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Releasing 1.1pre2.

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Guus Sliepen 2011-07-17 20:09:08 +02:00
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commit f8d94f34fc
3 changed files with 21 additions and 28 deletions
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13
NEWS
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@ -1,3 +1,16 @@
Version 1.1pre2 Juli 17 2011
* .cookie files are renamed to .pid files, which are compatible with 1.0.x.
* Experimental protocol enhancements that can be enabled with the option
ExperimentalProtocol = yes:
* Ephemeral ECDH key exchange will be used for both the meta protocol and
UDP session keys.
* Key exchanges are signed with ECDSA.
* ECDSA public keys are automatically exchanged after RSA authentication if
nodes do not know each other's ECDSA public key yet.
Version 1.1pre1 June 25 2011
* Control interface allows control of a running tinc daemon. Used by:

34
README
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@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
This is the README file for tinc version 1.1pre1. Installation
This is the README file for tinc version 1.1pre2. Installation
instructions may be found in the INSTALL file.
tinc is Copyright (C) 1998-2011 by:
@ -29,39 +29,19 @@ protocol is not fixed yet.
Security statement
------------------
In August 2000, we discovered the existence of a security hole in all versions
of tinc up to and including 1.0pre2. This had to do with the way we exchanged
keys. Since then, we have been working on a new authentication scheme to make
tinc as secure as possible. The current version uses the OpenSSL library and
uses strong authentication with RSA keys.
On the 29th of December 2001, Jerome Etienne posted a security analysis of tinc
1.0pre4. Due to a lack of sequence numbers and a message authentication code
for each packet, an attacker could possibly disrupt certain network services or
launch a denial of service attack by replaying intercepted packets. The current
version adds sequence numbers and message authentication codes to prevent such
attacks.
On September the 15th of 2003, Peter Gutmann contacted us and showed us a
writeup describing various security issues in several VPN daemons. He showed
that tinc lacks perfect forward security, the connection authentication could
be done more properly, that the sequence number we use as an IV is not the best
practice and that the default length of the HMAC for packets is too short in
his opinion. We do not know of a way to exploit these weaknesses, but we will
address these issues in tinc 2.0.
Cryptography is a hard thing to get right. We cannot make any
guarantees. Time, review and feedback are the only things that can
prove the security of any cryptographic product. If you wish to review
tinc or give us feedback, you are stronly encouraged to do so.
This version uses an experimental and unfinished cryptographic protocol. Use
it at your own risk.
Compatibility
-------------
Version 1.1pre1 is compatible with 1.0pre8, 1.0 and later, but not with older
Version 1.1pre2 is compatible with 1.0pre8, 1.0 and later, but not with older
versions of tinc.
When the ExperimentalProtocol option is used, tinc is still compatible with
1.0.X and 1.1pre2 itself, but not with any other 1.1preX version.
Requirements
------------

2
configure.in
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@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ AC_PREREQ(2.61)
AC_INIT
AC_CONFIG_SRCDIR([src/tincd.c])
AC_GNU_SOURCE
AM_INIT_AUTOMAKE(tinc, 1.1pre1+git)
AM_INIT_AUTOMAKE(tinc, 1.1pre2)
AC_CONFIG_HEADERS([config.h])
AM_MAINTAINER_MODE