- Make sure METAKEY is smaller than the modulus of the RSA key
- Get symmetric key from the least significant bytes of the RSA message
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1 changed files with 9 additions and 5 deletions
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@ -17,7 +17,7 @@
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along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
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Foundation, Inc., 675 Mass Ave, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA.
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$Id: protocol.c,v 1.28.4.81 2001/02/25 19:09:43 guus Exp $
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$Id: protocol.c,v 1.28.4.82 2001/02/26 11:37:20 guus Exp $
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*/
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#include "config.h"
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@ -439,8 +439,8 @@ cp
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RAND_bytes(cl->cipher_outkey, len);
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cl->cipher_outkey[0] &= 0x7F; /* FIXME: Somehow if the first byte is more than 0xD0 or something like that, decryption fails... */
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cl->cipher_outkey[0] &= 0x0F; /* Make sure that the random data is smaller than the modulus of the RSA key */
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if(debug_lvl >= DEBUG_SCARY_THINGS)
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{
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bin2hex(cl->cipher_outkey, buffer, len);
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@ -469,7 +469,9 @@ cp
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/* Further outgoing requests are encrypted with the key we just generated */
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EVP_EncryptInit(cl->cipher_outctx, EVP_bf_cfb(), cl->cipher_outkey, cl->cipher_outkey + EVP_bf_cfb()->key_len);
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EVP_EncryptInit(cl->cipher_outctx, EVP_bf_cfb(),
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cl->cipher_outkey + len - EVP_bf_cfb()->key_len,
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cl->cipher_outkey + len - EVP_bf_cfb()->key_len - EVP_bf_cfb()->iv_len);
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cl->status.encryptout = 1;
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cp
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@ -526,7 +528,9 @@ cp
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/* All incoming requests will now be encrypted. */
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EVP_DecryptInit(cl->cipher_inctx, EVP_bf_cfb(), cl->cipher_inkey, cl->cipher_inkey + EVP_bf_cfb()->key_len);
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EVP_DecryptInit(cl->cipher_inctx, EVP_bf_cfb(),
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cl->cipher_inkey + len - EVP_bf_cfb()->key_len,
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cl->cipher_inkey + len - EVP_bf_cfb()->key_len - EVP_bf_cfb()->iv_len);
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cl->status.decryptin = 1;
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