Added AESCTR_DRBG implementation (beta).

This commit is contained in:
Thomas Pornin 2018-08-01 00:50:13 +02:00
parent 491a45337d
commit cfbc702d3d
6 changed files with 366 additions and 0 deletions

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@ -28,6 +28,8 @@
#include <stddef.h> #include <stddef.h>
#include <stdint.h> #include <stdint.h>
#include "bearssl_block.h"
#ifdef __cplusplus #ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C" { extern "C" {
#endif #endif
@ -93,6 +95,32 @@ extern "C" {
* no currently known security penalty for exceeding the NIST limits, * no currently known security penalty for exceeding the NIST limits,
* and, in any case, HMAC_DRBG usage in implementing SSL/TLS always * and, in any case, HMAC_DRBG usage in implementing SSL/TLS always
* stays much below these thresholds. * stays much below these thresholds.
*
*
* ## AESCTR_DRBG
*
* AESCTR_DRBG is a custom PRNG based on AES-128 in CTR mode. This is
* meant to be used only in situations where you are desperate for
* speed, and have an hardware-optimized AES/CTR implementation. Whether
* this will yield perceptible improvements depends on what you use the
* pseudorandom bytes for, and how many you want; for instance, RSA key
* pair generation uses a substantial amount of randomness, and using
* AESCTR_DRBG instead of HMAC_DRBG yields a 15 to 20% increase in key
* generation speed on a recent x86 CPU (Intel Core i7-6567U at 3.30 GHz).
*
* Internally, it uses CTR mode with successive counter values, starting
* at zero (counter value expressed over 128 bits, big-endian convention).
* The counter is not allowed to reach 32768; thus, every 32768*16 bytes
* at most, the `update()` function is run (on an empty seed, if none is
* provided). The `update()` function computes the new AES-128 key by
* applying a custom hash function to the concatenation of a state-dependent
* word (encryption of an all-one block with the current key) and the new
* seed. The custom hash function uses Hirose's construction over AES-256;
* see the comments in `aesctr_drbg.c` for details.
*
* This DRBG does not follow an existing standard, and thus should be
* considered as inadequate for production use until it has been properly
* analysed.
*/ */
/** /**
@ -288,6 +316,79 @@ typedef int (*br_prng_seeder)(const br_prng_class **ctx);
*/ */
br_prng_seeder br_prng_seeder_system(const char **name); br_prng_seeder br_prng_seeder_system(const char **name);
/**
* \brief Context for AESCTR_DRBG.
*
* The context contents are opaque, except the first field, which
* supports OOP.
*/
typedef struct {
/**
* \brief Pointer to the vtable.
*
* This field is set with the initialisation method/function.
*/
const br_prng_class *vtable;
#ifndef BR_DOXYGEN_IGNORE
br_aes_gen_ctr_keys sk;
uint32_t cc;
#endif
} br_aesctr_drbg_context;
/**
* \brief Statically allocated, constant vtable for AESCTR_DRBG.
*/
extern const br_prng_class br_aesctr_drbg_vtable;
/**
* \brief AESCTR_DRBG initialisation.
*
* The context to initialise is provided as a pointer to its first field
* (the vtable pointer); this function sets that first field to a
* pointer to the vtable.
*
* The internal AES key is first set to the all-zero key; then, the
* `br_aesctr_drbg_update()` function is called with the provided `seed`.
* The call is performed even if the seed length (`seed_len`) is zero.
*
* The `aesctr` parameter defines the underlying AES/CTR implementation.
*
* \param ctx HMAC_DRBG context to initialise.
* \param digest_class vtable for the underlying hash function.
* \param seed initial seed (can be `NULL` if `seed_len` is zero).
* \param seed_len initial seed length (in bytes).
*/
void br_aesctr_drbg_init(br_aesctr_drbg_context *ctx,
const br_block_ctr_class *aesctr, const void *seed, size_t seed_len);
/**
* \brief Random bytes generation with AESCTR_DRBG.
*
* This method produces `len` pseudorandom bytes, in the `out`
* buffer. The context is updated accordingly.
*
* \param ctx AESCTR_DRBG context.
* \param out output buffer.
* \param len number of pseudorandom bytes to produce.
*/
void br_aesctr_drbg_generate(br_aesctr_drbg_context *ctx,
void *out, size_t len);
/**
* \brief Inject additional seed bytes in AESCTR_DRBG.
*
* The provided seed bytes are added into the AESCTR_DRBG internal
* entropy pool. The process does not _replace_ existing entropy,
* thus pushing non-random bytes (i.e. bytes which are known to the
* attackers) does not degrade the overall quality of generated bytes.
*
* \param ctx AESCTR_DRBG context.
* \param seed additional seed.
* \param seed_len additional seed length (in bytes).
*/
void br_aesctr_drbg_update(br_aesctr_drbg_context *ctx,
const void *seed, size_t seed_len);
#ifdef __cplusplus #ifdef __cplusplus
} }
#endif #endif

