bearssl/inc/bearssl_aead.h

461 lines
16 KiB
C

/*
* Copyright (c) 2017 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
*
* Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
* a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
* "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
* without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
* distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
* permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
* the following conditions:
*
* The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
* included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
* EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
* NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
* BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
* ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
* CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
* SOFTWARE.
*/
#ifndef BR_BEARSSL_AEAD_H__
#define BR_BEARSSL_AEAD_H__
#include <stddef.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include "bearssl_block.h"
#include "bearssl_hash.h"
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C" {
#endif
/** \file bearssl_aead.h
*
* # Authenticated Encryption with Additional Data
*
* This file documents the API for AEAD encryption.
*
*
* ## Procedural API
*
* An AEAD algorithm processes messages and provides confidentiality
* (encryption) and checked integrity (MAC). It uses the following
* parameters:
*
* - A symmetric key. Exact size depends on the AEAD algorithm.
*
* - A nonce (IV). Size depends on the AEAD algorithm; for most
* algorithms, it is crucial for security that any given nonce
* value is never used twice for the same key and distinct
* messages.
*
* - Data to encrypt and protect.
*
* - Additional authenticated data, which is covered by the MAC but
* otherwise left untouched (i.e. not encrypted).
*
* The AEAD algorithm encrypts the data, and produces an authentication
* tag. It is assumed that the encrypted data, the tag, the additional
* authenticated data and the nonce are sent to the receiver; the
* additional data and the nonce may be implicit (e.g. using elements of
* the underlying transport protocol, such as record sequence numbers).
* The receiver will recompute the tag value and compare it with the one
* received; if they match, then the data is correct, and can be
* decrypted and used; otherwise, at least one of the elements was
* altered in transit, normally leading to wholesale rejection of the
* complete message.
*
* For each AEAD algorithm, identified by a symbolic name (hereafter
* denoted as "`xxx`"), the following functions are defined:
*
* - `br_xxx_init()`
*
* Initialise the AEAD algorithm, on a provided context structure.
* Exact parameters depend on the algorithm, and may include
* pointers to extra implementations and context structures. The
* secret key is provided at this point, either directly or
* indirectly.
*
* - `br_xxx_reset()`
*
* Start a new AEAD computation. The nonce value is provided as
* parameter to this function.
*
* - `br_xxx_aad_inject()`
*
* Inject some additional authenticated data. Additional data may
* be provided in several chunks of arbitrary length.
*
* - `br_xxx_flip()`
*
* This function MUST be called after injecting all additional
* authenticated data, and before beginning to encrypt the plaintext
* (or decrypt the ciphertext).
*
* - `br_xxx_run()`
*
* Process some plaintext (to encrypt) or ciphertext (to decrypt).
* Encryption/decryption is done in place. Data may be provided in
* several chunks of arbitrary length.
*
* - `br_xxx_get_tag()`
*
* Compute the authentication tag. All message data (encrypted or
* decrypted) must have been injected at that point. Also, this
* call may modify internal context elements, so it may be called
* only once for a given AEAD computation.
*
* - `br_xxx_check_tag()`
*
* An alternative to `br_xxx_get_tag()`, meant to be used by the
* receiver: the authentication tag is internally recomputed, and
* compared with the one provided as parameter.
*
* This API makes the following assumptions on the AEAD algorithm:
*
* - Encryption does not expand the size of the ciphertext; there is
* no padding. This is true of most modern AEAD modes such as GCM.
*
* - The additional authenticated data must be processed first,
* before the encrypted/decrypted data.
*
* - Nonce, plaintext and additional authenticated data all consist
* in an integral number of bytes. There is no provision to use
* elements whose lengh in bits is not a multiple of 8.
*
* Each AEAD algorithm has its own requirements and limits on the sizes
* of additional data and plaintext. This API does not provide any
* way to report invalid usage; it is up to the caller to ensure that
* the provided key, nonce, and data elements all fit the algorithm's
* requirements.
*
*
* ## Object-Oriented API
*
* Each context structure begins with a field (called `vtable`) that
* points to an instance of a structure that references the relevant
* functions through pointers. Each such structure contains the
* following:
*
* - `reset`
*
* Pointer to the reset function, that allows starting a new
* computation.
*
* - `aad_inject`
*
* Pointer to the additional authenticated data injection function.
*
* - `flip`
*
* Pointer to the function that transitions from additional data
* to main message data processing.
*
* - `get_tag`
*
* Pointer to the function that computes and returns the tag.
*
* - `check_tag`
*
* Pointer to the function that computes and verifies the tag against
* a received value.
*
* Note that there is no OOP method for context initialisation: the
* various AEAD algorithms have different requirements that would not
* map well to a single initialisation API.
*/
/**
* \brief Class type of an AEAD algorithm.
