Use conditional compilation for cryptographic functions.

This gets rid of the rest of the symbolic links. However, as a consequence, the
crypto header files have now moved to src/, and can no longer contain
library-specific declarations. Therefore, cipher_t, digest_t, ecdh_t, ecdsa_t
and rsa_t are now all opaque types, and only pointers to those types can be
used.
This commit is contained in:
Guus Sliepen 2013-05-01 17:17:22 +02:00
parent e70b5b5bd7
commit 9b9230a0a7
35 changed files with 595 additions and 639 deletions

View file

@ -98,11 +98,11 @@ static bool send_record_priv_datagram(sptps_t *s, uint8_t type, const char *data
if(s->outstate) {
// If first handshake has finished, encrypt and HMAC
cipher_set_counter(&s->outcipher, &seqno, sizeof seqno);
if(!cipher_counter_xor(&s->outcipher, buffer + 6, len + 1UL, buffer + 6))
cipher_set_counter(s->outcipher, &seqno, sizeof seqno);
if(!cipher_counter_xor(s->outcipher, buffer + 6, len + 1UL, buffer + 6))
return false;
if(!digest_create(&s->outdigest, buffer, len + 7UL, buffer + 7UL + len))
if(!digest_create(s->outdigest, buffer, len + 7UL, buffer + 7UL + len))
return false;
return s->send_data(s->handle, type, buffer + 2, len + 21UL);
@ -131,10 +131,10 @@ static bool send_record_priv(sptps_t *s, uint8_t type, const char *data, uint16_
if(s->outstate) {
// If first handshake has finished, encrypt and HMAC
if(!cipher_counter_xor(&s->outcipher, buffer + 4, len + 3UL, buffer + 4))
if(!cipher_counter_xor(s->outcipher, buffer + 4, len + 3UL, buffer + 4))
return false;
if(!digest_create(&s->outdigest, buffer, len + 7UL, buffer + 7UL + len))
if(!digest_create(s->outdigest, buffer, len + 7UL, buffer + 7UL + len))
return false;
return s->send_data(s->handle, type, buffer + 4, len + 19UL);
@ -175,7 +175,7 @@ static bool send_kex(sptps_t *s) {
randomize(s->mykex + 1, 32);
// Create a new ECDH public key.
if(!ecdh_generate_public(&s->ecdh, s->mykex + 1 + 32))
if(!(s->ecdh = ecdh_generate_public(s->mykex + 1 + 32)))
return false;
return send_record_priv(s, SPTPS_HANDSHAKE, s->mykex, 1 + 32 + keylen);
@ -184,7 +184,7 @@ static bool send_kex(sptps_t *s) {
// Send a SIGnature record, containing an ECDSA signature over both KEX records.
static bool send_sig(sptps_t *s) {
size_t keylen = ECDH_SIZE;
size_t siglen = ecdsa_size(&s->mykey);
size_t siglen = ecdsa_size(s->mykey);
// Concatenate both KEX messages, plus tag indicating if it is from the connection originator, plus label
char msg[(1 + 32 + keylen) * 2 + 1 + s->labellen];
@ -196,7 +196,7 @@ static bool send_sig(sptps_t *s) {
memcpy(msg + 1 + 2 * (33 + keylen), s->label, s->labellen);
// Sign the result.
if(!ecdsa_sign(&s->mykey, msg, sizeof msg, sig))
if(!ecdsa_sign(s->mykey, msg, sizeof msg, sig))
return false;
// Send the SIG exchange record.
