Django's login form gives the username its max_length after the field
is built, so a longer username was not refused and reached
authentication. django-axes then stored it in its 255-character column,
which PostgreSQL refuses: a login with a 300-character username was a
500 (SQLite does not enforce the length). Both login forms, with and
without OTP, now check the length, so such a username is a form error
and never reaches authentication, the lockout or the Logs page.
This also turns the PostgreSQL leg of CI green again: the S-16 test
from #167 hit exactly this.
The Logs page shows who added, changed or deleted a compute, from web
or API, and every login, failed login, lockout and logout, with the
client address and a Result column (Done, Failed, Unknown for older
rows). A failed change is recorded with its reason and the error still
reaches the user; a refused one is recorded too.
- logs.audit.write saves each row in its own savepoint and never
raises, so a log write cannot break or undo the action it records.
The audit() context manager writes one row when the change ends.
- Logs gains success and ip; user, host and instance are wider and
date is indexed. The page orders by date then id.
- A compute edit names the changed fields; an edit that changes
nothing writes no row, and an empty password field is no change.
- A compute's VMs leaving the panel get a system row each: owners
kept on the Removed VMs page, moved to another compute, restored,
left without owners, or the removed record expired.
- Job rows carry the result. A job's log entry that cannot be
computed is logged and skipped instead of rolling back the finish
(test_service.py changes this on purpose).
- Logins are recorded by signal receivers; CustomLoginView is removed
and the plain LoginView is used. A wrong OTP code is a failed login,
counted by django-axes toward the lockout.
Panel records and host-side objects follow in the next layers.
With OTP_ENABLED the login used django-otp's OTPAuthenticationForm. Under the
pinned django-otp 1.7.3 that form could not log anyone in through the shipped
page: the page posts only a 6-digit otp_token, but the form now needs the
device named explicitly, so an enrolled user got "Please select a device.",
and a user who never enrolled got "Please enter your OTP token." with no
device to produce one. Verified in an isolated test database.
SingleDeviceOTPForm makes OTP per user: a user with a confirmed TOTP device
must enter a valid code; a user without one logs in with the password alone.
The form chooses the device itself (the user's oldest confirmed TOTP device,
locked with select_for_update inside clean_otp's transaction so replay and
throttling counters cannot race) and ignores any posted otp_device, which
django-otp does not check for confirmed status or type. The login page drops
the HTML "required" on the token field (the field is optional for an
unenrolled user) and says so.
The "Lost OTP?" page (email_otp) created a confirmed device when none existed.
With per-user OTP that let anyone who knows an address turn a password-only
account into an OTP-required one and, if the mail never arrived, lock it out.
It now resends the QR only to a user who already enrolled and never creates a
device (get_existing_totp_device); admin enrollment (admin_email_otp) still
creates one. Email QR distribution and confirmed-on-create enrollment are
unchanged by user decision.
Tests: per-user login (no device -> password only; device -> valid token
passes, wrong/empty token fails), a posted or another user's device is not
used, a token cannot be replayed, and the real login page over HTTP with
OTP_ENABLED; email_otp sends nothing and creates no device for an unenrolled
user. The new tests fail on the previous code.
