Use SPTPS when ExperimentalProtocol is enabled.
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efd21e232d
commit
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9 changed files with 92 additions and 112 deletions
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@ -31,12 +31,14 @@
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#include "edge.h"
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#include "graph.h"
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#include "logger.h"
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#include "meta.h"
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#include "net.h"
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#include "netutl.h"
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#include "node.h"
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#include "prf.h"
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#include "protocol.h"
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#include "rsa.h"
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#include "sptps.h"
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#include "utils.h"
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#include "xalloc.h"
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@ -122,9 +124,10 @@ bool id_h(connection_t *c, char *request) {
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return false;
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}
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if(experimental && c->protocol_minor >= 2)
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if(experimental && c->protocol_minor >= 2) {
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if(!read_ecdsa_public_key(c))
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return false;
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}
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} else {
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if(c->protocol_minor && !ecdsa_active(&c->ecdsa))
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c->protocol_minor = 1;
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@ -132,30 +135,19 @@ bool id_h(connection_t *c, char *request) {
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c->allow_request = METAKEY;
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if(c->protocol_minor >= 2)
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return send_metakey_ec(c);
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else
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if(c->protocol_minor >= 2) {
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c->allow_request = ACK;
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char label[25 + strlen(myself->name) + strlen(c->name)];
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if(c->outgoing)
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snprintf(label, sizeof label, "tinc TCP key expansion %s %s", myself->name, c->name);
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else
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snprintf(label, sizeof label, "tinc TCP key expansion %s %s", c->name, myself->name);
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return start_sptps(&c->sptps, c, c->outgoing, myself->connection->ecdsa, c->ecdsa, label, sizeof label, send_meta_sptps, receive_meta_sptps);
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} else {
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return send_metakey(c);
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}
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bool send_metakey_ec(connection_t *c) {
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logger(LOG_DEBUG, "Sending ECDH metakey to %s", c->name);
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size_t siglen = ecdsa_size(&myself->connection->ecdsa);
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char key[(ECDH_SIZE + siglen) * 2 + 1];
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// TODO: include nonce? Use relevant parts of SSH or TLS protocol
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if(!ecdh_generate_public(&c->ecdh, key))
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return false;
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if(!ecdsa_sign(&myself->connection->ecdsa, key, ECDH_SIZE, key + ECDH_SIZE))
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return false;
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b64encode(key, key, ECDH_SIZE + siglen);
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return send_request(c, "%d %s", METAKEY, key);
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}
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}
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bool send_metakey(connection_t *c) {
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@ -223,84 +215,7 @@ bool send_metakey(connection_t *c) {
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return result;
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}
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static bool metakey_ec_h(connection_t *c, const char *request) {
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size_t siglen = ecdsa_size(&c->ecdsa);
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char key[MAX_STRING_SIZE];
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logger(LOG_DEBUG, "Got ECDH metakey from %s", c->name);
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if(sscanf(request, "%*d " MAX_STRING, key) != 1) {
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logger(LOG_ERR, "Got bad %s from %s (%s)", "METAKEY", c->name, c->hostname);
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return false;
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}
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int inlen = b64decode(key, key, sizeof key);
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if(inlen != (ECDH_SIZE + siglen)) {
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logger(LOG_ERR, "Possible intruder %s (%s): %s", c->name, c->hostname, "wrong keylength");
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return false;
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}
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if(!ecdsa_verify(&c->ecdsa, key, ECDH_SIZE, key + ECDH_SIZE)) {
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logger(LOG_ERR, "Possible intruder %s (%s): %s", c->name, c->hostname, "invalid ECDSA signature");
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return false;
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}
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char shared[ECDH_SHARED_SIZE];
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if(!ecdh_compute_shared(&c->ecdh, key, shared))
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return false;
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/* Update our crypto end */
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if(!cipher_open_by_name(&c->incipher, "aes-256-ofb"))
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return false;
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if(!digest_open_by_name(&c->indigest, "sha512", -1))
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return false;
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if(!cipher_open_by_name(&c->outcipher, "aes-256-ofb"))
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return false;
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if(!digest_open_by_name(&c->outdigest, "sha512", -1))
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return false;
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size_t mykeylen = cipher_keylength(&c->incipher);
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size_t hiskeylen = cipher_keylength(&c->outcipher);
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char *mykey;
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char *hiskey;
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char *seed;
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if(strcmp(myself->name, c->name) < 0) {
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mykey = key;
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hiskey = key + mykeylen * 2;
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xasprintf(&seed, "tinc TCP key expansion %s %s", myself->name, c->name);
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} else {
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mykey = key + hiskeylen * 2;
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hiskey = key;
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xasprintf(&seed, "tinc TCP key expansion %s %s", c->name, myself->name);
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}
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if(!prf(shared, ECDH_SHARED_SIZE, seed, strlen(seed), key, hiskeylen * 2 + mykeylen * 2))
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return false;
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free(seed);
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cipher_set_key(&c->incipher, mykey, false);
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digest_set_key(&c->indigest, mykey + mykeylen, mykeylen);
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cipher_set_key(&c->outcipher, hiskey, true);
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digest_set_key(&c->outdigest, hiskey + hiskeylen, hiskeylen);
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c->status.decryptin = true;
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c->status.encryptout = true;
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c->allow_request = CHALLENGE;
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return send_challenge(c);
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}
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bool metakey_h(connection_t *c, char *request) {
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if(c->protocol_minor >= 2)
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return metakey_ec_h(c, request);
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char hexkey[MAX_STRING_SIZE];
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int cipher, digest, maclength, compression;
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size_t len = rsa_size(&myself->connection->rsa);
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@ -355,7 +270,7 @@ bool metakey_h(connection_t *c, char *request) {
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}
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bool send_challenge(connection_t *c) {
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size_t len = c->protocol_minor >= 2 ? ECDH_SIZE : rsa_size(&c->rsa);
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size_t len = rsa_size(&c->rsa);
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char buffer[len * 2 + 1];
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if(!c->hischallenge)
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@ -376,7 +291,7 @@ bool send_challenge(connection_t *c) {
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bool challenge_h(connection_t *c, char *request) {
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char buffer[MAX_STRING_SIZE];
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size_t len = c->protocol_minor >= 2 ? ECDH_SIZE : rsa_size(&myself->connection->rsa);
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size_t len = rsa_size(&myself->connection->rsa);
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size_t digestlen = digest_length(&c->indigest);
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char digest[digestlen];
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@ -434,7 +349,7 @@ bool chal_reply_h(connection_t *c, char *request) {
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/* Verify the hash */
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if(!digest_verify(&c->outdigest, c->hischallenge, c->protocol_minor >= 2 ? ECDH_SIZE : rsa_size(&c->rsa), hishash)) {
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if(!digest_verify(&c->outdigest, c->hischallenge, rsa_size(&c->rsa), hishash)) {
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logger(LOG_ERR, "Possible intruder %s (%s): %s", c->name, c->hostname, "wrong challenge reply");
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return false;
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}
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