Temporarily revert to old crypto code
(The new code is still segfaulting for me, and I'd like to proceed with other work.) This largely rolls back to the revision 1545 state of the existing code (new crypto layer is still there with no callers), though I reintroduced the segfault fix of revision 1562.
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269892f70b
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10 changed files with 535 additions and 239 deletions
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@ -22,8 +22,10 @@
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#include "system.h"
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#include <openssl/evp.h>
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#include <openssl/err.h>
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#include "splay_tree.h"
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#include "cipher.h"
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#include "connection.h"
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#include "logger.h"
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#include "net.h"
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@ -33,7 +35,7 @@
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#include "utils.h"
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#include "xalloc.h"
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static bool mykeyused = false;
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bool mykeyused = false;
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bool send_key_changed(connection_t *c, const node_t *n) {
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cp();
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@ -135,19 +137,18 @@ bool req_key_h(connection_t *c, char *request) {
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}
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bool send_ans_key(connection_t *c, const node_t *from, const node_t *to) {
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size_t keylen = cipher_keylength(&from->cipher);
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char key[keylen];
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char *key;
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cp();
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cipher_get_key(&from->cipher, key);
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bin2hex(key, key, keylen);
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key[keylen * 2] = '\0';
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key = alloca(2 * from->keylength + 1);
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bin2hex(from->key, key, from->keylength);
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key[from->keylength * 2] = '\0';
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return send_request(c, "%d %s %s %s %d %d %d %d", ANS_KEY,
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from->name, to->name, key,
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cipher_get_nid(&from->cipher),
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digest_get_nid(&from->digest), from->maclength,
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from->cipher ? from->cipher->nid : 0,
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from->digest ? from->digest->type : 0, from->maclength,
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from->compression);
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}
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@ -193,28 +194,58 @@ bool ans_key_h(connection_t *c, char *request) {
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return send_request(to->nexthop->connection, "%s", request);
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}
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/* Update our copy of the origin's packet key */
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if(from->key)
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free(from->key);
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from->key = xstrdup(key);
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from->keylength = strlen(key) / 2;
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hex2bin(from->key, from->key, from->keylength);
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from->key[from->keylength] = '\0';
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from->status.validkey = true;
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from->status.waitingforkey = false;
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from->sent_seqno = 0;
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/* Check and lookup cipher and digest algorithms */
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if(!cipher_open_by_nid(&from->cipher, cipher)) {
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logger(LOG_ERR, _("Node %s (%s) uses unknown cipher!"), from->name, from->hostname);
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return false;
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}
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if(cipher) {
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from->cipher = EVP_get_cipherbynid(cipher);
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if(strlen(key) / 2 != cipher_keylength(&from->cipher)) {
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logger(LOG_ERR, _("Node %s (%s) uses wrong keylength!"), from->name, from->hostname);
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return false;
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if(!from->cipher) {
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logger(LOG_ERR, _("Node %s (%s) uses unknown cipher!"), from->name,
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from->hostname);
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return false;
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}
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if(from->keylength != from->cipher->key_len + from->cipher->iv_len) {
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logger(LOG_ERR, _("Node %s (%s) uses wrong keylength!"), from->name,
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from->hostname);
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return false;
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}
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} else {
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from->cipher = NULL;
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}
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from->maclength = maclength;
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if(!digest_open_by_nid(&from->digest, digest)) {
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logger(LOG_ERR, _("Node %s (%s) uses unknown digest!"), from->name, from->hostname);
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return false;
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}
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if(digest) {
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from->digest = EVP_get_digestbynid(digest);
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if(from->maclength > digest_length(&from->digest) || from->maclength < 0) {
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logger(LOG_ERR, _("Node %s (%s) uses bogus MAC length!"), from->name, from->hostname);
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return false;
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if(!from->digest) {
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logger(LOG_ERR, _("Node %s (%s) uses unknown digest!"), from->name,
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from->hostname);
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return false;
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}
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if(from->maclength > from->digest->md_size || from->maclength < 0) {
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logger(LOG_ERR, _("Node %s (%s) uses bogus MAC length!"),
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from->name, from->hostname);
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return false;
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}
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} else {
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from->digest = NULL;
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}
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if(compression < 0 || compression > 11) {
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@ -224,14 +255,12 @@ bool ans_key_h(connection_t *c, char *request) {
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from->compression = compression;
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/* Update our copy of the origin's packet key */
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hex2bin(key, key, cipher_keylength(&from->cipher));
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cipher_set_key(&from->cipher, key, false);
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from->status.validkey = true;
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from->status.waitingforkey = false;
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from->sent_seqno = 0;
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if(from->cipher)
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if(!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&from->packet_ctx, from->cipher, NULL, (unsigned char *)from->key, (unsigned char *)from->key + from->cipher->key_len)) {
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logger(LOG_ERR, _("Error during initialisation of key from %s (%s): %s"),
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from->name, from->hostname, ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
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return false;
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}
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if(from->options & OPTION_PMTU_DISCOVERY && !from->mtuprobes)
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send_mtu_probe(from);
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