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@ -122,6 +122,7 @@ OBJ = \
$(OBJDIR)$Pi62_modpow2$O \ $(OBJDIR)$Pi62_modpow2$O \
$(OBJDIR)$Phmac$O \ $(OBJDIR)$Phmac$O \
$(OBJDIR)$Phmac_ct$O \ $(OBJDIR)$Phmac_ct$O \
$(OBJDIR)$Paesctr_drbg$O \
$(OBJDIR)$Phmac_drbg$O \ $(OBJDIR)$Phmac_drbg$O \
$(OBJDIR)$Psysrng$O \ $(OBJDIR)$Psysrng$O \
$(OBJDIR)$Prsa_default_keygen$O \ $(OBJDIR)$Prsa_default_keygen$O \
@ -701,6 +702,9 @@ $(OBJDIR)$Phmac$O: src$Pmac$Phmac.c $(HEADERSPRIV)
$(OBJDIR)$Phmac_ct$O: src$Pmac$Phmac_ct.c $(HEADERSPRIV) $(OBJDIR)$Phmac_ct$O: src$Pmac$Phmac_ct.c $(HEADERSPRIV)
$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(INCFLAGS) $(CCOUT)$(OBJDIR)$Phmac_ct$O src$Pmac$Phmac_ct.c $(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(INCFLAGS) $(CCOUT)$(OBJDIR)$Phmac_ct$O src$Pmac$Phmac_ct.c
$(OBJDIR)$Paesctr_drbg$O: src$Prand$Paesctr_drbg.c $(HEADERSPRIV)
$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(INCFLAGS) $(CCOUT)$(OBJDIR)$Paesctr_drbg$O src$Prand$Paesctr_drbg.c
$(OBJDIR)$Phmac_drbg$O: src$Prand$Phmac_drbg.c $(HEADERSPRIV) $(OBJDIR)$Phmac_drbg$O: src$Prand$Phmac_drbg.c $(HEADERSPRIV)
$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(INCFLAGS) $(CCOUT)$(OBJDIR)$Phmac_drbg$O src$Prand$Phmac_drbg.c $(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(INCFLAGS) $(CCOUT)$(OBJDIR)$Phmac_drbg$O src$Prand$Phmac_drbg.c

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@ -170,6 +170,7 @@ coresrc=" \
src/int/i62_modpow2.c \ src/int/i62_modpow2.c \
src/mac/hmac.c \ src/mac/hmac.c \
src/mac/hmac_ct.c \ src/mac/hmac_ct.c \
src/rand/aesctr_drbg.c \
src/rand/hmac_drbg.c \ src/rand/hmac_drbg.c \
src/rand/sysrng.c \ src/rand/sysrng.c \
src/rsa/rsa_default_keygen.c \ src/rsa/rsa_default_keygen.c \

