1
0
Fork 0
mirror of https://github.com/retspen/webvirtcloud synced 2026-11-08 19:26:48 +00:00
Commit graph

3 commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
catborise
f94b3cee7a chore: drop references to the local roadmap from code and tests
Comments, docstrings and live test names cited item IDs of a roadmap
that is not part of the repository. They now say what is meant, or
nothing where the sentence stands without them. Test assertions and
behavior are unchanged.
2026-10-04 11:09:25 +03:00
catborise
3e427a41b8 fix(instances): find known VMs by UUID, not by name
Instance.proxy looked the domain up by its stored name. After a rename
or a name swap outside WebVirtCloud, an operation on one VM changed
another; after a VM was replaced under the same name, operations hit
the new VM.

wvmInstance takes the UUID and uses lookupByUUIDString, with no
fallback to the name: a missing UUID fails instead of picking another
domain. Every caller that has an Instance passes it: proxy, console,
quota, post-migration autostart and the VDI URL. Migration uses the
domain the proxy already resolved. getvvfile and the gstfsd requests
use the host's current name of that UUID.

Live tests cover a name swap and a VM replaced under the same name;
both fail on the previous code.
2026-10-04 01:08:11 +03:00
catborise
4d34d9d07c fix: add an authorization matrix test and close the endpoints it finds
Add webvirtcloud/test_authorization_matrix.py, which walks every named URL
and checks that a user without any VM/compute relation only reaches an
explicit allowlist, and that the global view_instances permission does not
open consoles. It found:

- /computes/<id>/... views without any check (compute_graph,
  get_compute_*, get_dom_capabilities, storages.get_volumes): the whole
  computes URL namespace is now wrapped with superuser_only, so a view
  added there later cannot be exposed by a missing decorator.
- guess_mac_address (leaks dhcpd.conf host/MAC pairs), random_mac_address
  and guess_clone_name: superuser-only, like the buttons that use them.
- check_instance: cross-tenant VM name lookup with no caller; removed.
- getvvfile and get_vdi_url: reachable with only view_instances, and the
  .vv file contains the VNC password.

Console access now follows one rule, instances.utils.can_open_console:
an active superuser or an active owner of the VM. The global
view_instances permission is read-only. It is used by the console page,
novncd, getvvfile and get_vdi_url (getvvfile and the VDI tab are kept for
virt-viewer users). The console page answers 403 instead of 500 when
access is denied, with the same answer for a missing VM.
2026-10-02 20:33:12 +03:00