- create_admin had a branch for `"test" in sys.argv` that gave the admin
the password "admin"; 17 places signed in with it, and failed silently
with ADMIN_PASSWORD set in the environment. The tests now make their
own superuser and force_login it, and the shipped code has no test
branch: the test runner gives migrate a password (also when
ADMIN_PASSWORD is set but empty), so no data/admin_password is written
into the checkout.
- AccountsTestCase builds its rows in setUpTestData instead of
setUpClass and deleting them by hand.
- accounts tests set OTP_ENABLED with override_settings instead of
assigning settings (one assignment was never undone, so later tests in
the process ran with OTP on), and undo their app_settings change. The
OTP login class reloads the URLs again only after the setting is off.
- computes/tests/test_views.py reached the machine's own libvirt
(localhost over the socket) when TEST_LIBVIRT_HOST was unset; its live
tests now run only with TEST_LIBVIRT_HOST, like the other live tests,
as the README says.
SHOW_PROFILE_EDIT_PASSWORD was replaced in 2020 by the change_password
permission, settable per user or group. A post_migrate hook applied the
old setting to all users so existing installs kept their behavior, and
asked to remove the setting afterwards; but the settings template still
set it to True. Every migrate, so every upgrade, therefore granted the
permission to all users again and undid an admin's per-user or
per-group choice (with False it would have revoked it from everyone).
- Migration accounts.0008 applies the setting one last time, if a
settings.py still has it; the post_migrate hook is gone.
- New users get the permission when they are created (any path,
including LDAP); the admin user form ticks it and saves the admin's
choice afterwards.
- The template no longer sets SHOW_PROFILE_EDIT_PASSWORD; a check
(accounts.W001) asks to remove it from existing settings, and the
README upgrade notes say so.
The test that removes the permission and runs migrate fails on the
previous code. An upgrade from master with users was simulated: the
setting is applied once, and a permission removed afterwards stays
removed through the next migrate.
Comments, docstrings and live test names cited item IDs of a roadmap
that is not part of the repository. They now say what is meant, or
nothing where the sentence stands without them. Test assertions and
behavior are unchanged.
The forced change of the generated admin password was a session flag
set at login when the password still matched data/admin_password. A
new session after the file was gone bypassed it.
- UserAttributes.must_change_password (migration 0007) holds it; the
admin created with a generated password gets it, and a password
change clears it. ForcePasswordChangeMiddleware reads it.
- A system check (accounts.E001) stops the server unless the middleware
follows AuthenticationMiddleware; the README has the settings change.
- If the generated password cannot be stored privately, provisioning
stops without printing it and without creating the admin (one
transaction for the user and its attributes).
- The admin is provisioned on any real migrate run while no user
exists, so running migrate again after a failure creates it; flush
(plan=None) and rollbacks of accounts are skipped.
- The post_migrate receivers check the migration state for the models
they use, so a targeted migrate on a fresh database (e.g. migrate
appsettings) no longer fails with 'no such table'.
While data/admin_password exists and a user's password still matches it,
the login sets a session flag (checked once at login, not per request).
ForcePasswordChangeMiddleware then sends that user to the password-change
page for every view except change password, login and logout. Setting a
new password clears the flag and deletes data/admin_password. No schema
change; if ADMIN_PASSWORD was set, there is no file and nothing is forced.
In Docker, migrate runs as root while data/ belongs to www-data, so a
planted data/admin_password symlink would make root overwrite its target.
Remove any existing path first and create the file with
O_CREAT|O_EXCL|O_NOFOLLOW (mode set via fchmod). install.sh's /tmp
fallback log is now created with mktemp instead of a fixed name.
- The generated admin password is written to data/admin_password (mode
0600) instead of being printed, so it no longer ends up in the install
log or `docker logs`. If the file cannot be written it is printed as
before, so the admin is never locked out.
- webvirtcloud.sh no longer echoes the generated SECRET_KEY.
- install.sh creates the install log with mode 0600.
- Computes API: mark password as write_only in ComputeSerializer, restrict ComputeViewSet and architectures to IsAdminUser.
- Instances API: enforce user ownership tenant isolation in InstanceViewSet.list, restrict MigrateViewSet and CreateInstanceViewSet to IsAdminUser, require IsAdminUser for mutating FlavorViewSet.
- Storage, Network, and Interface APIs: restrict StorageViewSet, VolumeViewSet, NetworkViewSet, InterfaceViewSet to IsAdminUser.
- AppSettings & NWFilters: protect appsettings and nwfilter views with @superuser_only (403 Forbidden for non-superusers).
- noVNC Console: sign tokens with TimestampSigner (salt='console.novnc', max_age=600), verify signature and user authorization in novncd with backward-compatible fallback for debug/test mode.
- Accounts: avoid hardcoded default admin password; generate cryptographically secure random password unless ADMIN_PASSWORD is set (preserve 'admin' in test runner).
- gstfsd daemon: bind to 127.0.0.1 by default instead of 0.0.0.0.
- Tests: added comprehensive test coverage for API security, token expiration/rejection, and view permissions (132 tests passing).
