Nothing limited failed logins: a password could be guessed at the speed
the server answers. django-axes (8.3.1, Django 5.2, Python 3.10-3.13)
now counts them.
- A user is locked for the address the failed logins come from
(username and IP together), so an attacker cannot lock someone out
from elsewhere and users behind one NAT address do not share a lock.
A successful login resets the count. axes sits in front of every
authentication: the login page with or without OTP, LDAP and the API.
- The number of failed logins (default 5) and the lock time in minutes
(default 15) are on the Settings page (LOGIN_FAILURE_LIMIT,
LOGIN_LOCKOUT_MINUTES, added by migration appsettings.0014) and apply
at once; an invalid value falls back to the default. Unlock with
"manage.py axes_reset_username <username>".
- Behind the bundled nginx every request comes from 127.0.0.1; the
client address is read from X-Real-IP, which nginx sets, but only for
requests from a loopback address or from LOGIN_TRUSTED_PROXIES, so a
forged header does not escape a lock.
settings.py.template gets the app, middleware, backend and AXES_*
settings; README tells existing installations what to copy. Tests that
call client.login now pass a request, which the axes backend needs.
The new tests fail with axes disabled.
The user edit page redirected to its ?next= parameter after saving,
whatever it held: a link to the edit page with next=https://other.site
sent the administrator who saved the form to that site (CodeQL
py/url-redirection). The account page links there with a next of this
site.
next is now followed only when url_has_allowed_host_and_scheme accepts
it for this host, as user_instance_delete already does; otherwise the
user list. The test fails on the previous code for an absolute URL, a
scheme-relative one and a backslash variant.
django-bootstrap-icons serves icons from static/icon_cache and fetches a
missing one from the CDN while the page renders; a server without
internet access shows an error text instead of the icon.
- copy (Clone on the instance lists), envelope-open ("Lost OTP?" page)
and save (VM settings, network page) were not cached; they are now,
fetched with django-bootstrap-icons itself.
- The user and group lists asked for 'exclamation-triangle ' with a
trailing space, an icon that does not exist; the warning icon never
showed.
A test checks that every {% bs_icon %} in the templates has its cache
file; it fails on the previous files.
The admin page that creates a user saved the form first, which wrote
the user with the raw password in the password column, and hashed it
with a second save afterwards. The raw password was in the database,
and in its journal and any copy taken meanwhile, and stayed there if
anything failed between the two writes.
- UserCreateForm hashes the password before the first save; groups
and permissions are saved as before.
- The form applies AUTH_PASSWORD_VALIDATORS, after the user fields are
set (so the similarity check sees the new username), as the password
change forms already did. The settings template configures no
validators, so nothing changes unless an installation sets them.
The tests record the SQL parameters of the request: the previous code
wrote the raw password in the INSERT; it also accepted passwords that
configured validators reject.
SHOW_PROFILE_EDIT_PASSWORD was replaced in 2020 by the change_password
permission, settable per user or group. A post_migrate hook applied the
old setting to all users so existing installs kept their behavior, and
asked to remove the setting afterwards; but the settings template still
set it to True. Every migrate, so every upgrade, therefore granted the
permission to all users again and undid an admin's per-user or
per-group choice (with False it would have revoked it from everyone).
- Migration accounts.0008 applies the setting one last time, if a
settings.py still has it; the post_migrate hook is gone.
- New users get the permission when they are created (any path,
including LDAP); the admin user form ticks it and saves the admin's
choice afterwards.
- The template no longer sets SHOW_PROFILE_EDIT_PASSWORD; a check
(accounts.W001) asks to remove it from existing settings, and the
README upgrade notes say so.
The test that removes the permission and runs migrate fails on the
previous code. An upgrade from master with users was simulated: the
setting is applied once, and a permission removed afterwards stays
removed through the next migrate.
Super-linter ran from the unpinned :latest image and, because of
branches-ignore: [master], never on pull requests to master. Ruff now
checks syntax errors and pyflakes rules (E9, F) on every push and PR.
Fixes the existing findings: unused imports and variables, an unused
duplicate import in instances/tests.py, and the star import in
accounts/views.py. settings-dev.py keeps its star import of the base
settings.
The forced change of the generated admin password was a session flag
set at login when the password still matched data/admin_password. A
new session after the file was gone bypassed it.
- UserAttributes.must_change_password (migration 0007) holds it; the
admin created with a generated password gets it, and a password
change clears it. ForcePasswordChangeMiddleware reads it.
- A system check (accounts.E001) stops the server unless the middleware
follows AuthenticationMiddleware; the README has the settings change.
- If the generated password cannot be stored privately, provisioning
stops without printing it and without creating the admin (one
transaction for the user and its attributes).
- The admin is provisioned on any real migrate run while no user
exists, so running migrate again after a failure creates it; flush
(plan=None) and rollbacks of accounts are skipped.
- The post_migrate receivers check the migration state for the models
they use, so a targeted migrate on a fresh database (e.g. migrate
appsettings) no longer fails with 'no such table'.
- user_block, user_unblock and admin_email_otp changed state on GET, so an
<img> tag could lock a user out or trigger OTP emails through an
admin's session. They now require POST; the buttons are CSRF forms.
- The console token cookie is set with httponly, SameSite=Lax and, on
HTTPS, secure. Only novncd reads it; the page gets the token directly.