@ -207,17 +207,16 @@ static bool send_sig(sptps_t *s) {
static bool generate_key_material(sptps_t *s, const char *shared, size_t len) {
// Initialise cipher and digest structures if necessary
if(!s->outstate) {
bool result
= cipher_open_by_name(&s->incipher, "aes-256-ecb")
&& cipher_open_by_name(&s->outcipher, "aes-256-ecb")
&& digest_open_by_name(&s->indigest, "sha256", 16)
&& digest_open_by_name(&s->outdigest, "sha256", 16);
if(!result)
s->incipher = cipher_open_by_name("aes-256-ecb");
s->outcipher = cipher_open_by_name("aes-256-ecb");
s->indigest = digest_open_by_name("sha256", 16);
s->outdigest = digest_open_by_name("sha256", 16);
if(!s->incipher || !s->outcipher || !s->indigest || !s->outdigest)
return false;
}
// Allocate memory for key material
size_t keylen = digest_keylength(&s->indigest) + digest_keylength(&s->outdigest) + cipher_keylength(&s->incipher) + cipher_keylength(&s->outcipher);
size_t keylen = digest_keylength(s->indigest) + digest_keylength(s->outdigest) + cipher_keylength(s->incipher) + cipher_keylength(s->outcipher);
s->key = realloc(s->key, keylen);
if(!s->key)
@ -254,14 +253,14 @@ static bool receive_ack(sptps_t *s, const char *data, uint16_t len) {
if(s->initiator) {
bool result
= cipher_set_counter_key(&s->incipher, s->key)
&& digest_set_key(&s->indigest, s->key + cipher_keylength(&s->incipher), digest_keylength(&s->indigest));
= cipher_set_counter_key(s->incipher, s->key)
&& digest_set_key(s->indigest, s->key + cipher_keylength(s->incipher), digest_keylength(s->indigest));
if(!result)
return false;
} else {
bool result
= cipher_set_counter_key(&s->incipher, s->key + cipher_keylength(&s->outcipher) + digest_keylength(&s->outdigest))
&& digest_set_key(&s->indigest, s->key + cipher_keylength(&s->outcipher) + digest_keylength(&s->outdigest) + cipher_keylength(&s->incipher), digest_keylength(&s->indigest));
= cipher_set_counter_key(s->incipher, s->key + cipher_keylength(s->outcipher) + digest_keylength(s->outdigest))
&& digest_set_key(s->indigest, s->key + cipher_keylength(s->outcipher) + digest_keylength(s->outdigest) + cipher_keylength(s->incipher), digest_keylength(s->indigest));
if(!result)
return false;
}
@ -296,7 +295,7 @@ static bool receive_kex(sptps_t *s, const char *data, uint16_t len) {
// Receive a SIGnature record, verify it, if it passed, compute the shared secret and calculate the session keys.
static bool receive_sig(sptps_t *s, const char *data, uint16_t len) {
size_t keylen = ECDH_SIZE;
size_t siglen = ecdsa_size(&s->hiskey);
size_t siglen = ecdsa_size(s->hiskey);
// Verify length of KEX record.
if(len != siglen)
@ -311,12 +310,12 @@ static bool receive_sig(sptps_t *s, const char *data, uint16_t len) {
memcpy(msg + 1 + 2 * (33 + keylen), s->label, s->labellen);
// Verify signature.
if(!ecdsa_verify(&s->hiskey, msg, sizeof msg, data))
if(!ecdsa_verify(s->hiskey, msg, sizeof msg, data))
return false;
// Compute shared secret.
char shared[ECDH_SHARED_SIZE];
if(!ecdh_compute_shared(&s->ecdh, s->hiskex + 1 + 32, shared))
if(!ecdh_compute_shared(s->ecdh, s->hiskex + 1 + 32, shared))
return false;
// Generate key material from shared secret.
@ -336,14 +335,14 @@ static bool receive_sig(sptps_t *s, const char *data, uint16_t len) {
// TODO: only set new keys after ACK has been set/received
if(s->initiator) {
bool result
= cipher_set_counter_key(&s->outcipher, s->key + cipher_keylength(&s->incipher) + digest_keylength(&s->indigest))
&& digest_set_key(&s->outdigest, s->key + cipher_keylength(&s->incipher) + digest_keylength(&s->indigest) + cipher_keylength(&s->outcipher), digest_keylength(&s->outdigest));
= cipher_set_counter_key(s->outcipher, s->key + cipher_keylength(s->incipher) + digest_keylength(s->indigest))
&& digest_set_key(s->outdigest, s->key + cipher_keylength(s->incipher) + digest_keylength(s->indigest) + cipher_keylength(s->outcipher), digest_keylength(s->outdigest));
if(!result)
return false;
} else {
bool result
= cipher_set_counter_key(&s->outcipher, s->key)
&& digest_set_key(&s->outdigest, s->key + cipher_keylength(&s->outcipher), digest_keylength(&s->outdigest));
= cipher_set_counter_key(s->outcipher, s->key)
&& digest_set_key(s->outdigest, s->key + cipher_keylength(s->outcipher), digest_keylength(s->outdigest));
if(!result)
return false;
}
@ -413,7 +412,7 @@ bool sptps_verify_datagram(sptps_t *s, const char *data, size_t len) {
memcpy(buffer, &netlen, 2);
memcpy(buffer + 2, data, len);
return digest_verify(&s->indigest, buffer, len - 14, buffer + len - 14);
return digest_verify(s->indigest, buffer, len - 14, buffer + len - 14);
}
// Receive incoming data, datagram version.
