A compute's hostname and login go unquoted into the libvirt connection URI
(qemu+ssh://login@host/system, qemu+tcp://host/system, qemu+tls://...) and,
for an SSH compute, into the ssh command line of the DRBD status view. They
were barely validated: validate_hostname used re.match with a negated class,
so it caught only a leading special character, and login was never checked.
A hostname like "192.0.2.1/system?command=/path" injected a libvirt URI
parameter (verified: connecting ran the named command through the ssh
wrapper), and TLS/SSH parameters such as no_verify, pkipath, socket or
netcat could be added the same way; a login like "-oProxyCommand=..." became
an ssh option. The DRF ComputeSerializer applied neither check, and
validate_name tested a string literal instead of its argument, so it never
raised.
validate_hostname now accepts only an IPv4 address or a host name with
fullmatch (no scheme, port, path, query, whitespace or IPv6 literal; IPv6 is
left out until the URI building brackets it). validate_login accepts an empty
value (TCP falls back to the server's authentication, the socket transport
ignores the login) or a plain name with no leading "-". Both sit on the
Compute model fields, so the forms and the DRF serializer (which copies model
validators onto its fields) reject the values; a migration records the
metadata. validate_name checks its argument. drbd_status validates the login
and hostname before building login@host and ends ssh option parsing with
"--"; an existing or bypassed bad row is skipped rather than run.
Tests: hostname/login validators accept real values and reject URI and
option injection; the SSH form and the serializer (create, and an empty TCP
login) enforce them; drbd_status skips an injecting target. Checked the real
test computes still validate. The new tests fail on the previous code.
Nothing limited failed logins: a password could be guessed at the speed
the server answers. django-axes (8.3.1, Django 5.2, Python 3.10-3.13)
now counts them.
- A user is locked for the address the failed logins come from
(username and IP together), so an attacker cannot lock someone out
from elsewhere and users behind one NAT address do not share a lock.
A successful login resets the count. axes sits in front of every
authentication: the login page with or without OTP, LDAP and the API.
- The number of failed logins (default 5) and the lock time in minutes
(default 15) are on the Settings page (LOGIN_FAILURE_LIMIT,
LOGIN_LOCKOUT_MINUTES, added by migration appsettings.0014) and apply
at once; an invalid value falls back to the default. Unlock with
"manage.py axes_reset_username <username>".
- Behind the bundled nginx every request comes from 127.0.0.1; the
client address is read from X-Real-IP, which nginx sets, but only for
requests from a loopback address or from LOGIN_TRUSTED_PROXIES, so a
forged header does not escape a lock.
settings.py.template gets the app, middleware, backend and AXES_*
settings; README tells existing installations what to copy. Tests that
call client.login now pass a request, which the axes backend needs.
The new tests fail with axes disabled.
libvirt has no timeout for opening a connection. Measured in the test
setup: an unreachable host blocked qemu+tcp for 135 s and qemu+ssh for
133 s; a daemon that accepts and never answers blocks forever. Gunicorn
runs sync workers and the instance list connects to every compute, so
one unreachable compute held a worker for minutes per page load.
- A connection is opened in a helper thread, at most one per
connection at a time. The request waits LIBVIRT_CONNECT_TIMEOUT
(default 5 s). An open nobody waits for any more keeps running; until
it ends, requests get its error at once, and if it succeeds later the
connection is used. A failed open is not repeated for
LIBVIRT_RETRY_AFTER (default 30 s). A stuck host holds one thread and
does not keep other hosts from connecting.
- qemu+ssh runs ssh through vrtManager/libvirt-ssh (the URI's command
parameter), which adds ConnectTimeout=10 and BatchMode=yes, so an
abandoned ssh process ends and no prompt can hang. The user's ssh
configuration (aliases, ProxyJump, keys) still applies.
- The close callback acts only for the connection it was registered
for: a late callback of a replaced connection dropped its successor.
The reason is reported as text. A connection that closed before it
was published is an error.
- Compute.status is a bool (it returned the exception object, so the
"host is down" check in refresh_instance_database never fired); the
message is Compute.connection_error.
Unit tests cover the timeout, retry delay, late success, single open,
a stuck host next to a healthy one and the close callback. Live tests
(vrtManager/test_live_connection.py), for TCP and SSH computes of the
test setup: an unreachable address (no ssh left after 10 s), an endpoint
that never answers, a slow open completing later, a host that goes
silent on an established connection (keepalive ends calls within 45 s,
the next request reconnects), an ssh_config alias and a ProxyJump host.
Disk edits:
- edit_disk built a new <disk> from the form and replaced the old one,
losing what the form does not show (e.g. encryption and virtio
driver options); a bus change detached and re-attached the disk.
The disk of the persistent definition is now edited in place and the
domain defined once; a bus change picks a free device name and drops
the old address and virtio-only options. Pending persistent changes of
a running VM are kept.
- Clone omits empty disk devices, refuses a disk without a supported
source and destination, and checks the name before allocating storage.
Locks:
- Every VM change held its compute's exclusive lock, so one slow
operation blocked all VMs on that compute. A VM change now holds its
own VM lock plus a shared compute lock; reconciliation, migration and
cloning hold the compute exclusively (two clones of different VMs
must not pass the name check together).
- Quota-checked changes of one user (CPU, memory and disk resize,
clone) run one at a time under a per-user lock, also across computes,
so concurrent requests cannot all pass the check against the old
allocation. It is the outermost lock; superusers, who have no quota,
skip it.
- A busy lock answers 409 to the API and a message in the web UI. API
power and destroy actions return the view's error instead of success.