206
src/rand/aesctr_drbg.c Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,206 @@
/*
* Copyright (c) 2018 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
*
* Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
* a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
* "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
* without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
* distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
* permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
* the following conditions:
*
* The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
* included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
* EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
* NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
* BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
* ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
* CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
* SOFTWARE.
*/
#include "inner.h"
/* see bearssl_rand.h */
void
br_aesctr_drbg_init(br_aesctr_drbg_context *ctx,
const br_block_ctr_class *aesctr,
const void *seed, size_t len)
{
unsigned char tmp[16];
ctx->vtable = &br_aesctr_drbg_vtable;
memset(tmp, 0, sizeof tmp);
aesctr->init(&ctx->sk.vtable, tmp, 16);
ctx->cc = 0;
br_aesctr_drbg_update(ctx, seed, len);
}
/* see bearssl_rand.h */
void
br_aesctr_drbg_generate(br_aesctr_drbg_context *ctx, void *out, size_t len)
{
unsigned char *buf;
unsigned char iv[12];
buf = out;
memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv);
while (len > 0) {
size_t clen;
/*
* We generate data by blocks of at most 65280 bytes. This
* allows for unambiguously testing the counter overflow
* condition; also, it should work on 16-bit architectures
* (where 'size_t' is 16 bits only).
*/
clen = len;
if (clen > 65280) {
clen = 65280;
}
/*
* We make sure that the counter won't exceed the configured
* limit.
*/
if ((uint32_t)(ctx->cc + ((clen + 15) >> 4)) > 32768) {
clen = (32768 - ctx->cc) << 4;
if (clen > len) {
clen = len;
}
}
/*
* Run CTR.
*/
memset(buf, 0, clen);
ctx->cc = ctx->sk.vtable->run(&ctx->sk.vtable,
iv, ctx->cc, buf, clen);
buf += clen;
len -= clen;
/*
* Every 32768 blocks, we force a state update.
*/
if (ctx->cc >= 32768) {
br_aesctr_drbg_update(ctx, NULL, 0);
}
}
}
/* see bearssl_rand.h */
void
br_aesctr_drbg_update(br_aesctr_drbg_context *ctx, const void *seed, size_t len)
{
/*
* We use a Hirose construction on AES-256 to make a hash function.
* Function definition:
* - running state consists in two 16-byte blocks G and H
* - initial values of G and H are conventional
* - there is a fixed block-sized constant C
* - for next data block m:
* set AES key to H||m
* G' = E(G) xor G
* H' = E(G xor C) xor G xor C
* G <- G', H <- H'
* - once all blocks have been processed, output is H||G
*
* Constants:
* G_init = B6 B6 ... B6
* H_init = A5 A5 ... A5
* C = 01 00 ... 00
*
* With this hash function h(), we compute the new state as
* follows:
* - produce a state-dependent value s as encryption of an
* all-one block with AES and the current key
* - compute the new key as the first 128 bits of h(s||seed)
*
* Original Hirose article:
* https://www.iacr.org/archive/fse2006/40470213/40470213.pdf
*/
unsigned char s[16], iv[12];
unsigned char G[16], H[16];
int first;
/*
* Use an all-one IV to get a fresh output block that depends on the
* current seed.
*/
memset(iv, 0xFF, sizeof iv);
memset(s, 0, 16);
ctx->sk.vtable->run(&ctx->sk.vtable, iv, 0xFFFFFFFF, s, 16);
/*
* Set G[] and H[] to conventional start values.
*/
memset(G, 0xB6, sizeof G);
memset(H, 0x5A, sizeof H);
/*
* Process the concatenation of the current state and the seed
* with the custom hash function.
*/
first = 1;
for (;;) {
unsigned char tmp[32];
unsigned char newG[16];
/*
* Assemble new key H||m into tmp[].
*/
memcpy(tmp, H, 16);
if (first) {
memcpy(tmp + 16, s, 16);
first = 0;
} else {
size_t clen;
if (len == 0) {
break;
}
clen = len < 16 ? len : 16;
memcpy(tmp + 16, seed, clen);
memset(tmp + 16 + clen, 0, 16 - clen);
seed = (const unsigned char *)seed + clen;
len -= clen;
}
ctx->sk.vtable->init(&ctx->sk.vtable, tmp, 32);
/*
* Compute new G and H values.
*/
memcpy(iv, G, 12);
memcpy(newG, G, 16);
ctx->sk.vtable->run(&ctx->sk.vtable, iv,
br_dec32be(G + 12), newG, 16);
iv[0] ^= 0x01;
memcpy(H, G, 16);
H[0] ^= 0x01;
ctx->sk.vtable->run(&ctx->sk.vtable, iv,
br_dec32be(G + 12), H, 16);
memcpy(G, newG, 16);
}
/*
* Output hash value is H||G. We truncate it to its first 128 bits,
* i.e. H; that's our new AES key.
*/
ctx->sk.vtable->init(&ctx->sk.vtable, H, 16);
ctx->cc = 0;
}
/* see bearssl_rand.h */
const br_prng_class br_aesctr_drbg_vtable = {
sizeof(br_aesctr_drbg_context),
(void (*)(const br_prng_class **, const void *, const void *, size_t))
&br_aesctr_drbg_init,
(void (*)(const br_prng_class **, void *, size_t))
&br_aesctr_drbg_generate,
(void (*)(const br_prng_class **, const void *, size_t))
&br_aesctr_drbg_update
};