*/
typedef struct br_aead_class_ br_aead_class;
struct br_aead_class_ {
/**
* \brief Size (in bytes) of authentication tags created by
* this AEAD algorithm.
*/
size_t tag_size;
/**
* \brief Reset an AEAD context.
*
* This function resets an already initialised AEAD context for
* a new computation run. Implementations and keys are
* conserved. This function can be called at any time; it
* cancels any ongoing AEAD computation that uses the provided
* context structure.
* The provided IV is a _nonce_. Each AEAD algorithm has its
* own requirements on IV size and contents; for most of them,
* it is crucial to security that each nonce value is used
* only once for a given secret key.
*
* \param cc AEAD context structure.
* \param iv AEAD nonce to use.
* \param len AEAD nonce length (in bytes).
*/
void (*reset)(const br_aead_class **cc, const void *iv, size_t len);
/**
* \brief Inject additional authenticated data.
*
* The provided data is injected into a running AEAD
* computation. Additional data must be injected _before_ the
* call to `flip()`. Additional data can be injected in several
* chunks of arbitrary length.
*
* \param cc AEAD context structure.
* \param data pointer to additional authenticated data.
* \param len length of additiona authenticated data (in bytes).
*/
void (*aad_inject)(const br_aead_class **cc,
const void *data, size_t len);
/**
* \brief Finish injection of additional authenticated data.
*
* This function MUST be called before beginning the actual
* encryption or decryption (with `run()`), even if no
* additional authenticated data was injected. No additional
* authenticated data may be injected after this function call.
*
* \param cc AEAD context structure.
*/
void (*flip)(const br_aead_class **cc);
/**
* \brief Encrypt or decrypt some data.
*
* Data encryption or decryption can be done after `flip()` has
* been called on the context. If `encrypt` is non-zero, then
* the provided data shall be plaintext, and it is encrypted in
* place. Otherwise, the data shall be ciphertext, and it is
* decrypted in place.
*
* Data may be provided in several chunks of arbitrary length.
*
* \param cc AEAD context structure.
* \param encrypt non-zero for encryption, zero for decryption.
* \param data data to encrypt or decrypt.
* \param len data length (in bytes).
*/
void (*run)(const br_aead_class **cc, int encrypt,
void *data, size_t len);
/**
* \brief Compute authentication tag.
*
* Compute the AEAD authentication tag. The tag length depends
* on the AEAD algorithm; it is written in the provided `tag`
* buffer. This call terminates the AEAD run: no data may be
* processed with that AEAD context afterwards, until `reset()`
* is called to initiate a new AEAD run.
*
* The tag value must normally be sent along with the encrypted
* data. When decrypting, the tag value must be recomputed and
* compared with the received tag: if the two tag values differ,
* then either the tag or the encrypted data was altered in
* transit. As an alternative to this function, the
* `check_tag()` function may be used to compute and check the
* tag value.
*
* \param cc AEAD context structure.
* \param tag destination buffer for the tag.
*/
void (*get_tag)(const br_aead_class **cc, void *tag);
/**
* \brief Compute and check authentication tag.
*
* This function is an alternative to `get_tag()`, and is
* normally used on the receiving end (i.e. when decrypting
* messages). The tag value is recomputed and compared with the
* provided tag value. If they match, 1 is returned; on
* mismatch, 0 is returned. A returned value of 0 means that the
* data or the tag was altered in transit, normally leading to
* wholesale rejection of the complete message.
*
* \param cc AEAD context structure.
* \param tag tag value to compare with (16 bytes).
* \return 1 on success (exact match of tag value), 0 otherwise.
*/
uint32_t (*check_tag)(const br_aead_class **cc, const void *tag);
};
/**
* \brief Context structure for GCM.
*
* GCM is an AEAD mode that combines a block cipher in CTR mode with a
* MAC based on GHASH, to provide authenticated encryption:
*
* - Any block cipher with 16-byte blocks can be used with GCM.
*
* - The nonce can have any length, from 0 up to 2^64-1 bits; however,
* 96-bit nonces (12 bytes) are recommended (nonces with a length
* distinct from 12 bytes are internally hashed, which risks reusing
* nonce value with a small but not always negligible probability).
*
* - Additional authenticated data may have length up to 2^64-1 bits.
*
* - Message length may range up to 2^39-256 bits at most.
*
* - The authentication tag has length 16 bytes.
*
* The GCM initialisation function receives as parameter an
* _initialised_ block cipher implementation context, with the secret
* key already set. A pointer to that context will be kept within the
* GCM context structure. It is up to the caller to allocate and
* initialise that block cipher context.
