Implemented new authentication scheme from doc/SECURITY2.

This commit is contained in:
Guus Sliepen 2001-02-25 19:09:45 +00:00
parent 54881faf6f
commit 82455be966
3 changed files with 30 additions and 84 deletions

View file

@ -17,7 +17,7 @@
along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
Foundation, Inc., 675 Mass Ave, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA.
$Id: net.c,v 1.35.4.96 2001/02/25 16:34:17 guus Exp $
$Id: net.c,v 1.35.4.97 2001/02/25 19:09:41 guus Exp $
*/
#include "config.h"
@ -1297,6 +1297,8 @@ cp
}
connection_add(ncn);
send_id(ncn);
cp
return 0;
}

View file

@ -17,7 +17,7 @@
along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
Foundation, Inc., 675 Mass Ave, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA.
$Id: protocol.c,v 1.28.4.80 2001/02/25 16:34:19 guus Exp $
$Id: protocol.c,v 1.28.4.81 2001/02/25 19:09:43 guus Exp $
*/
#include "config.h"
@ -187,8 +187,6 @@ cp
int send_id(connection_t *cl)
{
cp
cl->allow_request = CHALLENGE;
cp
return send_request(cl, "%d %s %d %lx %hd", ID, myself->name, myself->protocol_version, myself->options, myself->port);
}
@ -263,13 +261,14 @@ cp
cl->port = port;
avl_insert_node(connection_tree, node);
/* Read in the public key, so that we can send a challenge */
/* Read in the public key, so that we can send a metakey */
if(read_rsa_public_key(cl))
return -1;
cl->allow_request = METAKEY;
cp
return send_challenge(cl);
return send_metakey(cl);
}
int send_challenge(connection_t *cl)
@ -277,6 +276,8 @@ int send_challenge(connection_t *cl)
char *buffer;
int len, x;
cp
/* CHECKME: what is most reasonable value for len? */
len = RSA_size(cl->rsa_key);
/* Allocate buffers for the challenge */
@ -292,32 +293,15 @@ cp
RAND_bytes(cl->hischallenge, len);
cl->hischallenge[0] &= 0x7F; /* Somehow if the first byte is more than 0xD0 or something like that, decryption fails... */
cp
if(debug_lvl >= DEBUG_SCARY_THINGS)
{
bin2hex(cl->hischallenge, buffer, len);
buffer[len*2] = '\0';
syslog(LOG_DEBUG, _("Generated random challenge (unencrypted): %s"), buffer);
}
/* Convert to hex */
/* Encrypt the random data */
if(RSA_public_encrypt(len, cl->hischallenge, buffer, cl->rsa_key, RSA_NO_PADDING) != len) /* NO_PADDING because the message size equals the RSA key size and it is totally random */
{
syslog(LOG_ERR, _("Error during encryption of challenge for %s (%s)"), cl->name, cl->hostname);
free(buffer);
return -1;
}
cp
/* Convert the encrypted random data to a hexadecimal formatted string */
bin2hex(buffer, buffer, len);
bin2hex(cl->hischallenge, buffer, len);
buffer[len*2] = '\0';
cp
/* Send the challenge */
cl->allow_request = CHAL_REPLY;
x = send_request(cl, "%d %s", CHALLENGE, buffer);
free(buffer);
cp
@ -352,22 +336,9 @@ cp
/* Convert the challenge from hexadecimal back to binary */
hex2bin(buffer,buffer,len);
hex2bin(buffer,cl->mychallenge,len);
/* Decrypt the challenge */
if(RSA_private_decrypt(len, buffer, cl->mychallenge, myself->rsa_key, RSA_NO_PADDING) != len) /* See challenge() */
{
syslog(LOG_ERR, _("Error during encryption of challenge for %s (%s)"), cl->name, cl->hostname);
return -1;
}
if(debug_lvl >= DEBUG_SCARY_THINGS)
{
bin2hex(cl->mychallenge, buffer, len);
buffer[len*2] = '\0';
syslog(LOG_DEBUG, _("Received random challenge (unencrypted): %s"), buffer);
}
cl->allow_request = CHAL_REPLY;
/* Rest is done by send_chal_reply() */
cp
@ -395,11 +366,6 @@ cp
/* Send the reply */
if(cl->status.outgoing)
cl->allow_request = ID;
else
cl->allow_request = METAKEY;
cp
