When a VM stopped, its console's stream could end before the worker's
next check saw the VM shut off. The check then found no stream to drop and
said nothing, or, seeing the VM still running, opened the console again,
which libvirt refused, and the session ended. The worker now remembers
whether the VM ran at its last check, and a console that cannot be opened
again because the VM stopped meanwhile is a stop: the terminal says the VM
is not running and the console opens again when it starts. A new stream is
the console's before its callback is registered, which may end it at once.
The live serial test's VM now repeats its BIOS banner (it reboots right
after finding no boot disk), so a console attached late still gets one,
and the test waits for the superuser's console to show it before the VM
stops. A run of the whole live suite over the socket missed the banner of
the paused-then-resumed VM before.
gstfsd, the root service on each compute that rewrites a shut-off VM's
/etc/shadow and authorized_keys, did what any client on its port asked.
Now it needs GSTFSD_KEY (64 hexadecimal characters, in the unit's
/etc/default/webvirt-gstfsd) and does not start without it. Each
connection gets a new challenge; the panel signs its request for it
with HMAC-SHA256 and gstfsd checks the signature before any change, so
a request recorded on one connection is refused on another. gstfsd
signs its reply for the same challenge and the panel's nonce, and the
panel accepts only that reply.
Each compute has a gstfsd key, the host's GSTFSD_KEY: the compute forms
and the API take it and never show it, and an empty value on an edit
keeps it. The bootstrap script makes the key file once, readable by
root only; the README shows how to make it and where the panel takes
it. The traffic is still not encrypted: a remote panel's port stays
open to the panel's address only.
- The worker told why a console did not open or closed only in the user's
terminal (as users see errors: a host that cannot be reached is not
named). It now also logs the full reason to socketiod's own stderr, the
journal or docker logs, which socketiod hands it as a descriptor.
- A refused token says the link has expired or the user may no longer
open the console: a valid link for a user who lost access was told only
that it had expired.
- A send that takes nothing (0 bytes) waits like a busy stream instead of
spinning.
- socketiod wrote input to the worker's terminal while holding the
session's lock, and the write could wait for the worker; the output
forwarder needs that lock. A large paste into a guest that echoes it
could stop both for good. The terminal is now non-blocking: input is
written as far as the worker takes it, and the wait for room is outside
the lock.
- The terminal is raw from the start. Until the worker made it raw, it
kept at most one 4 KiB line of a paste, and the worker's own setraw
dropped what was typed meanwhile; the worker no longer sets it.
- A superuser's takeover ends the old worker, and waits for it, before
starting the new one: libvirt gives a VM's console to one at a time.
- A resize while the worker ends no longer raises.
- The console worker learns whose session it is and checks every ten
seconds that the user may still open the console: an owner removed or a
user deactivated meanwhile loses it, with a line in the terminal. Access
was checked only when the session started, which could last for days.
- One console per VM: a console left open in a forgotten tab locked
everyone out, superusers included. A superuser's connection now takes
the console over, and the other window is told so.
- A paste reaches the VM whole: the non-blocking console stream takes it
in parts, or none while the VM is busy, and the rest was dropped. The
worker sends the rest until the VM has it, for at most five seconds.
- A libvirt error while the console is open (the host gone, the VM
undefined or migrated) ends the session with one line in the terminal
instead of a Python traceback; libvirt no longer prints its errors on
the terminal. Errors are shown as users see them elsewhere: a host that
cannot be reached is not named.
- The terminal says when the VM is not running and its console will open
when it starts. The terminal is raw before the console opens, and the
stream is dropped once when both threads see the VM stop.
The xterm console never connected: socketiod expected a different token
format, its worker had no compute credentials, one global console was
shared by every client and its output broadcast to all of them, and the
Docker image did not run socketiod at all.
- console/tokens.py: one authorize() for noVNC and socketiod; the signed
token is the only credential, checked at connect time.
- socketiod: one pty worker per client (consolecallback with the
instance id), one session per VM, a session cap, input and resize
checked; the parent never opens libvirt. The engine.io same-origin
check is on.
- consolecallback: opens the console with the compute's credentials and
exits with a message when it cannot.
