Added support for client certificates (both client-side and server-side, but still missing an API for extracting the client identity from the certificate).
This commit is contained in:
Thomas Pornin
parent
e9ce2f4e8c
commit
e61ad42191
27 changed files with 4441 additions and 1482 deletions
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@ -188,8 +188,7 @@ br_x509_minimal_init(br_x509_minimal_context *ctx,
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}
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static void
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xm_start_chain(const br_x509_class **ctx,
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unsigned expected_key_type, const char *server_name)
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xm_start_chain(const br_x509_class **ctx, const char *server_name)
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{
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br_x509_minimal_context *cc;
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@ -200,7 +199,6 @@ xm_start_chain(const br_x509_class **ctx,
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cc->cpu.dp = cc->dp_stack;
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cc->cpu.rp = cc->rp_stack;
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br_x509_minimal_init_main(&cc->cpu);
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cc->expected_key_type = expected_key_type;
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if (server_name == NULL || *server_name == 0) {
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cc->server_name = NULL;
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} else {
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@ -269,7 +267,7 @@ xm_end_chain(const br_x509_class **ctx)
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}
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static const br_x509_pkey *
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xm_get_pkey(const br_x509_class *const *ctx)
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xm_get_pkey(const br_x509_class *const *ctx, unsigned *usages)
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{
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br_x509_minimal_context *cc;
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@ -277,6 +275,9 @@ xm_get_pkey(const br_x509_class *const *ctx)
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if (cc->err == BR_ERR_X509_OK
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|| cc->err == BR_ERR_X509_NOT_TRUSTED)
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{
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if (usages != NULL) {
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*usages = cc->key_usages;
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}
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return &((br_x509_minimal_context *)ctx)->pkey;
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} else {
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return NULL;
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@ -472,7 +473,7 @@ cc: zero-server-name ( -- bool ) {
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T0_PUSHi(-(CTX->server_name == NULL));
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}
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addr: expected_key_type
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addr: key_usages
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addr: cert_sig
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addr: cert_sig_len
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addr: cert_signer_key_type
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@ -705,7 +706,7 @@ cc: check-direct-trust ( -- ) {
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if (ta->flags & BR_X509_TA_CA) {
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continue;
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}
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hash_dn(CTX, ta->dn, ta->dn_len, hashed_DN);
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hash_dn(CTX, ta->dn.data, ta->dn.len, hashed_DN);
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if (memcmp(hashed_DN, CTX->current_dn_hash, DNHASH_LEN)) {
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continue;
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}
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@ -765,7 +766,7 @@ cc: check-trust-anchor-CA ( -- ) {
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if (!(ta->flags & BR_X509_TA_CA)) {
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continue;
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}
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hash_dn(CTX, ta->dn, ta->dn_len, hashed_DN);
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hash_dn(CTX, ta->dn.data, ta->dn.len, hashed_DN);
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if (memcmp(hashed_DN, CTX->saved_dn_hash, DNHASH_LEN)) {
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continue;
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}
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@ -892,20 +893,14 @@ OID: subjectInfoAccess 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1.11
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\ Process a Key Usage extension.
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\ For the EE certificate:
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\ -- if the expected key usage is "key exchange", then the extension
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\ must contain either keyEncipherment (2) or dataEncipherment (3);
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\ -- if the expected key usage is "signature", then the extension
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\ must contain either digitalSignature (0) or nonRepudiation (1).
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\ -- if the key usage contains keyEncipherment (2), dataEncipherment (3)
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\ or keyAgreement (4), then the "key exchange" usage is allowed;
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\ -- if the key usage contains digitalSignature (0) or nonRepudiation (1),
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\ then the "signature" usage is allowed.
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\ For CA certificates, the extension must contain keyCertSign (5).
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: process-keyUsage ( lim ee -- lim )
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\ Compute flags, depending on EE status and expected key usage.
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\ This is a mask of bits in the first byte.
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if
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addr-expected_key_type get8 0x10 and if 0x30 else 0xC0 then
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else
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0x04
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then
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{ mask }
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{ ee }
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\ Read tag for the BIT STRING and open it.
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read-tag 0x03 check-tag-primitive
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read-length-open-elt
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@ -919,7 +914,20 @@ OID: subjectInfoAccess 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1.11
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1 of read8 ign >> ign << endof
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drop read8 0
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endcase
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mask and ifnot ERR_X509_FORBIDDEN_KEY_USAGE fail then
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\ Check bits.
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ee if
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\ EE: get usages.
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0
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over 0x38 and if 0x10 or then
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swap 0xC0 and if 0x20 or then
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addr-key_usages set8
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else
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\ Not EE: keyCertSign must be set.
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0x04 and ifnot ERR_X509_FORBIDDEN_KEY_USAGE fail then
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then
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\ We don't care about subsequent bytes.
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skip-close-elt ;
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\ Process a Subject Alt Name extension. Returned value is a boolean set
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@ -1070,15 +1078,8 @@ OID: subjectInfoAccess 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1.11
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\ Process public key.
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ee if
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\ For the EE certificate, check that the key type
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\ matches that which was expected, then copy the
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\ data to the relevant buffer.
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addr-expected_key_type get8 0x0F and
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dup if
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pkey-type = ifnot ERR_X509_WRONG_KEY_TYPE fail then
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else
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drop
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then
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\ For the EE certificate, copy the key data to the
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\ relevant buffer.
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pkey-type case
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KEYTYPE_RSA of nlen elen copy-ee-rsa-pkey endof
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KEYTYPE_EC of curve qlen copy-ee-ec-pkey endof
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@ -1286,6 +1287,9 @@ OID: subjectInfoAccess 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1.11
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check-trust-anchor-CA ;
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: main
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\ Unless restricted by a Key Usage extension, all usages are
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\ deemed allowed.
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0x30 addr-key_usages set8
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-1 decode-certificate
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co
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begin
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