superuser for all disk/media views, matching the UI.
- delete_vol resolves the volume from the VM's own disk XML by dev and
ignores the posted storage/name.
- Validate bus/cache/io/discard/detect_zeroes against the hypervisor's
lists, and format/serial/volume name against strict patterns.
- add_existing_vol only accepts volumes that exist in the selected pool.
- edit_volume only accepts a dev attached to the VM.
- vrtManager: escape all values interpolated into disk XML and pass dev
as an XPath variable in detach_disk/edit_disk.
- Computes API: mark password as write_only in ComputeSerializer, restrict ComputeViewSet and architectures to IsAdminUser.
- Instances API: enforce user ownership tenant isolation in InstanceViewSet.list, restrict MigrateViewSet and CreateInstanceViewSet to IsAdminUser, require IsAdminUser for mutating FlavorViewSet.
- Storage, Network, and Interface APIs: restrict StorageViewSet, VolumeViewSet, NetworkViewSet, InterfaceViewSet to IsAdminUser.
- AppSettings & NWFilters: protect appsettings and nwfilter views with @superuser_only (403 Forbidden for non-superusers).
- noVNC Console: sign tokens with TimestampSigner (salt='console.novnc', max_age=600), verify signature and user authorization in novncd with backward-compatible fallback for debug/test mode.
- Accounts: avoid hardcoded default admin password; generate cryptographically secure random password unless ADMIN_PASSWORD is set (preserve 'admin' in test runner).
- gstfsd daemon: bind to 127.0.0.1 by default instead of 0.0.0.0.
- Tests: added comprehensive test coverage for API security, token expiration/rejection, and view permissions (132 tests passing).
- Remove obsolete spice-html5 static assets and SPICE console templates
- Restrict default console types to VNC with migration 0012
- Filter out SPICE in VM creation form and backend capabilities
- Return friendly deprecation notice if legacy VM is opened with SPICE
- Clean up docs, architecture references, and libvirt-bootstrap scripts
- Relax libvirt-python and lxml version pins to allow precompiled distro packages
- Add PEP 508 environment marker to crypt-r (python_version >= 3.13) to avoid unnecessary C compilation on Python 3.12
- Add stdlib crypt fallback when crypt_r is not available in instances/views.py
- Make LDAP imports and configuration optional in settings.py.template
- Add --system-site-packages and missing packages in webvirtcloud.sh for RHEL/CentOS
- Update README with working Rocky Linux / RHEL / Fedora installation and local dev setup