@ -447,7 +446,7 @@ static bool sptps_receive_data_datagram(sptps_t *s, const char *data, size_t len
memcpy(buffer, &netlen, 2);
memcpy(buffer + 2, data, len);
if(!digest_verify(&s->indigest, buffer, len - 14, buffer + len - 14))
if(!digest_verify(s->indigest, buffer, len - 14, buffer + len - 14))
return error(s, EIO, "Invalid HMAC");
// Replay protection using a sliding window of configurable size.
@ -491,8 +490,8 @@ static bool sptps_receive_data_datagram(sptps_t *s, const char *data, size_t len
// Decrypt.
memcpy(&seqno, buffer + 2, 4);
cipher_set_counter(&s->incipher, &seqno, sizeof seqno);
if(!cipher_counter_xor(&s->incipher, buffer + 6, len - 4, buffer + 6))
cipher_set_counter(s->incipher, &seqno, sizeof seqno);
if(!cipher_counter_xor(s->incipher, buffer + 6, len - 4, buffer + 6))
return false;
// Append a NULL byte for safety.
@ -540,7 +539,7 @@ bool sptps_receive_data(sptps_t *s, const char *data, size_t len) {
// Decrypt the length bytes
if(s->instate) {
if(!cipher_counter_xor(&s->incipher, s->inbuf + 4, 2, &s->reclen))
if(!cipher_counter_xor(s->incipher, s->inbuf + 4, 2, &s->reclen))
return false;
} else {
memcpy(&s->reclen, s->inbuf + 4, 2);
@ -578,10 +577,10 @@ bool sptps_receive_data(sptps_t *s, const char *data, size_t len) {
// Check HMAC and decrypt.
if(s->instate) {
if(!digest_verify(&s->indigest, s->inbuf, s->reclen + 7UL, s->inbuf + s->reclen + 7UL))
if(!digest_verify(s->indigest, s->inbuf, s->reclen + 7UL, s->inbuf + s->reclen + 7UL))
return error(s, EIO, "Invalid HMAC");
if(!cipher_counter_xor(&s->incipher, s->inbuf + 6UL, s->reclen + 1UL, s->inbuf + 6UL))
if(!cipher_counter_xor(s->incipher, s->inbuf + 6UL, s->reclen + 1UL, s->inbuf + 6UL))
return false;
}
@ -609,7 +608,7 @@ bool sptps_receive_data(sptps_t *s, const char *data, size_t len) {
}
// Start a SPTPS session.
bool sptps_start(sptps_t *s, void *handle, bool initiator, bool datagram, ecdsa_t mykey, ecdsa_t hiskey, const char *label, size_t labellen, send_data_t send_data, receive_record_t receive_record) {
bool sptps_start(sptps_t *s, void *handle, bool initiator, bool datagram, ecdsa_t *mykey, ecdsa_t *hiskey, const char *label, size_t labellen, send_data_t send_data, receive_record_t receive_record) {
// Initialise struct sptps
memset(s, 0, sizeof *s);
@ -651,11 +650,11 @@ bool sptps_start(sptps_t *s, void *handle, bool initiator, bool datagram, ecdsa_
// Stop a SPTPS session.
bool sptps_stop(sptps_t *s) {
// Clean up any resources.
cipher_close(&s->incipher);
cipher_close(&s->outcipher);
digest_close(&s->indigest);
digest_close(&s->outdigest);
ecdh_free(&s->ecdh);
cipher_close(s->incipher);
cipher_close(s->outcipher);
digest_close(s->indigest);
digest_close(s->outdigest);
ecdh_free(s->ecdh);
free(s->inbuf);
free(s->mykex);
free(s->hiskex);