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@ -1074,6 +1074,41 @@ test_HMAC_DRBG(void)
fflush(stdout); fflush(stdout);
} }
static void
test_AESCTR_DRBG(void)
{
br_aesctr_drbg_context ctx;
const br_block_ctr_class *ictr;
unsigned char tmp1[64], tmp2[64];
printf("Test AESCTR_DRBG: ");
fflush(stdout);
ictr = br_aes_x86ni_ctr_get_vtable();
if (ictr == NULL) {
ictr = br_aes_pwr8_ctr_get_vtable();
if (ictr == NULL) {
#if BR_64
ictr = &br_aes_ct64_ctr_vtable;
#else
ictr = &br_aes_ct_ctr_vtable;
#endif
}
}
br_aesctr_drbg_init(&ctx, ictr, NULL, 0);
ctx.vtable->generate(&ctx.vtable, tmp1, sizeof tmp1);
ctx.vtable->update(&ctx.vtable, "new seed", 8);
ctx.vtable->generate(&ctx.vtable, tmp2, sizeof tmp2);
if (memcmp(tmp1, tmp2, sizeof tmp1) == 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "AESCTR_DRBG failure\n");
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
printf("done.\n");
fflush(stdout);
}
static void static void
do_KAT_PRF(br_tls_prf_impl prf, do_KAT_PRF(br_tls_prf_impl prf,
const char *ssecret, const char *label, const char *sseed, const char *ssecret, const char *label, const char *sseed,
@ -7965,6 +8000,7 @@ static const struct {
STU(multihash), STU(multihash),
STU(HMAC), STU(HMAC),
STU(HMAC_DRBG), STU(HMAC_DRBG),
STU(AESCTR_DRBG),
STU(PRF), STU(PRF),
STU(AES_big), STU(AES_big),
STU(AES_small), STU(AES_small),

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@ -684,7 +684,11 @@ test_speed_rsa_inner(char *name,
unsigned char tmp[sizeof RSA_N]; unsigned char tmp[sizeof RSA_N];
int i; int i;
long num; long num;
/*
br_hmac_drbg_context rng; br_hmac_drbg_context rng;
*/
br_aesctr_drbg_context rng;
const br_block_ctr_class *ictr;
memset(tmp, 'R', sizeof tmp); memset(tmp, 'R', sizeof tmp);
tmp[0] = 0; tmp[0] = 0;
@ -744,7 +748,21 @@ test_speed_rsa_inner(char *name,
fflush(stdout); fflush(stdout);
return; return;
} }
/*
br_hmac_drbg_init(&rng, &br_sha256_vtable, "RSA keygen seed", 15); br_hmac_drbg_init(&rng, &br_sha256_vtable, "RSA keygen seed", 15);
*/
ictr = br_aes_x86ni_ctr_get_vtable();
if (ictr == NULL) {
ictr = br_aes_pwr8_ctr_get_vtable();
if (ictr == NULL) {
#if BR_64
ictr = &br_aes_ct64_ctr_vtable;
#else
ictr = &br_aes_ct_ctr_vtable;
#endif
}
}
br_aesctr_drbg_init(&rng, ictr, "RSA keygen seed", 15);
num = 10; num = 10;
for (;;) { for (;;) {