It seems like a lot of overhead to call access() for every possible extension
defined in PATHEXT, but apparently this is what Windows does itself too. At
least this avoids calling system() when the script one is looking for does not
exist at all.
Since the tinc utility also needs to call scripts, execute_script() is now
split off into its own source file.
Since filenames could potentially leak to unprivileged users (for example,
because of locatedb), it should not contain the cookie used for invitations.
Instead, tinc now uses the hash of the cookie and the invitation key as the
filename to store pending invitations in.
As mentioned by Erik Tews, calling fchmod() after fopen() leaves a small window
for exploits. As long as tinc is single-threaded, we can use umask() instead to
reduce file permissions. This also works when creating the AF_UNIX control socket.
The umask of the user running tinc(d) is used for most files, except for the
private keys, invitation files, PID file and control socket.
In case no explicit netname of configuration directory is specified when
accepting an invitation, the netname specified in the invitation data is
used. However, this new netname is only known after making the connection
to the server. If the new netname conflicts with an existing one at the
client, we ask the user for a netname that doesn't conflict. However, we
should first finish accepting the invitation, so we don't run into the
problem that the server times out and cancels the invitation. So, we create
a random netname and store the files there, and only after we finish
accepting the invitation we ask the user for a better netname, and then
just rename the temporary directory to the final name.
Using the tinc command, an administrator of an existing VPN can generate
invitations for new nodes. The invitation is a small URL that can easily
be copy&pasted into email or live chat. Another person can have tinc
automatically setup the necessary configuration files and exchange keys
with the server, by only using the invitation URL.
The invitation protocol uses temporary ECDSA keys. The invitation URL
consists of the hostname and port of the server, a hash of the server's
temporary ECDSA key and a cookie. When the client wants to accept an
invitation, it also creates a temporary ECDSA key, connects to the server
and says it wants to accept an invitation. Both sides exchange their
temporary keys. The client verifies that the server's key matches the hash
in the invitation URL. After setting up an SPTPS connection using the
temporary keys, the client gives the cookie to the server. If the cookie
is valid, the server sends the client an invitation file containing the
client's new name and a copy of the server's host config file. If everything
is ok, the client will generate a long-term ECDSA key and send it to the
server, which will add it to a new host config file for the client.
The invitation protocol currently allows multiple host config files to be
send from the server to the client. However, the client filters out
most configuration variables for its own host configuration file. In
particular, it only accepts Name, Mode, Broadcast, ConnectTo, Subnet and
AutoConnect. Also, at the moment no tinc-up script is generated.
When an invitation has succesfully been accepted, the client needs to start
the tinc daemon manually.