*/
typedef struct {
/** \brief Pointer to vtable for this context. */
const br_aead_class *vtable;
#ifndef BR_DOXYGEN_IGNORE
const br_block_ctr_class **bctx;
br_ghash gh;
unsigned char h[16];
unsigned char j0_1[12];
unsigned char buf[16];
unsigned char y[16];
uint32_t j0_2, jc;
uint64_t count_aad, count_ctr;
#endif
} br_gcm_context;
/**
* \brief Initialize a GCM context.
*
* A block cipher implementation, with its initialised context structure,
* is provided. The block cipher MUST use 16-byte blocks in CTR mode,
* and its secret key MUST have been already set in the provided context.
* A GHASH implementation must also be provided. The parameters are linked
* in the GCM context.
*
* After this function has been called, the `br_gcm_reset()` function must
* be called, to provide the IV for GCM computation.
*
* \param ctx GCM context structure.
* \param bctx block cipher context (already initialised with secret key).
* \param gh GHASH implementation.
*/
void br_gcm_init(br_gcm_context *ctx,
const br_block_ctr_class **bctx, br_ghash gh);
/**
* \brief Reset a GCM context.
*
* This function resets an already initialised GCM context for a new
* computation run. Implementations and keys are conserved. This function
* can be called at any time; it cancels any ongoing GCM computation that
* uses the provided context structure.
*
* The provided IV is a _nonce_. It is critical to GCM security that IV
* values are not repeated for the same encryption key. IV can have
* arbitrary length (up to 2^64-1 bits), but the "normal" length is
* 96 bits (12 bytes).
*
* \param ctx GCM context structure.
* \param iv GCM nonce to use.
* \param len GCM nonce length (in bytes).
*/
void br_gcm_reset(br_gcm_context *ctx, const void *iv, size_t len);
/**
* \brief Inject additional authenticated data into GCM.
*
* The provided data is injected into a running GCM computation. Additional
* data must be injected _before_ the call to `br_gcm_flip()`.
* Additional data can be injected in several chunks of arbitrary length;
* the maximum total size of additional authenticated data is 2^64-1
* bits.
*
* \param ctx GCM context structure.
* \param data pointer to additional authenticated data.
* \param len length of additiona authenticated data (in bytes).
*/
void br_gcm_aad_inject(br_gcm_context *ctx, const void *data, size_t len);
/**
* \brief Finish injection of additional authenticated data into GCM.
*
* This function MUST be called before beginning the actual encryption
* or decryption (with `br_gcm_run()`), even if no additional authenticated
* data was injected. No additional authenticated data may be injected
* after this function call.
*
* \param ctx GCM context structure.
*/
void br_gcm_flip(br_gcm_context *ctx);
/**
* \brief Encrypt or decrypt some data with GCM.
*
* Data encryption or decryption can be done after `br_gcm_flip()`
* has been called on the context. If `encrypt` is non-zero, then the
* provided data shall be plaintext, and it is encrypted in place.
* Otherwise, the data shall be ciphertext, and it is decrypted in place.
*
* Data may be provided in several chunks of arbitrary length. The maximum
* total length for data is 2^39-256 bits, i.e. about 65 gigabytes.
*
* \param ctx GCM context structure.
* \param encrypt non-zero for encryption, zero for decryption.
* \param data data to encrypt or decrypt.
* \param len data length (in bytes).
*/
void br_gcm_run(br_gcm_context *ctx, int encrypt, void *data, size_t len);
/**
* \brief Compute GCM authentication tag.
*
* Compute the GCM authentication tag. The tag is a 16-byte value which
* is written in the provided `tag` buffer. This call terminates the
* GCM run: no data may be processed with that GCM context afterwards,
* until `br_gcm_reset()` is called to initiate a new GCM run.
*
* The tag value must normally be sent along with the encrypted data.
* When decrypting, the tag value must be recomputed and compared with
* the received tag: if the two tag values differ, then either the tag
* or the encrypted data was altered in transit. As an alternative to
* this function, the `br_gcm_check_tag()` function can be used to
* compute and check the tag value.
*
* \param ctx GCM context structure.
* \param tag destination buffer for the tag (16 bytes).
*/
void br_gcm_get_tag(br_gcm_context *ctx, void *tag);
/**
* \brief Compute and check GCM authentication tag.
*
* This function is an alternative to `br_gcm_get_tag()`, normally used
* on the receiving end (i.e. when decrypting value). The tag value is
* recomputed and compared with the provided tag value. If they match, 1
* is returned; on mismatch, 0 is returned. A returned value of 0 means
* that the data or the tag was altered in transit, normally leading to
* wholesale rejection of the complete message.
*
* \param ctx GCM context structure.
* \param tag tag value to compare with (16 bytes).
* \return 1 on success (exact match of tag value), 0 otherwise.
*/
uint32_t br_gcm_check_tag(br_gcm_context *ctx, const void *tag);
/**
* \brief Class instance for GCM.
*/
extern const br_aead_class br_gcm_vtable;
#ifdef __cplusplus
}
#endif
#endif