return send_request(cl, "%d %s", CHAL_REPLY, hash);
}
@ -445,16 +411,11 @@ cp
return -1;
}
/* Identity has now been positively verified.
If we are accepting this new connection, then send our identity,
if we are making this connecting, acknowledge.
ack_h() handles the rest from now on.
*/
cp
if(cl->status.outgoing)
return send_metakey(cl);
else
return send_id(cl);
return ack_h(cl);
}
int send_metakey(connection_t *cl)
@ -503,15 +464,14 @@ cp
/* Send the meta key */
if(cl->status.outgoing)
cl->allow_request = METAKEY;
else
cl->allow_request = ACK;
x = send_request(cl, "%d %s", METAKEY, buffer);
free(buffer);
/* Further outgoing requests are encrypted with the key we just generated */
EVP_EncryptInit(cl->cipher_outctx, EVP_bf_cfb(), cl->cipher_outkey, cl->cipher_outkey + EVP_bf_cfb()->key_len);
cl->status.encryptout = 1;
cp
return x;
}
@ -564,26 +524,15 @@ cp
syslog(LOG_DEBUG, _("Received random meta key (unencrypted): %s"), buffer);
}
/* All incoming requests will now be encrypted. */
EVP_DecryptInit(cl->cipher_inctx, EVP_bf_cfb(), cl->cipher_inkey, cl->cipher_inkey + EVP_bf_cfb()->key_len);
cp
if(cl->status.outgoing)
return send_ack(cl);
else
return send_metakey(cl);
}
cl->status.decryptin = 1;
int send_ack(connection_t *cl)
{
int x;
cl->allow_request = CHALLENGE;
cp
if(cl->status.outgoing)
cl->allow_request = ACK;
x = send_request(cl, "%d", ACK);
cl->status.encryptout = 1;
cp
return x;
return send_challenge(cl);
}
int ack_h(connection_t *cl)
@ -611,7 +560,6 @@ cp
cl->allow_request = ALL;
cl->status.active = 1;
cl->status.decryptin = 1;
cl->nexthop = cl;
cl->cipher_pkttype = EVP_bf_cbc();
cl->cipher_pktkeylength = cl->cipher_pkttype->key_len + cl->cipher_pkttype->iv_len;
@ -620,9 +568,6 @@ cp
syslog(LOG_NOTICE, _("Connection with %s (%s) activated"), cl->name, cl->hostname);
cp
if(!cl->status.outgoing)
send_ack(cl);
/* Check some options */
if((cfg = get_config_val(cl->config, config_indirectdata)))
@ -1349,7 +1294,7 @@ int tcppacket_h(connection_t *cl)
/* Jumptable for the request handlers */
int (*request_handlers[])(connection_t*) = {
id_h, challenge_h, chal_reply_h, metakey_h, ack_h,
id_h, metakey_h, challenge_h, chal_reply_h,
status_h, error_h, termreq_h,
ping_h, pong_h,
add_host_h, del_host_h,
@ -1361,7 +1306,7 @@ int (*request_handlers[])(connection_t*) = {
/* Request names */
char (*request_name[]) = {
"ID", "CHALLENGE", "CHAL_REPLY", "METAKEY", "ACK",
"ID", "METAKEY", "CHALLENGE", "CHAL_REPLY",
"STATUS", "ERROR", "TERMREQ",
"PING", "PONG",
"ADD_HOST", "DEL_HOST",

View file

@ -17,7 +17,7 @@
along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
Foundation, Inc., 675 Mass Ave, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA.
$Id: protocol.h,v 1.5.4.19 2001/01/07 20:19:35 guus Exp $
$Id: protocol.h,v 1.5.4.20 2001/02/25 19:09:45 guus Exp $
*/
#ifndef __TINC_PROTOCOL_H__
@ -30,13 +30,13 @@
incompatible version have different protocols.
*/
#define PROT_CURRENT 8
#define PROT_CURRENT 9
/* Request numbers */
enum {
ALL = -1, /* Guardian for allow_request */
ID = 0, CHALLENGE, CHAL_REPLY, METAKEY, ACK,
ID = 0, METAKEY, CHALLENGE, CHAL_REPLY,
STATUS, ERROR, TERMREQ,
PING, PONG,
ADD_HOST, DEL_HOST,
@ -57,7 +57,6 @@ extern int send_id(connection_t*);
extern int send_challenge(connection_t*);
extern int send_chal_reply(connection_t*);
extern int send_metakey(connection_t*);
extern int send_ack(connection_t*);
extern int send_status(connection_t*, int, char*);
extern int send_error(connection_t*, int, char*);
extern int send_termreq(connection_t*);