- Docker runs socketiod as a runit service; nginx proxies /socket.io/
with Host and the scheme for the origin check. Supervisor and systemd
start it as well; WEBVIRTCLOUD_SERIAL_CONSOLE=1 enables it.
- Tests: token and session unit tests, socketiod as a process, and a
live test that reads SeaBIOS from a wvc-test VM on the TCP and SSH
hosts.
Files that libguestfs creates have no SELinux label. On an enforcing
guest (RHEL, Rocky, Alma, Fedora) sshd may not read the unlabeled
/root/.ssh/authorized_keys, so a key added from the panel did not let
anyone log in ("avc: denied { read } ... unlabeled_t").
After writing a key, gstfsd now relabels /root/.ssh with the guest's own
file contexts (/etc/selinux/<SELINUXTYPE>/contexts/files/file_contexts),
as virt-customize does. Guests without an SELinux policy or with SELinux
disabled are left as they are. If the guest needs labels but the host's
libguestfs cannot set them, the request fails before anything is written.
A root password needs no labelling: /etc/shadow keeps its file and label.
gstfsd mounted every partition it listed: a root on LVM was never found,
a disk with two OS roots got the change twice and two concatenated
replies, and no root, an error or a request longer than 1024 bytes ended
the connection without a reply. It now lets libguestfs inspect the guest,
mounts its one OS the way the guest does (a broken filesystem off the
changed path is left out), and sends exactly one reply, keeping the first
error. The root entry is found on any line of /etc/shadow and must be
unique; a key needs no shadow file. A request is at most 64 KiB. Each
change runs in a worker process with a directly started appliance; both
are killed when the request is not done 100 s after gstfsd accepted it
(GSTFSD_DEADLINE may only lower that), before the panel's 120 s timeout
releases the VM, or when the panel's connection ends, and the reply waits
until they are gone, so nothing touches the disk once the panel has given
up. A worker that dies says why. The panel
connects over IPv4 or IPv6, sends the whole request and reads the reply
until gstfsd closes.
Comments, docstrings and live test names cited item IDs of a roadmap
that is not part of the repository. They now say what is meant, or
nothing where the sentence stands without them. Test assertions and
behavior are unchanged.
- Add the public key to authorized_keys instead of replacing the file.
- Use AF_INET6 when GSTFSD_BIND_HOST is an IPv6 address (binding ::1
crashed with the AF_INET server).
- Close idle client connections after 30 s.
Tests run the real daemon against a small fake guestfs module over a
socket; this also exercises the earlier sendall() fix.
- Hash the root password with a random SHA-512 salt instead of the fixed
"$6$kgPoiREy".
- Talk to gstfsd through one helper with a 120 s socket timeout; an
unreachable daemon or a bad reply is an error message, not a 500.
- gstfsd refuses to listen on a non-loopback address unless
GSTFSD_ALLOW_REMOTE=1: it is an unauthenticated root service.
- gstfsd: encode replies (sendall(str) raised TypeError on Python 3, so
the success path never worked) and use octal chmod modes.
- README: what gstfsd does and how to allow it on a remote compute.
- Computes API: mark password as write_only in ComputeSerializer, restrict ComputeViewSet and architectures to IsAdminUser.
- Instances API: enforce user ownership tenant isolation in InstanceViewSet.list, restrict MigrateViewSet and CreateInstanceViewSet to IsAdminUser, require IsAdminUser for mutating FlavorViewSet.
- Storage, Network, and Interface APIs: restrict StorageViewSet, VolumeViewSet, NetworkViewSet, InterfaceViewSet to IsAdminUser.
- AppSettings & NWFilters: protect appsettings and nwfilter views with @superuser_only (403 Forbidden for non-superusers).
- noVNC Console: sign tokens with TimestampSigner (salt='console.novnc', max_age=600), verify signature and user authorization in novncd with backward-compatible fallback for debug/test mode.
- Accounts: avoid hardcoded default admin password; generate cryptographically secure random password unless ADMIN_PASSWORD is set (preserve 'admin' in test runner).
- gstfsd daemon: bind to 127.0.0.1 by default instead of 0.0.0.0.
- Tests: added comprehensive test coverage for API security, token expiration/rejection, and view permissions (132 tests passing).
